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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended for the
second time in its sixty-four year history in 1993.1 It was specifically
amended, among other reasons, because of the pronounced chilling
See infra Part II.
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effects it had on plaintiffs bringing civil rights claims in the federal
courts.2 More specifically, many commentators believed that the threat
and, indeed, the disproportionate imposition of large Rule 11 sanctions
chilled creative advocacy by deterring civil rights plaintiffs and their
attorneys from filing meritorious claims in the federal courts.3
The amended Rule has been in effect for nine years now. 4
Unfortunately, based on the research conducted for this article, it does
not appear that the amendments have been successful in reducing the
Rule's chilling effects. Civil rights plaintiffs are still targeted for Rule 11
sanctions more frequently than other litigants in the federal courts, and
they are actually sanctioned at a much higher rate than any other
category of litigant.5 The following story is not an atypical one for a civil
rights plaintiff in the federal courts.6
An older white male believes that he has been passed up for
promotions at work because of his age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.7  He attempts to negotiate a
resolution with his employer, but negotiations fail. The employee files a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which,
after investigation, issues a right to sue/no position letter. The employee
retains counsel. To sue or not to sue-this is the dilemma. Much of the
relevant evidence is in the possession of the employer. The attorney
knows that a complaint is not sanctionable under Rule 11 if a plaintiff
indicates that his factual contentions are likely to have evidentiary
support. But some federal courts employ a heightened pleading
standard in civil rights cases, notwithstanding the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
2 See infra Part II.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 28-31; see also infra Part W.A.
4 The amendments took effect on December 1, 1993. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
5 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
6 This story is a hypothetical composite of various cases collected for this article. It does
not recount the actual conduct of any particular parties.
7 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") is an important response to
workplace discrimination; it is an attempt to further protect civil rights. It is interesting to
note, however, that most ADEA claims are actually brought by white males who hold
managerial or professional positions. See RHONDA REAVES, COST, CUSTOMER PREFERENCE
AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (2000) (contrasting the purpose of Title
VII, which is to protect traditionally marginalized groups, with what seems to be
happening under the ADEA, namely, that the ADEA is primarily being used by white
males to protect their wealth and privilege) (manuscript on file with author).
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Intelligence & Coordination Unit.8  After conducting a reasonable
investigation, the employee's attorney concludes that there is a plausible
basis for believing that a discrimination claim against the employer
exists and files a complaint. Two days after service, a warning letter is
sent by defense counsel stating that there is no basis for plaintiff's claims,
demanding withdrawal of the complaint, and threatening Rule 11
sanctions. Plaintiff does not withdraw his complaint. A few days later,
defendant files a motion to dismiss. Included in the motion is a request
for Rule 11 sanctions.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the federal district court
judge indicates to the parties that she is inclined to grant the defendant's
motion, including its request for sanctions, but feels constrained not to
until plaintiff has some opportunity for discovery. The judge therefore
indicates that she will wait for summary judgment but warns plaintiff
and plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff's claims seem shaky at best. The
judge denies defendant's motion to dismiss and its request for Rule 11
sanctions. Discovery commences. The litigation is intense and
sometimes heated on both sides. Discovery is taking several months; the
litigation is dragging on. Defense counsel sends a second warning letter
to plaintiff's counsel-if you do not dismiss the complaint with prejudice,
we will file a Rule 11 motion. Discovery does not reveal sufficient facts
to sustain plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff then files a motion to dismiss his
complaint. Defendant refuses to stipulate to the dismissal unless
plaintiff agrees to pay its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the
litigation. Plaintiff refuses.
At the hearing on plaintiff's motion, the judge issues an order to
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 11 for
filing the complaint. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is granted. After final
judgment is entered, defendant files its Rule 11 motion asking for all of
its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending the action. The district
court imposes Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff's attorney pursuant to
defendant's motion, finding that the warning letters sent by defense
counsel gave plaintiff sufficient notice of the potential problems with his
claims and ample time to amend or withdraw the complaint; the district
court makes no mention of the fact that no separate Rule 11 motion was
filed as required by the amended Rule or that the motion was filed after
8 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not permit
heightened pleading standards in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
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final judgment when there was no pleading, motion, or other paper for
the plaintiff to amend or withdraw. Alternatively, the court also imposes
Rule 11 sanctions pursuant to its order to show cause, perhaps
acknowledging that defendant's Rule 11 motion is procedurally
defective under the 1993 amendments to the Rule, or perhaps not. The
district court then awards all of the defendant's attorneys' fees and
expenses as an "appropriate" Rule 11 sanction.
Why have the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 not been more successful
in reducing the Rule's chilling effects? To begin with, the 1993
amendments could only be successful in this respect if all of the
following three factors had fallen into place. First, the causes of Rule 11's
chilling effects had to be identified and understood. Second, the 1993
amendments had to address those causes specifically. And, finally, the
federal courts had to interpret and apply the 1993 amendments in a
manner consistent with the Advisory Committee's intent to reduce Rule
11's chilling effects on civil rights plaintiffs in the federal courts. What
this last factor required, therefore, was strict construction and consistent
application of the revised Rule by the federal courts. Unfortunately,
these requirements do not appear to have been achieved in practice.
To unravel these three factors and to fully answer the question of
why the 1993 amendments have not been more successful in eliminating
or reducing Rule 11's chilling effects, we must start at the beginning.
Part II of this Article, therefore, provides a brief history of Rule 11
leading up to the 1993 amendments. 9 It focuses in some detail on Rule
11's chilling effects on civil rights claims as probably the most troubling
problem caused by the 1983 version of the Rule; it then examines the
causes of the Rule's chilling effects and the specific ways that the 1993
amendments were supposed to address those causes. Part III then
examines Rule 11 practice in six federal circuits10 to see how the federal
courts have been interpreting and applying the 1993 amendments.1 In
Part III.A, case law from the federal circuit courts of appeals is
9 See infra Part II.
10 The six circuits are the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Three
of the circuits, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth, were selected because they were surveyed in a
Rule 11 study conducted by the American Judicature Society in 1992 (the "AJS study"). See
Lawrence Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 949-50 (1992).
The AJS study, therefore, will hopefully provide a useful comparison for the more recent
data collected. The remaining circuits, the Second, Third, and Sixth, were selected because
of the significant amount of Rule 11 activity generated in those circuits. Id.
11 See infra Part III.
2002] Rule 11
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analyzed.12  This Part concludes by finding that there are mixed
messages being sent by the federal appellate courts. For example, the
circuit courts, for the most part, seem to require strict compliance with
many of the procedural requirements of the 1993 amendments, but not
always. Significant intracircuit as well as some intercircuit conflicts exist
with respect to important provisions of the 1993 Rule. In Part III.B, case
law from the federal district courts within the six circuits selected is
analyzed.13 Troubling trends, including problematic uses of the order to
show cause procedure and a continued emphasis on monetary sanctions
as the sanction of choice for Rule 11 violations, which are suggested by
the appellate court opinions, are more pronounced at the district court
level.
Based on the case law research in Part III, Part IV ultimately
concludes that Rule 11's chilling effects continue in the federal courts
and attempts to explain why.14 Part IV.A examines the specific impact
these chilling effects have, and will continue to have, on civil rights
plaintiffs.15  Part LV.B then considers whether Rule 11 should be
amended further or repealed1 6 Since neither option is one that appears
to be currently on the table, Part IV.C suggests that the federal courts
adopt high sanctioning thresholds in interpreting Rule 11 and for
imposing Rule 11 sanctions.17 Part IV.C explicitly recognizes that high
sanctioning thresholds privilege some values, like access to court, over
others, like efficiency.18 This privileging of access to the federal courts,
however, is intentional, because I find enduring value in access to court
for civil rights plaintiffs and, indeed, for all non-mainstream or
marginalized litigants asserting novel theories that challenge existing
power structures and our present conceptions of the world.
II. TRYING TO AVOID THE PITFALLS: THE 1993 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 11
The federal district courts have a panoply of sanctioning provisions
at their disposal to control not only the litigation before them but also the
litigants and attorneys participating in the proceedings as well.19 But
12 See infra Part III.A.
13 See infra Part III.B.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See infra Part IV.A.
16 See infra Part IV.B.
17 See infra Part IV.C.
is See infra Part IV.C.
19 According to the United States Supreme Court,
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perhaps no provision is as well known or as controversial as Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20 Rule 11 has gone through three
different incarnations in its sixty-four year history. As originally enacted
in 1938, Rule 11 was designed to "promote honesty in pleading" and
required a finding of subjective bad faith before sanctions could be
imposed.21 Because bad faith was hard to prove and courts were
A district court can punish contempt of its authority, including
disobedience of its process, by fine or imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 401;
award costs, expenses, and attorney's fees against attorneys who
multiply proceedings vexatiously, 28 U.S.C. § 1927; sanction a party
and/or the party's attorney for filing groundless pleadings, motions,
or other papers, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11; sanction a party and/or his
attorney for failure to abide by a pretrial order, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
16(f); sanction a party and/or his attorney for baseless discovery
requests or objections, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(g); award expenses
caused by a failure to attend a deposition or to serve a subpoena on a
party to be deposed, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 30(g); award expenses when
a party fails to respond to discovery requests or fails to participate in
the framing of a discovery plan, Fed Rule Civ. Proc. 37(d) and (g);
dismiss an action or claim of a party that fails to prosecute, to comply
with the Federal Rules, or to obey an order of the court, Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 41(b); punish any person who fails to obey a subpoena, Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 45(f); award expenses and/or contempt damages when a
party presents an affidavit in a summary judgment motion in bad faith
or for the purpose of delay, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(g); and make rules
governing local practice that are not inconsistent with the Federal
Rules, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81.
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 62 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
20 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision to Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 171 (1994)
[hereinafter Tobias, Revision] ("The 1983 revision of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ... proved to be the most controversial amendment in the long history of the
Federal Rules."); Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 857 (1992)
[hereinafter Tobias, Reconsidering]. Tobias explains that
Rule 11 has sparked intense debate among the bench, the bar, and
writers and has prompted five major studies of its implementation.
Judges have issued approximately 2,000 reported opinions, thousands
of unreported determinations, and many additional unpublished
decisions. There has also been much informal Rule 11 activity.
Indeed, the Rule's influence is so pervasive that federal court
practitioners ignore it at their peril.
Tobias, Reconsidering, supra. See also Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and
Lawyers' Responses to the Courts: The 1993 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1629, 1630 (1994) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("By far the most
visible and controversial sanctioning mechanism.., is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure....").
21 Karen Kessler Cain, Frivolous Litigation, Discretionary Sanctioning and A Safe Harbor:
The 1993 Revision of Rule 11, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 207, 209 (1994).
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reluctant to impose sanctions, the 1938 version of Rule 11 was rarely
used.z2
In response to a purported "litigation explosion" in the federal
courts,23 Rule 11 was amended in 1983 as part of a package of
22 Id. ("From 1950 to 1976 only nineteen Rule 11 motions were reported."); see also
Georgine M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191 (1988) [hereinafter
Vairo, Critical] (stating that the 1938 version of Rule 11 was "largely ignored"); James R.
Simpson, Why Change Rule 11? Ramifications of the 1992 Amendment Proposal, 29 CAL. W. L.
REV. 495, 496 (1993) ("Due to the difficulty in proving subjective bad faith, the rule was
rarely invoked during its first 45 years prior to the 1983 amendment."); Howard A. Cutler,
Comment, A Practitioner's Guide to the 1993 Amendment to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 265, 273 (1994).
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938,
Rule 11 provided that the attorney's signature served as certification
that there was an adequate foundation in fact and law to support the
paper and that it was not filed simply to cause delay. Since the rule
required a showing of subjective bad faith to trigger sanctions, and
since this showing was very difficult and time-consuming, the rule
was rarely invoked prior to the 1983 amendment.
Cutler, supra, at 273 (footnote omitted).
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in
deterring abuses .... There has been considerable confusion as to (1)
the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or
taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of
attorneys who sign pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of
available and appropriate motions.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983 amendment) (citations
omitted). See also Marshall, supra note 10, at 947 (1992) ("Clearly, the nature of
the rules and the general judicial reluctance to sanction attorneys led to the very
low incidence of sanctions prior to 1983.").
23 Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 485 (1988/1989)
[hereinafter Tobias, Litigation] ("The [1983] amendment's adoption was prompted by
increasing concern about abuse of the litigation process and about the 'litigation
explosion'-the perception that unprecedented numbers of civil cases were being filed and
that too many lacked merit.").
Beginning in the late 1970s, a chorus of complaints arose about
increasing litigation abuse and judges' reluctance to impose sanctions.
It is difficult to identify the factual basis for the complaints of abuse.
However, it is clear that the volume of civil litigation in the federal
courts ... had increased and with it the volume of complaints. A
number of other factors may also have had an impact: the appearance
of new causes of action, such as those created by civil rights, labor,
environmental, and securities law, and novel theories of recovery; the
expanding use of class actions; and the steep increase in the number of
lawyers, particularly those engaged in litigation. As a result, litigation
activity mushroomed.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 8
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amendments designed to give federal district courts more authority to
control litigation. 24 Rule 11's primary purpose was to deter frivolous
lawsuits. 25 The 1983 version of the Rule achieved, and continues to
achieve, many salutary results. More specifically, "Rule 11 in the federal
courts deters careless and ill-conceived filings to a measurable extent.
Rule 11 has made attorneys 'stop, look and inquire' before filing. That is
William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 7, 8 (1994) (footnote
omitted). But see infra text accompanying notes 526-27 (questioning whether a litigation
explosion in the federal courts ever existed).
24 Eric K. Yamamoto, Case Management and the Hawaii Courts: The Evolving Role of the
Managerial Judge in Civil Litigation, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 395, 430 (1987) [hereinafter Yamamoto,
Case Management].
Apart from relying heavily on sanctions to reduce expense and delay,
the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules sought to confirm the
authority, and underscore the responsibility, of trial judges actively to
manage the pretrial process .... Seen as a package, the 1983 ... rule
reforms sought to reduce expense and delay through open-textured
rules that gave judges broad discretion to control the pretrial stage of
litigation as well as authority to impose sanctions for perceived misuse
of the generous pleading and discovery procedures in civil litigation.
Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The
United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 679 (1997).
25 Cutler, supra note 22, at 273.
In the early 1980s, .. . the federal courts experienced a "litigation
explosion" marked by overuse of the federal judicial system and
abusive litigation practices. In response to this litigation abuse, the
Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States
Supreme Court proposed an amendment to Rule 11 which became
effective in August 1983. The 1983 amendment was designed to curb
abusive litigation tactics in the federal courts, reduce costly,
unnecessary litigation, and ultimately streamline federal litigation by
forcing attorneys to stop and think before filing a pleading.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Cain, supra note 21, at 207 ("In 1983, an amended version of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was enacted as one means of deterring
abusive litigious behavior."). The Advisory Committee commenting on the 1983
amendments stated,
The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to
impose sanctions ... by emphasizing the responsibilities of the
attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the imposition of
sanctions.
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by building
upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court to
award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose
opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation ....
Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses
and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage
dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process
by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (citations omitted).
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for the better. Fewer meritless positions are asserted and litigated.
Groundless motions and nuisance value claims are discouraged." 26 But
the 1983 version of Rule 11 engendered at least as many problems as it
purported to solve:
Federal Rule 11's curb on "litigation abuse," ... has
come at an apparently steep price. Judges, attorneys,
litigants and scholars complain about excessive Rule 11
litigation, about heightened adversariness, about Rule 11
as a strategic weapon, about the inhibition of creative
lawyering and about diminished access to the
courthouse for "marginal" litigants.27
26 Eric K. Yamamoto & Danielle K. Hart, Rule 11 and State Courts: Panacea or Pandora's
Box?, 13 UNIv. HAW. L. REV. 57, 60-61 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
The authors of three substantial rule 11 studies have stated that the
amendment has helped to refocus the attention of the federal bench
and bar on sanctions, making the judiciary and lawyers keenly aware
of their importance ... . Judge Schwarzer has observed that "rule 11
has raised the consciousness of lawyers to the need for a careful
prefiling investigation of the facts and inquiry into the law," that the
amendment "has accomplished its drafters' purpose of causing
lawyers to 'stop and think' before filing," and that awareness of the
rule's requirements, 'certainly has deterred some frivolous, wasteful or
abusive litigation." Thus, certain of the revision's purposes have been
attained and even the primary problem that prompted the 1983
amendment, the deterrence of abuse, has been ameliorated ....
Tobias, Litigation, supra note 23, at 513-14 (footnotes omitted). See also Marshall, supra note
10, at 964 (describing a survey conducted of lawyers practicing in the Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals by the American Judicature Society in which lawyers were
asked, "'What is the biggest impact, if any, of the sanctioning provisions of Rule 11 on your
practice?'" and "the leading response ... was that Rule 11 has generated increased factual
investigation before the filing of cases and pleadings, with 22.9% of the respondents citing
this as the biggest impact of the Rule").
27 Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 60-61 (footnotes omitted). Professor Vairo
discusses the "cottage industry" created by the 1983 version of Rule 11 in more detail:
From 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted,
to 1983, there were only a handful of reported Rule 11 decisions.
During the first three and a half years after 1983, when Rule 11 was
amended, 688 Rule 11 decisions were published-496 district court
opinions and 192 circuit court opinions. By the end of 1990, over 3,000
cases had been reported.
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.
475, 480 (1991) [hereinafter Vairo, Where We Are].
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One of the most troubling aspects of the 1983 version of Rule 11 was
its "chilling effects." 28 These chilling effects essentially took two distinct
but related forms. First, Rule 11 stifled the development of the common
law by "inhibit[ing] vigorous and creative lawyering," thereby chilling
creative advocacy.29 More specifically, because of the threat of Rule 11
sanctions, lawyers were much less likely to file some novel but
meritorious claims that they might otherwise have pursued and/or to
make novel legal arguments that may well have prevailed in court.30
Second, Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact on certain types of
litigants and their attorneys; the threat of sanctions "pose[d] special
threats to small plaintiffs' attorneys and to public interest and pro bono
attorneys, thereby inhibiting court access for certain social groups,
especially those asserting novel legal theories or reordered social
understandings in the form of legal rights."31
28 Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 105 (1991)
[hereinafter Tobias, Recalibrated] ("The most controversial aspect of the implementation of
these revisions has been judicial enforcement of [the 1983 version of] Rule 11 in ways that
disadvantage or 'chill' civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys.").
29 Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 61.
30 Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1642-43; see also infra notes 45-46 and
accompanying text.
31 Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 101; Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1643
("Commentators have also observed that plaintiffs-especially civil rights plaintiffs-feel the
chill most acutely, because it is upon them that sanctions disproportionately fall."); Vairo,
Mhere We Are, supra note 27, at 483.
Critics feared that Rule 11 would be used to chill access to the federal
courts because the rule would be employed aggressively by defense
attorneys against litigants like ... Linda Brown. The reported cases
justify those fears and suggest that [the 1983 version of] Rule 11 is
being used disproportionately against plaintiffs, and particularly in
certain types of litigation such as civil rights, employment
discrimination, securities fraud cases brought by investors, and
antitrust cases brought by smaller companies.
Vairo, here We Are, supra note 27, at 483 (footnotes omitted). See also Scott Nehrbass, The
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Balancing the Goal of Deterrence with
Considerations of Due Process and Fairness, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 199, 207 (1992) ("[B]etween
1984 and 1989, more published Rule 11 opinions involved civil rights cases than any other
type of lawsuit."); Christopher D. Wolek, Practice and Procedure: The "Safe-Harbor"
Amendment to Rule 11 ... Any Port in a Storm?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 323 (1994) ("Rule 11
sanctions in Oklahoma's district courts, as well as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, tend
to reflect the [Advisory] Committee's criticisms on a smaller scale. Plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
counsel have received the overwhelming majority of Rule 11 sanctions in Oklahoma
district courts since 1983.") (footnotes omitted). See generally Tobias, Recalibrated, supra note
28; Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REV.
1775 (1992) [hereinafter, Tobias, Plaintiffs]. See also infra text accompanying notes 34-44.
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In 1990, as a result of these and other problems created by the 1983
version of the Rule, the Advisory Committee issued a call for written
comments on Rule 11.32 The Advisory Committee seemed to be
particularly interested in receiving comments regarding Rule 11's
chilling effect on the assertion of meritorious claims by certain kinds of
litigants. Of the ten questions on which the Advisory Committee sought
comments, three dealt directly with Rule 11's chilling effects.33
Several informal and formal studies of Rule 11 were conducted.34
The early studies found that plaintiffs were sanctioned much more
32 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Call for Written Comments on Rule I1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 335, 344-45 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments]. The Advisory
Committee solicited comments on ten different issues. Id. at 345.
33 The three questions were as follows:
4. Is there evidence that the sanctions rules have been administered
unfairly to any particular group of lawyers or parties? Particular
concern has been expressed about the effect on civil rights plaintiffs.
5. It has been suggested that there may be a risk of unfairness to
groups even if the sanctions rules are administered with
unexceptionable even-handedness by the courts. Such unfairness
could accrue from differences in the circumstances of parties and
lawyers.
Do the sanctions provisions bear, for example, more heavily on
plaintiffs' lawyers than defendants' lawyers?
Differing systems of professional compensation may also cause
differences in effects of sanctions on lawyer conduct. Perhaps a pro
bono lawyer may be more affected by the threat of evenly-
administered sanctions than a lawyer representing a client willing and
able to invest great resources to wear down a financially weak
adversary, and to bear the cost of any sanction imposed ....
6. Concern has also been expressed about the appropriateness of the
size of some sanctions imposed under the rules .... It has been urged
that to require a lawyer to bear the adversary's full legal expenses
through discovery and trial because of the lawyer's signing of a
pleading with inadequate pre-filing investigation could in some cases
be excessive, resulting in "over-deterrence" causing lawyers to be
reluctant to assert even marginally well-founded contentions for fear
of a sanction colossal in relation to potential benefit to the client
served. This effect could combine with that previously stated; large
sanctions may be more likely to over-deter lawyers of modest
resources, or small firms, than large firms better able to distribute the
risk of occasional large sanctions .... These concerns for over-
deterrence embody the related concern that the rule may have a
"chilling effect" on the assertion of meritorious claims or defenses
generally, or of some particular category of claims or defenses ....
Call for Comments, supra note 32, at 347.
34 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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frequently than defendants, particularly in civil rights cases. For
example,
Professor Nelken, who conducted one early survey,
determined that 22.4 percent of the cases in which rule
11 motions were lodged from 1983 to 1985 involved civil
rights, although civil rights claims comprised only 7.65
percent of the civil docket, and that defendants invoked
the amendment substantially more often than plaintiffs
.... Professor Vairo who undertook a study of all the
reported opinions between August 1983 and
December 15, 1987 has offered more disconcerting data.
She found that "[the 1983 version of] rule 11 is being
used disproportionately against [civil rights] plaintiffs,"
that they were being sanctioned at a rate 17 percent
greater than plaintiffs in all other lawsuits .... The
Third Circuit Task Force which examined all rule 11
activity within its geographic scope from July 1, 1987
until June 30, 1988 determined that civil rights plaintiffs
and/or their lawyers were sanctioned "at a rate (8/17 or
47.1%) that is considerably higher than the rate (6/71 or
8.45%) for plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases," .... 35
More recent studies provide somewhat conflicting information.36
The results are probably conflicting, however, because of the very
different perspectives being surveyed. In one study, conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center in 1990 (the "FJC study"), federal district court
judges were questioned.37 In another study, conducted by the American
Judicature Society and published in 1992 (the "AJS study"), attorneys
practicing in three federal circuits were surveyed.38 What is particularly
35 Tobias, Litigation, supra note 23, at 490-91 (footnotes omitted); see also Yamamoto &
Hart, supra note 26, at 103-04.
36 See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
37 In the FJC study, the Center conducted three different analyses of the effects of Rule
11 in the federal courts. Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., The Federal Judicial Center's Study of Rule
11, 2 FJC DIREcTIONS 3, 3 (Nov. 1991). First, the Center conducted "an in-depth study of
Rule 11 activity in cases filed in five federal district courts: Arizona, the District of
Columbia, Northern Georgia, Eastern Michigan, and Western Texas." Id. Second, the
Center "reviewed all opinions involving Rule 11 activity published in federal reporters
from 1984 through 1989." Id. Third, the Center "surveyed all United States district court
judges about their experience with Rule 11." Id.
The American Judicature Society commissioned a study of the Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits. Marshall, supra note 10, at 949-50. Twelve-page surveys were then sent to
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striking about the FJC and AJS studies is the very different perceptions of
Rule 11's impact on the actual practice of law between judges (the FJC
study) and lawyers (the AJS study).39 For example, the FJC study, which
focused on federal district court judges' reactions to Rule 11,40 concluded
that sanctions were sought more often against plaintiffs than defendants
and that motions for sanctions against plaintiffs were more likely to be
granted than those against defendants. 41 The FJC study also concluded,
the lead attorneys on 400 randomly selected cases during the calendar year 1989-90. Id.
The response rate "was a remarkable 74.9%, or 3,358 respondents out of 4,494 attorneys
surveyed." Id.
39 That federal court judges and the attorneys practicing before them have different
perceptions of Rule 11's chilling effects, and impact more generally, is not new. Discussing
the 1983 version of Rule 11, Professor Tobias wrote that
Judge Schwarzer remarks that, while rule 11's unpredictability could
have a chilling effect, "lawyers should have little to fear in light of the
type of conduct that courts have punished [and my] own experience
has disclosed no anecdotal evidence of chilling." It is easy enough for
federal judges to say that lawyers have little fear, but civil rights
practitioners justifiably remain concerned about precisely what activity
could be held to contravene the amendment and about the size of the
awards that might be imposed .... As to Judge Schwarzer's second
contention that he has observed no chilling, there is little reason why
the experience of a federal judge who rigorously applies rule 11 would
reveal a chilling effect. Thus, his failure to detect any is unremarkable,
if not irrelevant, yet evidence of chilling has been reported, appears to
be increasing, and is being collected.
Tobias, Litigation, supra note 23, at 508 (footnotes omitted). See also Donna Marino, Rule 11
and Public Interest Litigation: The Trend Toward Limiting Access to the Federal Courts, 44
RUTGERS L. REV. 923, 976-77 (1992).
Indeed, judges may view Rule 11 constraints in a very different
manner than the attorney or represented party who must bear the
consequences the rule imposes. Judge William Schwarzer of the
Northern District of California comments that judges "have a
somewhat different perspective from that of lawyers, formed by daily
exposure to a constant flow of poorly prepared, ill-considered, and
often misleading ... papers." A judge's primary focus may be
expediting the litigation, while an attorney's objective is to prevail on
behalf of his client; these conflicting duties are bound to clash, creating
conflicts between judge, attorney, and client.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
40 The FJC study also monitored federal court docket sheets. See Marshall, supra note 10,
at 949 n.31.
41 Wiggins, supra note 37, at 19.
Across the five districts, Rule 11 motions/orders targeted the plaintiff
slightly or significantly more frequently than the defendant. And in all
districts, orders that imposed sanctions also targeted the plaintiff more
frequently than the defendant. Given that more of the motions
targeted the plaintiff, it is to be expected that more of the orders that
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however, that civil rights plaintiffs were not disproportionately impacted
by Rule 11.42 Like the FJC study, the AJS study also found that plaintiffs
and their counsel were the target of Rule 11 sanction activity to a far
greater extent than defendants and their counsel.4 3 Unlike the FJC study,
however, the AJS study concluded that civil rights cases were
disproportionately impacted by Rule 11. According to that study,
One of the recurring criticisms of Rule 11 is that courts
have applied it unevenly against lawyers engaged in
imposed sanctions would also target the plaintiff. In all districts,
however, it appears that the difference in number of motions filed
against the plaintiff and defendant do not fully account for the
difference in the number of sanctions imposed.
Id.
42 Id. at 22-23.
Analyzing the overall incidence of Rule 11 motions/orders and the
imposition rate of sanctions in civil rights cases does not give a
complete picture of the impact of the rule .... We therefore examined
how frequently represented plainitffs and their attorneys in civil rights
cases encounter Rule 11 motions/orders and at what rate courts grant
such motions.
We found that the percentage of motions/orders that targeted
represented plaintiffs or their attorneys in civil rights cases was similar
to or was slightly to significantly lower than that in the other types of
cases with substantial Rule 11 activity in four of the five district [courts
studied]. In the fifth district, the percentage in civil rights cases was
slightly to significantly higher than that in other types of cases.
We also found that in each district, the imposition rate for
represented civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys was comparable
with or slightly to significantly lower than that for all other types of
litigants and cases.
Id. Judge Schwarzer argues that "[tlo examine Rule 11 through the lens of civil rights cases
alone affords a misleading view. Those cases represent only a small piece of the universe
of litigation in which Rule 11 operates." Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 34. In interpreting the
FJC study, Judge Schwarzer argues further that "[tihe evidence, moreover, shows that civil
rights cases have not been disproportionately impacted and that much of the sanctions
activity was directed at plaintiffs who were not represented by counsel." Id. Significantly,
in response to the comments it received, the Advisory Committee specifically asked "the
FJC to refine certain aspects of its preliminary analysis," namely its data regarding
sanctions in civil rights cases. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 20, at 863 & n.42.
43 Marshall, supra note 10, at 952-53.
We also found, as has been widely reported, that plaintiffs' counsel has
been the target of sanction activity to a far greater extent than defense
counsel ... [T]he plaintiff's side was the target of sanctions in 70.3% of
the cases in which sanctions were imposed. With regard to formal
Rule 11 activity not leading to sanctions, the plaintiff's side was the
target in 57.6% of the cases in which such activity occurred.
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certain kinds of practices, particularly lawyers
representing civil rights plaintiffs . . . . The most
interesting findings on this issue relate, as expected, to
the frequency of civil rights cases as compared to other
types of cases. Although civil rights cases made up
11.4% of federal cases filed, our survey shows that 22.7%
of the cases in which sanctions had been imposed were
civil rights cases. This frequency is quite dramatic when
compared to contracts cases and personal injury cases;
contracts cases represent 23.0% of cases filed but account
for only 15.9% of sanctions; personal injury cases
constitute 19.2% of cases but account for only 15.1% of
sanctions. In this regard, our evidence tends to confirm
the commentary about Rule 11's disproportionate
impact on civil rights cases. 44
In a related and important vein, two additional findings by the AJS
study suggest that Rule 11 also appeared to be chilling creative
advocacy, especially in the area of civil rights. First, that study found
that "19.3% of respondents [i.e., practicing lawyers] decided not to assert
a claim or defense that they felt had potential merit" because of Rule
11. 45 Second, the study found that Rule 11 dramatically impacted the
way in which civil rights plaintiffs' attorneys practiced law with 31% of
these lawyers stating that they "decided not to assert a claim or defense
that [they] felt had potential merit."46
44 Id. at 965-66 (footnote omitted). Professor Tobias states the case made by the AJS
study more forcefully. Indeed, he argues that the AJS study shows that Rule 11 as applied
has disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs more than any other category of civil litigant. See
generally Tobias, Plaintiffs, supra note 31.
45 Marshall, supra note 10, at 961. With respect to the AJS study, Rule 11 and civil rights
litigation, Professor Tobias writes that the AJS study "indicates that judges sanction civil
rights plaintiffs as frequently as all other classifications of parties and that the Rule has led
civil rights attorneys to advise clients to abandon perfectly meritorious claims." Tobias,
Plaintiffs, supra note 31, at 1775; see also Charles M. Yablon, The Good, The Bad, and the
Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 85 (1996).
46 Marshall, supra note 10, at 971.
[W]ith respect to civil rights cases, one reason that civil rights lawyers-
plaintiffs' side and defense side combined-do not display a
dramatically increased level of reaction to Rule 11 is that civil rights
defense lawyers appear to be disproportionately unaffected by Rule 11.
As the figures presented in Table Fourteen reveal, respondents who
identified themselves as spending more than 50% of their time doing
civil rights plaintiffs' work were far more likely to be affected by Rule
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After reviewing the extensive commentary and other evidence
received as a result of its Call for Comments, 47 the Advisory Committee
found support for five propositions, two of which are particularly
important here. First, the Advisory Committee concluded that "Rule 11,
in conjunction with other rules, has tended to impact plaintiffs more
frequently and severely than defendants." 48 Second, the Committee also
concluded that "[Rule 11] occasionally has created problems for a party
which seeks to assert novel legal contentions or which needs discovery
from other persons to determine if the party's belief about the facts can
be supported with evidence." 49
Rule 11 was therefore amended in 1993 for the second time in its
sixty-four year history.50 The 1993 amendments were specifically
designed to redress, 51 among other things, the Rule's chilling effects.5 2
11 than other lawyers in virtually every response category that was
measured. For example, 44% of the self-identified civil rights
plaintiffs' lawyers reported that they had advised a client not to
pursue a lawsuit that had little or no merit, compared to 13.2% of those
who spend most of their time on civil rights defense work. That this
disparity is not attributable purely to the plaintiff orientation of this
specific question can be seen by looking at the response rates to the
question of whether the lawyer decided not to assert a claim or defense
that the lawyer felt had potential merit. This question is not
particularly plaintiff oriented, yet 31% of civil rights plaintiffs' lawyers
reported having taken this action, compared to 17.9% of those who do
civil rights work on the defense side. Similarly, 24% of civil rights
plaintiffs' lawyers reported that they had not filed particular papers
that they would have liked to file, compared to 10% of those doing
civil rights defense work. Indeed, this may be one of the only classes
of lawyers whose behavior tends to mirror the relatively low risk of
sanctions they face. It is with respect to this substantial disparity in
effect between plaintiffs' lawyers and defense lawyers that the civil
rights area emerges as unique. This can be seen by considering how
Rule 11 has affected plaintiffs' and defense counsel differently in the
other category containing a particularly high level of Rule 11 activity-
the category labelled "other commercial cases."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
47 See generally Tobias, Revision, supra note 20 (setting forth a very good overview of the
entire amendment process). See also Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 27.
4 Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 64 (1991).
49 Id.
50 The amendments took effect on December 1, 1993. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See generally
Tobias, Revision, supra note 20 (discussing the amendment process); Vairo, Where We Are,
supra note 27 (explaining the Rule 11 amendment process).
51 According to Schwarzer, "[tlhe overriding purpose of the 1993 amendments was, as
the 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes ... state, to remedy the problems perceived to have
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To understand how the amendments to Rule 11 were supposed to
alleviate the Rule's chilling effects, it is necessary and important to
understand what caused these effects in the first place.5 3
It appears that Rule 11's chilling effects can be traced to several, and
sometimes related, causes including: the amount of discretion
committed to federal district court judges, inconsistent application of the
Rule, lack of uniform sanctioning procedures, insufficiently rigorous
appellate review, the use of Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device, and a
substantive bias in the federal courts against certain civil rights
plaintiffs.54 First, significant parts of a Rule 11 decision were left to the
discretion of the federal district courts. Although the Rule made
sanctions mandatory upon a finding that it had been violated, it was the
district court judges who determined, in the first instance, whether Rule
11 had been violated and, if so, what "appropriate" sanction should be
imposed.55 The discretion vested in the district courts was viewed by
arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of Rule 11." Schwarzer,
supra note 23, at 12; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("This revision is
intended to remedy problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the
1983 revision of the rule.").
52 Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1651 ("The 1993 Amendments seek to ...
reduce the Rule's chilling effects.").
One pervasive theme in [Advisory] Committee deliberations was a
concerted effort to respond to criticism of the current Rule. Many
members expressly stated that they were attempting to be responsive,
and many suggestions testify to this. For instance, concern about
chilling, satellite litigation, and judicial economy underlay inclusion of
safe harbors and efforts to limit reliance on monetary sanctions.
Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 20, at 891. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, advisory committee's note
("This revision is intended to remedy problems that have arisen in the interpretation and
application of the 1983 revision of the rule.").
53 The reason for this conclusion is simple-if the causes of the chilling effects were not
addressed by the amendments, it would be impossible that the amendments could
successfully address the Rule's adverse effects.
5 These causes were also responsible for the other problems created by the 1983 version
of Rule 11. See, e.g., Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 62 (stating that "Rule 11's
identified problems in the federal court [which would include the Rule's chilling effects]
are traceable to several sources" including low sanctioning thresholds, inconsistent
application of the Rule, and "conflicts about values of court access").
55 Tobias, Recalibrated, supra note 28, at 107 ("Application of the Rule is a two-stage
process: determining whether it has been violated, and, if so, selecting the appropriate
sanction."); cf. Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the 1993
Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFsTRA L. REV. 677, 695 (1996) [hereinafter Armour, Practice];
Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 82 ("The rule provides little guidance to the trial court
about what constitutes an 'appropriate' sanction.").
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/8
2002] Rule 11 19
many as the most problematic aspect of the federal courts' sanctioning
practice,5 6 primarily because sanctioning decisions are inherently
subjective. 57 Judges themselves disagree on whether a given fact pattern
violates Rule 11.58 Indeed, the FJC study found that in nineteen percent
of the Rule 11 cases appealed, the federal appellate courts reversed the
district courts' Rule 11 decisions based on the merits of the underlying
substantive claim.5 9  These cases were "particularly troublesome,"
according to the Federal Judicial Center, because, "[n]ot only was the
A substantial body of the critical commentary focused on "fine tuning"
the Rule's application on a case by case basis and improving the
courts' sanctions practice. There was, however, a more fundamental
concern raised by some critics: the discretionary nature of the courts'
decisions whether or not to deem a claim legally or factually frivolous,
the threshold liability issue. These critics were concerned that the lack
of doctrinal limitations in the Rule generated inconsistent and
conflicting case law and gave undue play to the individual judge's
normative assumptions about worthy litigation.
Armour, Practice, supra, at 695.
56 This frequent criticism prompted the Advisory Committee to ask whether
the rule leaves more discretion with the district courts than is
necessary or desirable, or perhaps tolerable .... The Civil Rules have
generally favored judicial discretion as a means to secure just results
and have avoided procedural rigidity. On the other hand,
indeterminancy in the sanctions rules can weaken their instructive
value .... There may ... be a greater injustice associated with a
relatively indeterminate rule that gives rise to punitive consequences
Call for Comments, supra note 32, at 349 (question #9).
57 See, e.g., Armour, Practice, supra note 55, at 695-96 ("[Wihat was most problematic in
the courts' sanction practice was the extent to which the courts' subjective judgments were
inevitably involved in the interpretation and application of the Rule."); Simpson, supra note
22, at 499 ("While the Rule applies an objective standard to judge the reasonableness of a
pleading, reasonableness is determined through a judge's subjective beliefs.").
58 Simpson, supra note 22, at 499.
A study that presented 292 judges with ten hypothetical Rule 11
situations found that almost half of the judges would have awarded
sanctions while the other half would have found merit. Such a
remarkable conflict in application obviously causes attorneys to file
only safe claims to avoid the chance of sanctions.
Id. "One influential study found that judges surveyed nationwide disagreed substantially
on the frivolity of ten sample cases, suggesting that sanctioning was very subjective and
dependent upon differences between individual judges." Developments in the Law, supra
note 20, at 1650.
59 Wiggins, supra note 37, at 15.
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claim or defense underlying the sanctions motions arguable, the
appellate court found it to be meritorious." 60
The corollary problem spawned by these subjective interpretations
of the Rule, therefore, was inconsistent application of the Rule both
within and among the various federal circuits in practice. 61 Significantly,
60 Id. at 16.
61 Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation ofAmerican Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule
11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930-31 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, Transformation]. Professor
Burbank noted,
Even after a six-year period ... there is a conflict between or among
circuits on practically every important question of interpretation and
policy under [the 1983 version of] the Rule, from the content of the
duties imposed on a person who signs a paper filed in the district
court, to the procedural rights of those who may be sanctioned, the
persons or entities on whom sanctions may be imposed, the
standard(s) of appellate review, and even to whether sanctions are in
fact mandatory for a violation. Moreover, intracircuit conflicts are not
uncommon, and in a number of circuits there is no appellate law at all
on numerous important questions of interpretation.
Id. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1649-50.
Rule 11's "utter unpredictability" is not only a concern in its own right,
but it also aggravates other problems presented by the Rule.
Inconsistency arguably ... increases the ex ante risk that meritorious
conduct will be sanctioned and hence the chilling effect of sanctions,
and increases the arbitrariness and hence the potential unfairness of
sanctions .... The frequent claims of inconsistency seem to have some
empirical basis. Sanction imposition rates vary drastically among
judicial districts, as does the frequency with which judges impose sua
sponte sanctions.
Id. See also Tobias, Recalibrated, supra note 28, at 120-21.
[S]ubstantial variations exist within and among the circuits and
probably will persist. Differently constituted panels in the same circuit
may issue quite dissimilar Rule 11 opinions. The uncertainty is
exacerbated because there is slight chance of convincing a court to
grant rehearing en banc .... Similar uncertainty and inconsistency
exist at the district court level. A substantial amount of the apparently
enhanced judicial enforcement has been in those large urban districts
that have experienced much of the Rule activity to date. Even in those
districts, however, uncertainty exists ....
Id. See also Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 20, at 860.
Many courts inconsistently interpreted the Rule's language or
inconsistently enforced its provisions in similar factual contexts, and
there was much satellite litigation involving Rule 11. This activity had
harmful implications for many parties, lawyers, and judges, but it
particularly disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys,
whose lack of resources can make them risk-averse.
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there seems to be some acknowledgment and agreement that
inconsistent application of Rule 11 was partly the result of a lack of
uniform sanctioning procedures62  and an insufficiently rigorous
standard of appellate review.63 In any event, inconsistent application of
the Rule created chilling effects because lawyers could not predict what
would trigger Rule 11 sanctions. As a result, risk-averse lawyers, like
civil rights and other resource-poor lawyers,64 were often deterred from
filing meritorious claims.65
Id.
62 Call for Comments, supra note 32, at 349. The Advisory Committee was aware, for
instance, that "[slome observers have regarded the procedures employed in sanctions
matters to be deficient. It has been contended that the failure to provide a formal structure
to the proceeding may have resulted in dispositions of sanctions issues that have been too
summary." Id.
One significant aspect of the May 1991 proposal was its prescription of
additional, and more specific, procedural requirements for judicial
imposition of sanctions. This contrasts markedly with the 1983 Rule
which included virtually no procedures. The dearth of procedures
meant that numerous judges provided very few, and inconsistent
procedures, particularly for satisfying due process.
Tobias, Plaintiffs, supra note 31, at 1784. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at
1647-48 ("Rule 11 uncertainty manifests itself in two main ways: (1) through imposition of
sanctions without adequate procedural protections, and (2) through judicial inconsistency in
Rule 11 application and frequent imposition of sanctions based on hindsight.") (emphasis
added); cf. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil
Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.D.R. 159, 167 (1991) ("The lack of clear procedures permits
occasional uninformed arrogance.").
63 Prior to 1991, the federal circuit courts of appeals adopted different standards of
review with some circuits adopting a three-tiered standard. See, e.g., Yamamoto, Case
Management, supra note 24, at 441-42. In 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), in which the Court adopted
abuse of discretion as the applicable standard of review for all aspects of federal district
courts' Rule 11 decisions. Id. at 405; see Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 90.
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court opted for the abuse of discretion standard
right at a time when "the Federal Rules Advisory Committee and various commentators
[started] questioning whether too much discretion ha[d] been invested in district judges."
Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 90. Indeed, Judge Sam D. Johnson of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals lamented that decisions emanating from the various circuit courts, most
notably the Fifth Circuit, "reflect[ed] the appellate courts' tendency to acquiesce in district
court sanctions-no matter their size." Sam D. Johnson et al., The Proposed Amendments to
Rule 11: Urgent Problems and Suggested Solutions, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 647, 658-59 (1991).
6 Tobias, Recalibrated, supra note 28, at 109.
Many civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys have an acute lack of time
and money. It is important to understand the Rule's vigorous
invocation required civil rights attorneys who litigated in subjective
good faith to spend substantial resources defending their reputations
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and their wallets. Resource constraints make them particularly
susceptible to being chilled by overly enthusiastic application of the
Rule.
Id.
The second general issue relates to resource-deficient litigants, such as
many civil rights plaintiffs, and to their lawyers as well as to certain
inherent characteristics of the cases that they pursue. For example,
civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, in comparison to their adversaries,
which are often governmental units or in-house counsel, have little
access to relevant information and possess limited resources for
conducting factual investigations, assembling, analyzing, and
synthesizing material, performing legal research, and drafting papers.
Civil rights suits, in contrast to private, two-party actions,
correspondingly involve public issues and large numbers of
individuals and entities.
Tobias, Revision, supra note 20, at 190-91.
In short, the intrinsic nature of considerable civil rights litigation and
the restraints which impede many civil rights plaintiffs and
practitioners may make their efforts to comply with Rule 11's strictures
covering prefiling inquiries and legal and factual certification seem
inadequate. These inherent characteristics, particularly the parties'
and attorneys' lack of money, time, power, and access to information
involving their cases, also explain why these litigants and their counsel
may be risk averse and why Rule 11's invocation might chill their
efforts.
Id. at 192.
65 Cutler, supra note 22, at 274; Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 164748
("Another cause of... chilling is that attorneys are often uncertain about how Rule 11 will
be administered. This uncertainty deters risk-averse attorneys from bringing some
meritorious claims that they would bring if they could accurately predict the risk of
sanctions."); Simpson, supra note 22, at 499 ("Inconsistent application of the Rule chills
creative arguments. Inconsistent application has been the hallmark of Rule 11 activity.");
Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9 at 860 ("Many courts inconsistently interpreted the
Rule's language or inconsistently enforced its provisions in similar factual contexts... This
activity had harmful implications for many parties, lawyers and judges, but it particularly
disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys, whose lack of resources can make
them risk-averse.") (footnotes omitted).
[W]hile a litigant's conduct under the 1983 amendment was judged
under an objective standard of reasonableness, this standard
ultimately incorporated a judge's subjective beliefs and led to
inconsistent application of the rule .... As a result, attorneys could
not rely on prior decisions to determine if an inquiry satisfied the rule.
Instead, they filed "safe" claims that invited minimal Rule 11 inquiry
to avoid the wrath of sanctions. Thus, the rule went beyond its
intended goal of deterring abusive tactics and also deterred marginally
legitimate claims.
Cutler, supra note 22, at 274 (footnotes omitted).
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Compounding the chilling effects was the fact that sanctions were
mandatory if a Rule 11 violation was found.66 Furthermore, once found,
the overwhelming sanction of choice was monetary sanctions in the form
of attorneys' fees.67 The frequency and size of some of the attorneys' fees
awards chilled creative and vigorous advocacy by deterring lawyers
from bringing novel, controversial but tenable, or even good faith
arguments for a change in the law.68 Rule 11's potential for chilling
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983).
67 The AJS study, for example, found that monetary sanctions were awarded in
approximately 95% of the cases in which sanctions were imposed. Marshall, supra note 10,
at 956-57 ("Notwithstanding [the trial judge's discretion in determining an 'appropriate'
sanction], ... we were not surprised to find that the overwhelming majority (95%) of
sanctions were not 'warm friendly discussions on the record' but were, in fact, monetary.").
"Rule 11 sanctions have typically taken the form of monetary fees payable to the opposing
party." Wiggins, supra note 37, at 3, 18. The Federal Judicial Center specifically found that,
"[in the five districts, between 20% and 31% of the rulings imposed sanctions .... The
overwhelming majority of these orders included monetary fees payable to the opposing
party, from a low of 70% of such orders in Western Texas to a high of 93% in Eastern
Michigan." Id. at 18; see also Johnson, supra note 63, at 649; Rubind & Ringenbach, supra
note 48, at 64 (noting that the Advisory Committee found that Rule 11 "has too rarely been
enforced through nonmonetary sanctions, with cost-shifting having become the normative
sanction").
Although Rule 11 does not require it, and the appellate courts have
made some effort to discourage it, federal district courts have
repeatedly employed Rule 11 sanctions to reimburse litigants who
incur legal expenses in challenging arguably frivolous motions or
pleadings. An award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party is the
favored form of sanction under Rule 11 and, in fact, has become a
virtually automatic response to a Rule 11 violation. One commentator
has concluded that some form of attorneys' fees award is assessed in
ninety-six percent of all cases involving a Rule 11 violation. As a
result, Rule 11 has become a device with which courts can coerce and
intimidate litigants and their attorneys.
Johnson, supra note 63, at 649.
68 Id. at 650.
[Wihile large awards of attorneys' fees can be effective sanctions, they
also can be coercive, even debilitating, sanctions .... In addition to
their economic effect, large awards of attorneys' fees can stifle the
advocacy of novel or controversial positions .... The threat of the
imposition of large awards of attorneys' fees ... effectively closes the
courts to [good faith arguments to change existing law]. The
impending danger of large monetary sanctions inexorably discourages
practitioners from pressing positions which, while tenable, depart
from the current state of the law.
Id. The Advisory Committee was concerned about the potential chilling effects of sanctions
in the form of attorneys' fees and, therefore, solicited comments on that very question. See
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effects was particularly pronounced with litigants who lacked
resources.
69
Finally, as previously discussed, there was evidence to suggest that
the 1983 version of Rule 11 was used disproportionately against "federal
court plaintiffs generally and . . . non-mainstream claimants
particularly." 70 Some of this higher frequency of sanctions against
plaintiffs was to be expected, as plaintiffs initiate litigation. 71  The
disproportionate impact, however, convinced many critics and
commentators that Rule 11 was not being wielded neutrally and, indeed,
that there was a substantive bias against these types of claims in the
federal courts.72
supra note 33 (quoting question number six of the Advisory Committee's Call for
Comments).
69 See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 22, at 274-75.
In addition to the chilling effect engendered from the unpredictable
reasonableness standard under the 1983 amendment, the use of
monetary sanctions and the frequent imposition of large fee-shifting
awards further frustrated the rule's intention to insulate attorneys'
creativity, especially when a client had limited resources. An attorney
who represented a client with limited resources might employ a
conservative approach on behalf of his client in the face of potential
Rule 11 sanctions since the client could not shoulder the burden of
monetary sanctions.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Tobias, Litigation, supra note 23, at 501.
[Slizeable awards in even a few cases, especially those involving civil
rights, can discourage individuals and lawyers from commencing and
continuing civil rights suits because their lack of resources makes them
unusually vulnerable. These problems are epitomized by the selection
of monetary sanctions of attorneys' fees as the sanction of choice-out
of a myriad of less onerous possibilities-with the potential for chilling
and other difficulties that the alternative entails.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 82-83 ("The federal
courts' emphasis on monetary sanctions and the sizeable amount of well-publicized
awards have exacerbated Rule 11's potential for chilling vigorous advocacy. Small firm
and public interest attorneys are especially impacted.") (footnotes omitted).
70 Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 104; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-44.
71 Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 104 ("[The] empirical research indicates that ready
use of Rule 11 has had a disproportionate impact on federal court plaintiffs generally and
on non-mainstream claimants particularly. More frequent sanctions against plaintiffs, the
initiators of litigation, might be expected.").
72 Id.
Some judges and commentators have concluded, however, that Rule
11 has not been wielded neutrally, and that federal court applications
of the rule have discriminated against certain classes of plaintiffs and
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To alleviate Rule 11's chilling effects, the Advisory Committee made
major substantive changes to the Rule, which were designed to reduce
the Rule's negative impact on the assertion of novel claims 73 and its
attorneys. In particular, sanctions are more likely to be imposed
against claimants who are perceived as socially or politically marginal
and against "public interest" attorneys or attorneys representing
unpopular clients or causes.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Cutler, supra note 22, at 275-76 ("[C]ourts have frequently
been intolerant of novel theories and have utilized Rule 11 to deter parties from presenting
these theories. Although the 1983 amendment addresses likely judicial intolerance, in
practice judges have not heeded its warnings.") (footnote omitted); Tobias, Litigation, supra
note 23, at 502 ("The significant number of sanctions motions filed against plaintiffs in [civil
rights] actions and the high percentage which have been granted essentially have
resurrected the archaic idea of 'disfavored' claims.") (footnote omitted); Vairo, Mere We
Are, supra note 27, at 484-85.
It is difficult to generalize about the significance of these statistics. The
large number of cases in which sanctions are awarded may mean one
of two things: 1) that there are relatively more frivolous civil rights
cases, and that these cases are being justifiably dismissed and the
offending parties and attorneys rightfully sanctioned; or 2) that Rule 11
is an unfair tool for defendants that allows them to unfairly attack civil
rights plaintiffs. Unfortunately, there is ample statistical evidence that
the latter is the explanation in far too many cases.
Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 27, at 484-85 (footnotes omitted). See also Eric K.
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 341, 365 (1990) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat] (quoting Judge
Carter as saying, "'Rule 11 has not been wielded neutrally' and that applications of the rule
evince 'extraordinary substantive bias' against certain minority claims"). But see Mark
Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the Neutrality of Procedural
Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 206 (1999) (arguing that "the studies do not provide sufficient
data to conclude that the 1983 version of Rule 11 is non-neutral"); Yablon, supra note 45, at
67 (arguing that the cases most frequently sanctioned in the federal courts are "low-
probability" cases). A low probability case is one which an attorney reasonably believes
has "a low (but not zero) probability of success." Yablon, supra note 45, at 67. Professor
Yablon concedes that "civil rights cases are indeed being disproportionately sanctioned
under Rule 11," but that they are being sanctioned at a higher rate "primarily because a
disproportionate number of low-probability cases litigated in federal courts are civil rights
actions." Id. at 91. Consequently, Professor Yablon would absolve the federal courts of the
charge of bias against civil rights cases. Id. at 90-91.
73 Rule 11's "good faith" standard was replaced by a "non-frivolous" standard. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). This "non-frivolous" standard was an attempt to reduce Rule 11's
adverse impact on the assertion of novel claims in federal court. See Cain, supra note 21, at
219.
[T]he 1993 "warranted by law" clause adds a provision for the
establishment of new law. The new clause pertains to claims
"warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law." This addition appears to be a response to
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disproportionate impact on plaintiffs trying to assert claims in federal
court.74 While the substantive amendments are significant, the Advisory
the chilling effect that has been reported as reducing attorneys'
enthusiasm for bringing novel claims.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Simpson, supra note 22, at 505 ("[Rule 11(b)(2)] introduces a
new standard of 'nonfrivolous[ness]' to judge creative arguments. This creates an
'objective standard' .... With a lower standard for frivolousness, creative legal arguments
should be less susceptible to sanctions.").
74 Prior to the 1993 amendments, a plaintiff could not assert factual allegations unless
they were warranted by evidence discovered during prefiling investigation. Cutler, supra
note 22, at 281. As a result, the efforts of those plaintiffs who had a sound basis for a
factual assertion were hampered by Rule 11 by requiring "discovery, formal or informal,
from opposing parties or third parties to gather and confirm the evidentiary basis for the
allegation." Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Defendants, on the other
hand, were allowed to deny factual allegations based on a lack of information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the matters asserted. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b); FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's note. Under the current version of Rule 11, however, plaintiffs
may now make factual allegations that are "likely to have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery" without violating the Rule. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11(b)(3). In other words, plaintiffs may now get into federal court with less factual
information, especially in those situations where relevant information is in the possession
of the defendant or third parties. Thus, Rule 11(b)(3) was designed to equalize the burdens
between plaintiffs and defendants, thereby decreasing the disproportionate impact of Rule
11 on plaintiffs trying to get into the federal courts. See Leslie M. Kelleher, The December
1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-A Critical Analysis, 12 TOURo L. REV.
7, 64 (1995).
In response to criticisms that the 1983 Rule 11 unfairly and
disproportionately affected plaintiffs, the certification with respect to
factual allegations has been changed. The attorney or party certifies
that the allegations have evidentiary support, and may identify
specific allegations that "are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for ... discovery." Thus, the plaintiff may
allege facts based on information and belief, and seek support for the
allegation during discovery, much like defendant's power, under Rule
8(b) "to deny allegations by stating that from their initial investigation
they lack sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Another 1993 change that sought to decrease chilling ... was the
amendment to help "equalize the burden of the rule upon plaintiffs
and defendants" by allowing plaintiffs to make factual allegations
"likely to have evidentiary support .... This change decreases the
burden on plaintiffs and enables them to state a claim if the necessary
facts are in the possession of the defendant.
Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1646 (footnotes omitted). See also Nehrbass, supra
note 31, at 222 ("Allegations or denials of facts may be included in a complaint and
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Committee appears, to a large extent, to have relied heavily on
procedure to mitigate the Rule's chilling effects. 75 Consequently, this
Article will focus primarily on the procedural requirements the 1993
amendments added to Rule 11 and will address some of the subsidiary
issues related to and raised by them.
First, unlike the 1983 version of the Rule, the current Rule 11
includes several specific requirements that must be complied with to
invoke the Rule. Thus, Rule 11 sanctions can be initiated in only one of
two ways: either by motion of the party or on the court's own initiative. 76
If Rule 11 is invoked by motion, it must be made and filed "separately
from other motions or requests" 77 and "shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate [the Rule]." 78 In addition, a Rule 11 motion
must be served on the opposing party but cannot actually be filed with
the court until twenty-one days after service or such other time as the
court may prescribe. 79 If the offending motion, pleading, or other paper
has not been appropriately amended or withdrawn within that twenty-
one day "safe harbor" period, the Rule 11 motion can then, and only
then, be filed with the court.80 Conversely, if the alleged Rule 11
violation has been corrected, whether by appropriate amendment or
withdrawal, the Rule 11 motion should not be filed with the court.81 The
identified as 'likely to have evidentiary support ... ' thus allowing, at least initially, for
more speculative claims to be asserted.") (footnote omitted).
75 Cf. Johnson, supra note 63, at 663-64 ("The most salient change proposed by the
Advisory Committee is a thorough reorganization of Rule 11, a change plainly designed to
improve the procedures by which sanctions are imposed."); Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 19
("Perhaps the most drastic change is the new procedure for invoking Rule 11.").
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A), (B).
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. According to the Advisory Committee,
These provisions are intended to provide a type of "safe harbor"
against motions under Rule 11 in that a party will not be subject to
sanctions on the basis of another party's motion unless, after receiving
the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge
candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a specified
allegation.
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serving of a separate Rule 11 motion triggers the beginning of the safe
harbor period.82
Unfortunately, the current version of the Rule does not specifically
address the timing of a Rule 11 motion, that is, when a Rule 11 motion
should be served and, if filed, decided by the court.83 The Advisory
Committee notes to Rule 11 do, however, provide some important
guidelines. The Advisory Committee states,
The revision leaves for resolution on a case-by-case
basis, considering the particular circumstances involved,
the question as to when a motion for violation of Rule 11
should be served and when, if filed, it should be
decided. Ordinarily the motion should be served
promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed and, if
delayed too long, may be viewed as untimely. In other
circumstances, it should not be served until the other
party has had a reasonable opportunity for discovery.
Given the "safe harbor" provisions discussed ... , a
party cannot delay serving its Rule 11 motion until
conclusion of the case (or judicial rejection of the
offending contention).84
As with the prior version of the Rule, the court, on its own initiative,
may also invoke Rule 11. To do so, however, the court must now enter
an order specifically describing the conduct violating the Rule and
directing the party, its attorney, and/or the law firm "to show cause why
it has not violated [the Rule.]"8 5 Ordinarily, orders to show cause should
only be issued "in situations that are akin to a contempt of court."86
82 Id.
83 Under the safe harbor provision in Rule 11(c)(1)(A), however, "a Rule 11 motion
cannot be made unless there is some paper, claim, or contention that can be withdrawn."
Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule 11: Past as Prologue?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 65 (1994)
[hereinafter Vairo, Prologue]; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A); supra text accompanying
notes 76-82. A logical interpretation of the Rule, therefore, would be that a party cannot
wait to seek sanctions until after the contention has been disposed of by a judge. In that
situation, the safe harbor provision of Rule 11 simply could not be complied with. This
interpretation would essentially render the safe harbor provision meaningless. See infra
Part llI.A.l.c, B.3 (discussing this issue in more detail).
84 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
85 FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
86 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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There is no safe harbor period for a litigant who withdraws or corrects
an alleged Rule 11 violation after an order to show cause has been issued
by the court.87 At the same time, the court is admonished to take any
corrective action into account "in deciding what-if any-sanction to
impose if, after consideration of the litigant's response, the court
concludes that a violation has occurred."88
Before a court can impose any sanctions, however, Rule 11 explicitly
requires that due process be satisfied.89 More specifically, the party,
attorney, and/or law firm that is the subject of the sanctions motion or
the order to show cause must be given notice of the specific conduct that
appears to violate the Rule90 and a reasonable opportunity to respond. 91
What constitutes "reasonable opportunity to respond" will vary
depending on the circumstances. 92
Even if a Rule 11 violation is found, imposition of sanctions is now
discretionary with the federal district courts. 93 In other words, the
87 Id. There does not appear to be anything in Rule 11(c), therefore, that prevents a
federal district court judge from imposing sanctions against a litigant and/or her attorney
who has corrected the alleged Rule 11 violation. See Jeffrey A. Parness, The New Federal
Rule 11: Different Sanctions, Second Thoughts, 83 ILL. B.J. 126, 128 (1995).
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
89 This is also a significant change from the 1983 version of the Rule, which did not
expressly provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983).
90 See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(1)(A), (B).
91 Rule 11(c) provides in pertinent part that "[ilf, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated .... " FED. R. Civ. P.
11(c) (emphasis added).
92 The Advisory Committee states,
Explicit provision is made for litigants to be provided notice of the
alleged violation and an opportunity to respond before sanctions are
imposed. Whether the matter should be decided solely on the basis of
written submissions or should be scheduled for oral argument (or,
indeed, for evidentiary presentation) will depend on the
circumstances.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
93 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) ("If... the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated,
the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon
the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for
the violation.") (emphasis added). Under the 1983 version of the Rule, sanctions were
mandatory if the court found a violation of the Rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983). The
Advisory Committee provides a non-exclusive list of factors for the federal district courts
to consider in "deciding whether to impose a sanction or what sanctions would be
appropriate in the circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. The list of
factors reads:
Kie: Still Chilling After All These Years:  Rule 11 of the Federal Rul
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002
30 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37
federal district court is no longer required to impose a sanction even if it
determines that Rule 11 has been violated. If the court does decide to
impose a sanction, it is required to impose the least severe sanction
necessary "to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated" 94 and is specifically encouraged to impose non-
monetary sanctions.95  In fact, the Advisory Committee takes the
position that, "[slince the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather
than to compensate," any monetary sanction "should ordinarily be paid
into court as a penalty."96 Indeed, monetary sanctions in the form of
attorneys' fees may only be imposed where Rule 11 sanctions were
initiated by motion of a party, and, even then, they may only be awarded
Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it
was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it
infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense;
whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation;
whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation
process in time or expense; whether the responsible person is trained
in the law; what amount, given the financial resources of the
responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in
the same case; what amount is needed to deter similar activity by other
litigants: all of these may in a particular case be proper considerations.
Id.
94 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) ("A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited
to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated."); see also, FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("The court has
significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a
violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions should not be more severe than reasonably
necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending person or comparable conduct by
similarly situated persons.") (emphasis added).
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) ("Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature ...."); see also FED.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("The rule does not attempt to enumerate the
factors a court should consider in deciding whether to impose a sanction or what sanctions
would be appropriate in the circumstances; but, for emphasis, it does specifically note that a
sanction may be nonmonetary as well as monetary.") (emphasis added). The Advisory
Committee also states that the court has a wide variety of possible sanctions it can impose
and lists several examples, none of which includes payment of attorneys' fees. Id.
The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for
violations, such as striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition,
reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other
educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; referring
the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government
attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head),
etc.
Id.
96 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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if "warranted for effective deterrence" 97 and "should not exceed the
expenses and attorneys' fees for the services directly and unavoidably
caused by the [Rule 11(b)] violation."98 Attorneys' fees are not available if
sanctions are imposed via an order to show cause issued by the court.99
If sanctions are awarded pursuant to an order to show cause, the court
may order monetary sanctions in the form of a penalty to be paid into
the court but, even then, only if the order to show cause was issued
before the claim(s) were voluntary dismissed or settled.10
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). The Advisory Committee contemplates that monetary
sanctions will only be "warranted for effective deterrence" in "unusual circumstances,"
such as violations of the improper purpose provision in Rule 11(b)(2). FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee's note.
98 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). The Committee
provides the following example:
If, for example, a wholly unsupportable count were included in a
multi-count complaint or counterclaim for the purpose of needlessly
increasing the cost of litigation to an impecunious adversary, any
award of expenses should be limited to those directly caused by
inclusion of the improper count, and not those resulting from the filing
of the complaint or answer itself.
Id.
99 FED. R. COv. P. 11(c)(2).
Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction
may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an
order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted
for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or
all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct
result of the violation.
Id. (emphasis added). In addition, "[mionetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2)," which deals with the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions raised during the litigation. Id.
100 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)(B) ("Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
own initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal
or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to
be sanctioned."). The Advisory Committee writes,
The power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, but with
the condition that this be done through a show cause order ... . The
revision provides that a monetary sanction imposed after a court-
initiated show cause order be limited to a penalty payable to the court
and that it be imposed only if the show cause order is issued before
any voluntary dismissal or an agreement of the parties to settle the
claims made by or against the litigant.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Such a restriction on the court's power was
necessary, according to the Advisory Committee, because "[p]arties settling a case should
not be subsequently faced with an unexpected order from the court leading to monetary
sanctions that might have affected their willingness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a case."
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Finally, if the court decides to impose Rule 11 sanctions, the court is
now explicitly required to issue an order describing the violating
conduct and explaining the basis for the sanction imposed.10 1 No such
requirement is mandated when the court denies sanctions. Under the
1983 version of the Rule, the court was not similarly required to explain
its imposition of sanctions. 0 2
Notwithstanding all of the important procedural changes made to
Rule 11 in 1993,103 by far the most significant amendment was the
addition of the safe harbor provision in Rule 11(c)(1)(A). 1°4 The safe
harbor provision is deemed by many to be the most significant of the
amendments for several related reasons. First, it effectively immunizes
from Rule 11 sanctions the litigant who takes advantage of it.105 Second,
Id. See generally, Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: Rules 11, 26(g), 30(d), and 37, §1927, Inherent
Power, Appellate Rule 38, and §1912, SE63 ALI-ABA 79, 118-19 (1999) (discussing the
limitations on the use of monetary sanctions imposed by current Rule 11).
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3).
102 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983); see also, FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("If
the court imposes sanctions, it must, unless waived, indicate its reasons in a written order
or on the record; the court should not ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for
sanctions.").
103 See supra notes 73-102 and accompanying text.
104 Yablon, supra note 45, at 98-99.
The most significant of the 1993 changes in Rule 11 may, therefore,
well be the "safe harbor" provision, which permits a party to
withdraw a "challenged" claim within twenty-one days after a Rule 11
motion is served and thereby avoid the threat of sanctions. The service
of a Rule 11 motion can then give plaintiffs' lawyers another chance to
stop and think and decide whether a claim that was a long shot when
filed still looks worth pursuing. The additional information available
at this later stage in the proceedings, plus a chance to avoid sanctions,
may well cause lawyers to drop those long shots that don't reveal
much chance of success.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Sidney Powell & S. Ann Saucer, Revised Rule 11: Is It Safer?,
15 Miss. C. L. REV. 271, 275 (1995) ("The history of the amendment ... reflects that the safe
harbor is meant as a significant change and is a major component of the 1993 amendment's
downgrade of the oppressive 1983 Rule."); Tobias, Plaintiffs, supra note 31, at 1785 n.63
("The Advisory Committee relied substantially on the safe harbor provision to address
criticisms of Rule 11 .... "); Vairo, Prologue, supra note 83, at 64 ("The safe harbor is an
important protection for Rule 11 targets .... It immunizes litigants from Rule 11 sanctions
if they withdraw the challenged paper."); Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 27, at 498 ("The
safe harbor provision[ ] [is] the most important addition[ ]to the rule. A litigant who has
made a mistake should have the opportunity to withdraw a paper without suffering
sanctions.").
105 See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
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the safe harbor provision should reduce the number of Rule 11 motions
filed and the amount of satellite litigation under the new Rule.10 6 Third,
the safe harbor provision appears to be the mechanism used by the
Advisory Committee to ameliorate the potential harshness of some of the
other substantive 1993 amendments. 10 7 For example, the safe harbor
provision may lessen the impact of the Advisory Committee's decision to
reject the "pleading as a whole" approach,10 8 of the continuing duty
imposed by new Rule 11,109 and of the potential Rule 11 liability of
106 Theordore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1007, 1016
(1999).
The increased potential for satellite litigation is substantially vitiated
by the newly created twenty-one-day safe harbor provision. Under the
new Rule, a party moving for Rule 11 sanctions must serve the motion
on the opposing party at least twenty-one days prior to filing it with
the court. Thus, the party alleged to be in violation of the Rule is able
to correct the filing prior to incurring liability.
Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1640 (footnotes omitted).
107 See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
108 The current version of Rule 11 requires a litigant to certify that the "claims, defenses,
and other legal contentions," as well as "the allegations and other factual contentions" satisfy the
Rule's standards. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (emphasis added); see also, Schwarzer, supra note
23, at 14. Theoretically, a certification requirement that applies to each claim, defense, or
contention may invite repeated Rule 11 motions, thereby undermining some of the benefits
of the safe harbor provision. See Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 27, at 498-99. The
Advisory Committee and others, however, appear to believe that the safe harbor provision
will actually reduce any potential punitive consequences of this amendment because
sanctions cannot be requested, let alone imposed, unless the opposing party is given the
opportunity presented by the safe harbor to correct or withdraw the offending allegation.
See, e.g., Excerpt from the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 515, 524 (1992) [hereinafter Judicial Conference Committee Report]
(noting that the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 1993 revisions "emphasize
that Rule 11 motions should not be prepared-or threatened-for minor, inconsequential
violations .... These changes, coupled with the opportunity to correct allegations under the 'safe
harbor' provision[], should eliminate the need for court consideration of Rule 11 motions directed at
insignificant aspects of a complaint or answer.") (emphasis added); Schwarzer, supra note 23, at
15.
A valid claim, defense, or contention will no longer provide cover for
others that are frivolous or baseless. However, since sanctions cannot
now be imposed unless the opposing party has first been given an
opportunity to withdraw the offending allegation, [there is a]
substantial reduction in the punitive consequences of the amendment
Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 15.
109 Pursuant to Rule 11(b), a litigant cannot continue to assert a position previously taken,
if that position has become untenable, without violating Rule 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
Despite the fact that the continuing duty requirement "adds a new dimension to Rule 11,"
Judge Schwarzer takes the position that "[t]he impact of this continuing duty will ... be
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attorneys, law firms, and parties.1 0 Finally, the safe harbor provision
should also help to reduce Rule 11's chilling effects."'
Taking the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 as a whole, the Advisory
Committee appears to have made a concerted effort to address the
causes of the Rule's chilling effects and, thus, the chilling effects
themselves.11 2 More specifically, the amendments clearly attempt to
constrain the discretion of the federal district courts to impose Rule 11
ameliorated by the 'safe harbor' provision of Rule 11." Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 16.
"Because the opponent must give notice of intent to move for sanctions with respect to an
allegation, the proponent of that allegation will have an opportunity to consider whether it
should be withdrawn before being exposed to the risk of sanctions." Id. at 17.
110 Rule 11 now authorizes sanctions against "the attorneys, law firms, or parties who
have violated" the Rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Potential liability for a Rule 11 sanction,
therefore, has been purposefully expanded by the 1993 amendments. At least part of the
reason for this expanded liability is the existence of the safe harbor provision itself. See
Judicial Conference Committee Report, supra note 108, at 525.
Given the opportunity under the "safe harbor" provisions to avoid sanctions,
imposed on a motion, coupled with the changes designed to reduce the
frequency of "fee-shifting" sanctions that have produced the largest
monetary sanctions, the Committee has added ... language clarifying
that a law firm should ordinarily be held jointly accountable in such
circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, "[b]ecause of the safe harbor provision, courts may
expect supervising attorneys, such as law firm partners, to evaluate whether to withdraw
the offending paper. If the supervising attorneys decline to do so, they must risk facing the
consequences." Hirt, supra note 106, at 1018.
1 One commentator writes that
since the twenty-one day safe harbor period enables a litigant to
amend or withdraw a contention without penalty, the provision
provides protection to parties with limited resources or those who
assert unpopular claims. These parties, who under the 1983
amendment arguably refrained from asserting a controversial claim or
position, fearful of the imposition of monetary sanctions, can
completely avoid Rule 11 sanctions by amending or withdrawing a
pleading during the twenty-one day period. Ultimately, the safe
harbor should limit the rule's chilling effect on litigation.
Cutler, supra note 22, at 287 (footnotes omitted). See also, Tobias, Plaintiffs, supra note 31, at
1784-85 ("If the safe harbor provision functions as intended, it could protect civil rights
plaintiffs, especially those who lack resources or pursue nontraditional, political, or close
lawsuits. A safe harbor provision may also reduce the chilling effects of Rule 11.")
(footnotes omitted); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 20, at 876 (stating that the safe harbor
provision's "inclusion was an important means of responding to criticism of Rule 11,
especially its tendency to chill") (footnote omitted).
112 See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text (discussing the causes).
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sanctions 1 3 by setting forth specific procedures and guidelines
governing sanctioning decisions" 4 and by explicitly limiting the use of
monetary sanctions, especially with respect to sanctions imposed on a
court's own initiative.115 In so doing, Rule 11's chilling effects are
potentially minimized by decreasing the incentives for filing Rule 11
motions in the first place and decreasing the chances that such motions
will be granted if filed. 116
Those same procedural requirements are also an attempt by the
Advisory Committee to provide uniformity among sanctioning decisions
in the federal courts. 17 Uniformity should help litigants and their
attorneys predict what will trigger Rule 11 sanctions 1 8 and, therefore,
somewhat alleviate the fear of risk-averse lawyers, like civil rights and
other resource-poor lawyers, that Rule 11 sanctions will be imposed for
filing unpopular but meritorious claims in federal court.119
Furthermore, the amendments will not only make obtaining Rule 11
sanctions more costly,120 they should also make it much less likely that
113 See Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 24 (noting that "[t]he impact of the exercise of
[judicial] discretion will be tempered by the safe harbor and substantially moderated
sanctions provisions").
114 See supra text accompanying notes 76-92.
115 See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
116 See Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule 11, 601 PLI/LIT 105, 146 (1999) ("The
1993 amendment discourages monetary awards as sanctions on the ground that fee awards
create a financial incentive to file Rule 11 motions. Like the pre-1993 rule, the amended
rule gives courts discretion as to the nature of an appropriate sanction; unlike the pre-1993
rule, the amended rule constrains that discretion."); Developments in the Law, supra note 20,
at 1646 ("Both the safe harbor provision and the shift to discretionary sanctions decrease
chilling primarily by reducing the likelihood that sanctions will be imposed.").
117 See supra text accompanying notes 76-92.
118 Simpson, supra note 22, at 507 ("For general and specific deterrence, attorneys must
know what conduct violated the rule so that they can conform their conduct.").
119 See Cutler, supra note 22, at 268.
[1In altering the sanctioning process, the 1993 amendment will
counteract the chilling impact that Rule 11 had on litigants with
limited resources. The courts' permissive standard for the imposition
of sanctions coupled with limited authority to impose monetary
sanctions will likely minimize the financial disincentives these parties
faced under the 1983 amendment. As a result, the new sanctions
guidelines will likely reduce the discriminatory nature of Rule 11
against litigants with limited resources.
Id.
120 For example, requiring a separate motion should make Rule 11 sanctions more
difficult and, therefore, costly to obtain thereby dissuading litigants from using a Rule 11
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monetary sanctions will be awarded even if sanctions are imposed.121 By
de-emphasizing monetary sanctions, the amendments potentially
increase creative and vigorous advocacy by reducing the financial
disincentives of resource-poor litigants to file meritorious claims in federal
court.122 They also potentially reduce the disproportionate impact of
Rule 11 on civil rights plaintiffs and/or their attorneys by, one,
decreasing the financial incentives of parties to file Rule 11 motions in the
first place' 23 and, two, admonishing the federal district courts to take into
consideration the responsible party's ability to pay when awarding
monetary sanctions under the Rule.124
motion solely for the purpose of obtaining attorneys' fees. See Cutler, supra note 22, at 267-
68.
Since litigants are required to file a Rule 11 motion separate and
distinct from case pleadings, a request for attorney's fees can no longer
be added to the end of a substantive, case-specific motion. Instead,
attorneys must prepare a separate, independent motion to initiate Rule
11 proceedings, for which litigants may be unwilling to pay.
Therefore, parties should be dissuaded from utilizing Rule 11 solely to
garner attorney's fees.
Id. See also Tobias, Revision, supra note 20, at 207.
The 1993 Rule requires counsel as well as unrepresented litigants to
submit sanctions motions independently of other documents that they
file and to describe the specific infraction alleged to violate the Rule.
These strictures are, in part, intended to make the pursuit of sanctions
more onerous, thereby reducing Rule 11 activity.
Id.
121 See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
122 See supra text accompanying note 116.
123 Clearly, if less Rule 11 motions are filed, less will be granted against plaintiffs and/or
their attorneys, especially in the area of civil rights.
124 Cutler, supra note 22, at 290 ("In reducing the frequency of attorney's fees as a Rule 11
sanction, the 1993 amendment should reduce the rule's adverse impact on pro se parties,
sole practitioners, and other litigants with limited resources."); see also Tobias, Revision,
supra note 20, at 210.
The Advisory Committee also exhibited solicitude for the needs of
litigants and lawyers who have little money or power, such as
numerous civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel, by inserting three
admonitions in the Advisory Committee Note. The Committee first
suggested that partial fee reimbursement might be an adequate
deterrent to Rule 11 violations by individuals with modest resources.
For similar reasons, the revisers also included in the Note the
following fact as one of an enumerated list which courts could
properly consider in choosing appropriate sanctions: "[Wihat amount,
given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to
deter that person from repetition in the same case." The Note also
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Finally, the findings requirement imposed by the 1993 amendments
is potentially significant. It could help mitigate some of the inconsistent
applications of Rule 11 by the federal courts by providing an important
aid to appellate review. By providing a clearer record of what
constitutes sanctionable conduct and why, the appellate courts should be
able to develop clearer and more consistent Rule 11 standards. Clearer
standards, in turn, should reduce the likelihood that litigants in the
federal courts will choose not to bring meritorious claims because they
will know in advance what conduct will trigger Rule 11 sanctions. In a
related vein, the findings requirement should also limit any arbitrary
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. More specifically, the amendments
make the use of improper bases for Rule 11 sanctions, such as a
substantive bias, harder to hide by requiring the federal district courts to
explain their decisions to impose sanctions.'25  To the extent that
substantive bias accounts for some of Rule 11's disproportionate impact
on civil rights plaintiffs in the federal courts, this amendment should
help alleviate that phenomenon as well. 126
Ultimately, however, whether a violation of Rule 11 has occurred and,
if so, what sanction to impose continue to be matters left to the
substantial discretion of the federal district courts.127 As a result, the
admonished judges against relying on Rule 11 for fee-shifting which
would contravene the standards governing statutory fee awards, as
required by the Christiansburg Garment opinion, in litigation pursed
under legislation which prescribes fee awards to prevailing parties.
Tobias, Revision, supra note 20, at 210 (footnotes omitted).
125 See supra text accompanying notes 89-92, 101; see also Armour, Practice, supra note 55,
at 728.
The assumption that underlies the adjudicative process is that the
openness and thoroughness of the analysis at the trial court level,
when coupled with a commitment to provide a detailed record for
appeal, fosters neutrality, objectivity, and adherence to external legal
standards. This element of public and institutional scrutiny is
intended to restrict the courts' reliance upon highly personalized,
subjective, or internalized standards or the influence of bias in
reaching the final result.
Armour, Practice, supra note 55, at 728 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 777 ("[C]oncerns
about bias or undue subjectivity can only be redressed if the court makes the context of its
sanctions analysis explicit.").
126 Armour, Practice, supra note 55, at 728.
127 See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("Whether a violation has occurred
and what sanctions, if any, to impose for a violation are matters committed to the
discretion of the trial court ... ").
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Advisory Committee also opted to retain abuse of discretion as the
applicable standard of review for the trial courts' Rule 11 decisions.
128
Thus, while it seems safe to say that the Advisory Committee relied
primarily on procedural amendments in 1993 to mitigate Rule 11's
chilling effects, the critical question that remains to be answered is
whether those amendments have been effective. To answer this
question, it is necessary to examine how the 1993 amendments to Rule 11
have been applied by the federal courts in practice. This discussion is
taken up in the next two Parts of this Article.
III. RULE 11: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
To determine whether the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 have
effectively mitigated the Rule's chilling effects, case law from six federal
circuits was collected and analyzed. 29 It is important to note at the
outset that the purpose of this article is not to conduct a circuit by circuit
analysis. It is not an attempt, in other words, to determine how each of
the six federal circuits selected here approaches and/or applies Rule 11
in practice. Instead, the case law from these circuits will be analyzed and
the data will be extrapolated to get a sense of Rule 11 practice in the
federal courts in general.
A. The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
The procedural amendments can be organized in two broad
categories, namely, the Rule 11 motion and Rule 11 via an order to show
cause. The issues raised in these broad categories will be addressed in
turn along with other subsidiary Rule 11 issues raised by the 1993
amendments, such as the timing of sanctions motions and orders to
show cause, "appropriate" sanctions, and the effectiveness of appellate
review.
One of the frequent criticisms of the 1983 version of Rule 11 was that
it was not applied consistently in the federal courts and, therefore,
resulted in unpredictability.' 30 The AJS study lent some support to this
128 Id.
129 The circuits selected are the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
See supra note 10 for a brief discussion of why these particular circuits were chosen.
130 See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also, Marshall, supra note 10, at 981 ("One
of the widespread criticisms leveled against federal courts' application of Rule 11 is that
different circuits have varied widely from other circuits."); Wiggins, supra note 37, at 3.
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conclusion when it found that the three circuits it surveyed did in fact
apply Rule 11 differently. 131 In contrast, the FJC study found that there
was "a moderate to high level of inter-judge agreement in reviewing
sanctions decisions,"132 i.e., at the appellate level. 133  The research
collected here, however, appears to both support and refute these
studies. 134  On the one hand, there does appear to be significant
agreement among most of the circuits examined with respect to many of
the procedural requirements added by the 1993 amendments, but not
always. In fact, significant intracircuit conflicts exist with respect to
several of the 1993 procedural amendments. On the other hand,
intercircuit conflicts appear to exist with respect to some of the
amendments. In short, very mixed messages are being sent by the
federal circuit courts of appeals, not only to the litigants and attorneys in
One criticism of Rule 11 is that there is too little predictability in its
application because there are no clear standards as to what constitutes
a violation of the rule. The essence of this criticism is that the rule is
too indeterminate, resulting in inconsistent interpretation and use
across judges and courts.
Wiggins, supra, note 37, at 3.
131 Marshall, supra note 10, at 981.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has the reputation of being the most
aggressive enforcer of Rule 11, while the Ninth Circuit has developed a
reputation as being one of the more passive enforcers of the Rule, and
the Fifth Circuit is generally considered to be somewhere in between
.... [T]he results of our survey are consistent with the circuits'
reputations: 9.9% of respondents from the Seventh Circuit reported
having been involved in a case involving imposition of sanction during
the previous twelve month period; 7.6% of respondents from the Fifth
Circuit reported such involvement; while only 6.2% of the lawyers
from the Ninth Circuit were involved in a case in which sanctions had
been imposed during the past year. Moreover, the most striking
difference was in the rate of sanctions imposed. We found that the
Seventh Circuit had the highest rate of sanctions imposed as a
proportion of motions filed (24.5%), with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
having a considerably lower rate (14.6% and 14.4%, respectively).
Id. (emphasis and footnotes omitted). According to the AJS study, however, the differences
in how Rule 11 was applied in the three circuits was not a result of significant differences in
the legal standards or procedures employed by the federal courts in those circuits. Id. at
983.
132 Wiggins, supra note 37, at 3, 27 (emphasis added).
133 Wiggins, supra note 37, at 14-16 (discussing agreement between the district courts and
the circuit courts).
134 A total of forty-three federal appellate cases were collected for this article. See infra
Appendix 1.
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those circuits, but also to the federal district court judges who make the
Rule 11 decisions in the first place.
1. The Rule 11 Motion
As previously discussed, under the 1993 amendments, a Rule 11
motion must be made separately from other motions and served on the
non-moving party twenty-one days prior to filing with the court.135
Several related questions are thus raised. Is a separate motion actually
required, or are letters or other informal warnings enough to satisfy Rule
11? Is the moving party absolutely required to give the non-moving
party twenty-one days to withdraw or amend the document alleged to
violate Rule 11? Finally, given the safe harbor provision, when does a
Rule 11 motion have to be served and filed? Each of these issues will be
addressed in turn.
a. The Separate Motion Requirement
The separate motion requirement is strictly construed in the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which means that an actual motion is
required to satisfy Rule 11; a warning letter or other informal notice of
potential Rule 11 sanctions is insufficient.1 36 Failure to comply with the
separate motion requirement in those circuits has resulted in the reversal
of an award of sanctions.137
135 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
136 Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that defendant gave
plaintiff multiple warnings but concluding that such warnings were not motions "and the
Rule requires service of a motion"); L.B. Foster Co. v. America Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 89-90
(2d Cir. 1998) (reasoning that plaintiff's inclusion of its request for Rule 11 sanctions in a
letter requesting a Rule 54(b) certification "fail[ed] to give [defendant] the separate notice
referred to in Rule 11"); Johnson v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 74 F.3d 147, 151 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that warning letter from party seeking sanctions and request for Rule 11 sanctions
in a memorandum in support of a motion to dismiss did not satisfy formal notice
requirement imposed by separate motion requirement). According to the Ninth Circuit,
"[it would ... wrench both the language and purpose of the amendment to the Rule to
permit an informal warning to substitute for service of a motion." Barber, 146 F.3d at 710.
137 See Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
defendant construction company was not entitled to Rule 11 sanctions because it failed to
comply with the separate motion requirement when it included its Rule 11 motion along
with a motion for summary judgment); Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
174 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendants' argument to treat their affidavit of
services and reply affidavit as a motion for Rule 11 sanctions because a motion must "be
made separately from other motions or requests") (citation omitted); L.B. Foster Co., 138
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The Sixth Circuit, however, has taken a different approach. In Barker
v. Bank One, Lexington, N.A., 138 for example, plaintiff filed a complaint
against forty different defendants, all of whom he claimed conspired to
deprive him of his inheritance in a will contest.139 In April and June of
1995, attorneys for several of the defendants wrote to plaintiff's counsel
warning him that the action was frivolous and that they would seek
sanctions.140 Plaintiff did not respond to the letters.141 On September 28,
1995, the complaint was dismissed as to those defendants. 142 On April
11, 1996, final judgment was entered.143 On May 9, 1996, defendants
served their Rule 11 motion and subsequently filed it on May 31, 1996.14
The district court granted defendants' Rule 11 motion on April 29, 1997,
and imposed $15,726.75 in attorneys' fees jointly against plaintiff and his
attorney and $12,914.05 in attorneys' fees against plaintiff alone. 145
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Rule 11 sanctions, holding
that the warning letters provided plaintiff's counsel with specific notice
of defendants' intent to seek Rule 11 sanctions and "more than sufficient
time" either to convince his client to voluntarily dismiss the complaint or
to withdraw from further representation. 146 The problem, of course, is
that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Barker clearly contradicts the plain and
explicit language of Rule 11(c)(1)(A), which requires that a separate
motion, not a warning letter, be served.
In a related vein, the Sixth Circuit has also held that the separate
motion requirement is satisfied where a Rule 11 motion is combined
F.3d at 89-90 (reversing district court's order granting plaintiff's Rule 11 motion because,
among other things, of plaintiff's failure to comply with the separate motion requirement);
Johnson, 74 F.3d at 151 (holding that there was no Rule 11 motion by defendants for the
district court to rule on when defendants merely included a request for Rule 11 sanctions as
part of their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss); Hadges v. Yonkers
Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing the district court's order granting
defendant's Rule 11 motion in part because of defendant's failure to comply with the
separate motion requirement).
138 No. 97-5787, 1998 WL 466437 (6th Cir. July 30,1998).
139 Id. at *1.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at *2.
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with a request for other sanctions.147 Such a motion does not run afoul of
the separate motion requirement, according to the Sixth Circuit, because
the separate motion requirement is "intended to highlight the sanctions
request by preventing it from being tacked onto or buried in motions on
the merits, such as motions to dismiss or for summary judgment." 148
Despite the fact that Rule 11 explicitly requires a Rule 11 motion to "be
made separately from other motions or requests," 149 there does not
appear to be anything fundamentally wrong with the Sixth Circuit's
approach here. More specifically, allowing other requests for sanctions
to be combined with a Rule 11 motion does not seem to run afoul of the
intent behind the separate motion requirement, namely, to avoid tag-
along Rule 11 motions. This approach also appears to have beneficial
consequences, such as avoiding duplicative motions for sanctions, which
should save all parties involved (including the court) time, money,
and/or other resources.
b. The Safe Harbor Provision
Federal circuit court experience with the safe harbor provision has
produced conflicts both between and within the circuits, with the
internal circuit disagreements being particularly pronounced. The safe
harbor provision has been held to be an absolute requirement in
opinions by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits-the provision
must be complied with for sanctions to be imposed by the district
court.150
147 Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 294 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiff's
argument that defendant's "motion for sanctions was not 'separate' because [defendant]
moved for sanctions and/or attorney fees pursuant to Rule 11, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and 28
U.S.C. § 1927").
148 Id. The court also reasoned that to require Rule 11 motions to be filed separately from
other sanctions requests would be needlessly duplicative and wasteful. Id.
149 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
150 See, e.g., Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district
court's denial of defendants' Rule 11 motion when defendants served opposing counsel
with the motion either on the day they filed their sanctions motion or shortly before; in
either event, defendants "failed to comply with the twenty-one day rule"); Cobleigh v.
United States, No. 97-2302, 1999 WL 195738 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 1999) (reversing district
court's decision to grant defendant's Rule 11 motion for failure to comply with the safe
harbor provision stating that "[tihis court has held that the safe harbor provision is an
absolute requirement and that, unless the movant has complied with the twenty-one day
safe harbor service, the motion for sanctions shall not be filed with or presented to the
court") (footnote and quotation marks omitted); Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir.
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In Radcliffe v. Rainbow Construction Co., 151 for example, the federal
district court for the Northern District of California granted defendant's
motion for Rule 11 sanctions and awarded $75,000 in attorneys' fees
despite the fact that defendant filed its Rule 11 motion as part of its
motion for summary judgment and failed to serve plaintiffs with the
motion twenty-one days prior to filing it with the court.152 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, stating that, because defendant "did not comply with
the twenty-one day advance service provision[,] ... [defendant] was not
entitled to obtain an award from plaintiffs." 15 3 In so holding, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that a "'literal application
of the safe harbor provision' was unnecessary" because plaintiffs had
been given more than three months between the time the defendant's
Rule 11 motion was filed and the court's order imposing sanctions was
entered to withdraw the challenged contention.154 According to the
Ninth Circuit, "the procedural requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A)'s 'safe
harbor' are mandatory." 155 Thus, "the fact that the plaintiffs had
advance warning that [defendant] objected to their conspiracy allegation
did not cure [defendant's] failure to comply with the strict procedural
1995) (holding that the district court's order imposing Rule 11 sanctions could not be
upheld on appeal when plaintiffs failed to comply with the safe harbor provision because
plaintiffs did not serve their Rule 11 motion on defendants and their counsel prior to
filing); accord Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing
the district court's order granting defendant's Rule 11 motion because of defendant's
failure to comply with Rule 11's separate motion and safe harbor provisions); Barber v.
Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998); Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041,
1058 (7th Cir. 1998) (defendants conceded that Rule 11 sanctions were improper where they
had failed to comply with the separate motion and safe harbor provisions of Rule 11);
Bernstein v. Remer, No. 96-2232, 1997 WL 685369, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1997); Ridder, 109
F.3d at 296.
151 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001).
152 Id. at 788.
153 Id. at 789 (the Ninth Circuit did not address the merits of the district court's order).
154 Id.
The court decided that because [defendant] had filed a Rule 11 motion
in response to the plaintiff's [sic] first amended complaint, and three
months had passed between the motion and the court's order
concerning sanctions, the plaintiffs and their attorneys had been given
adequate notice and opportunity to withdraw the challenged
allegation. As a result, the court ruled that Rule 11(c)(1)(A)'s 'safe
harbor' provision had been satisfied, notwithstanding the lack of
advance service on the plaintiffs.
Id.
155 Id. at 788 (citing Barber, 146 F.3d at 710-11).
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requirement of Rule 11(c)(1)(A)." 156 The Ninth Circuit had no trouble
concluding that "[t]he district court abused its discretion when it
concluded otherwise." 157
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, however, are not always consistent
in their interpretations of the safe harbor provision. In Flanagan v.
Arnaiz, 158 the Ninth Circuit upheld Rule 11 sanctions imposed on
plaintiffs by the district court even though defendants had not complied
with the safe harbor provision.159  The court apparently rejected
plaintiffs' safe harbor argument on appeal because "the district judge
gave [plaintiffs] twenty-one days to withdraw from their meritless
position." 160 Despite this clear irregularity in Rule 11's procedural
requirements, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no abuse of
discretion by the district court. 161
In a particularly troubling opinion, the Seventh Circuit also upheld
sanctions imposed pursuant to a motion despite the fact that the safe
harbor provision was not complied with.162 In Divane v. Krull Electric
Co., 63 the trustees of an employee benefit fund sued defendant electric
company after defendant stopped making required contributions to the
employee benefit plan.1M Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim
alleging that, since it was no longer a signatory to the collective
bargaining agreement at issue, the suit violated the Labor Management
Relations Act.165 Defendant's answer to plaintiffs' complaint refused to
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Nos. 97-15517, 97-15518, 1999 WL 1128641 (9th Cir. Dec. 7,1999).
159 Id. at *2.
160 Id. (emphasis added). The Flanagan opinion is not only unpublished, it is also very
short and lacking in detail. But three significant facts can be deduced from the fact that it
was the district judge who provided plaintiffs with the twenty-one day safe harbor period:
(1) this case did not involve an order imposing sanctions entered on the court's own
initiative, as a safe harbor period is not required when the court acts pursuant to an order
to show cause; (2) defendants, therefore, must have filed a Rule 11 motion; and (3)
defendants did not provide plaintiffs with the required twenty-one day safe harbor period
prior to filing their motion with the court because, if they had, the district court would not
have needed to intercede. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B); see also supra text accompanying
notes 85-88 (discussing sanctions imposed on court's initiative).
161 Id.
162 See Divane v. Krull Electric Co., 200 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1999).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1023.
165 Id.
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admit several statements that defendant had previously admitted in the
companion litigation.166  On September 13, 1996, plaintiffs sent
defendant's counsel a Rule 11 motion requesting that he withdraw the
counterclaim or correct the answer by October 4, 1996, pursuant to Rule
11(c)(1)(A).167 When defendant failed to comply with either option,
plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss on October 17, 1996, in which they
requested that the court strike defendant's answer and enter sanctions
against defendant's counsel for $500.168 The district court denied the
motion.169 After trial ended in plaintiffs' favor several months later,
plaintiffs filed a second motion for Rule 11 sanctions.170 The motion was
served and filed on the same day.'71 Three months after filing, the
district court entered an order imposing sanctions against defendant's
counsel requiring him to pay attorneys' fees of $33,292 to plaintiffs,
which constituted all of the attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiffs in the
litigation, and $2,306.69 to the court.172
On appeal, the sanctioned attorney argued, among other things, that
plaintiffs' Rule 11 motion failed to comply with the safe harbor
provision-the motion was not served on defendant twenty-one days
prior to filing. 173 The district court had concluded that compliance with
the safe harbor provision was not needed in this case because the Rule 11
motion was filed after the case was concluded at trial, and, therefore,
there was no way that defendant or its counsel could have withdrawn its
pleadings at that point.174  The Seventh Circuit disagreed. The safe
harbor provision, according to the appellate court, was not an empty
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1023-24. There is absolutely no indication in the opinion that plaintiffs actually
filed a separate Rule 11 motion. Instead, it appears that plaintiffs merely included a
request for sanctions as part of their motion to dismiss. See id.
169 Id. at 1024.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. The district court originally ordered defendant's attorney to pay $40,171.07 in
attorneys' fees and $5,000 to the court. Id. The district court subsequently amended the
sanctions pursuant to defense counsel's motion for reconsideration. Id. The district court
also held, however, that if defendant satisfied the entire judgment against it, defendant's
counsel would only be required to pay $2,306.69 into the court. Id. By imposing sanctions
in this fashion, it appears that the district court created a conflict of interest between the
attorney and his client because the attorney's potential out-of-pocket liability was
conditioned on whether his client paid the judgment against it. Id.
173 Id. at 1025.
174 Id. at 1026.
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formality.1 75 The court found, however, that the provision was satisfied
in the instant case by taking notice of plaintiffs' September 1996, Rule 11
motion, which had been served on defense counsel more than twenty-
one days prior to final judgment176
According to the appellate court, at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion
to dismiss and for sanctions, the district court had denied the motion
after concluding that defendant's counterclaim raised questions of fact;
the motion was, therefore, premature. 177 The Seventh Circuit interpreted
this action by the district court as effectively extending the safe harbor
for defendant and its counsel until trial, notwithstanding the fact that the
only motion for sanctions that appears to have been filed by plaintiffs
prior to final judgment was the one included with their motion to
dismiss, which violates Rule 11's separate motion requirement and
which was denied by the district court on October 17, 1996.178 By
interpreting the district court's action in this fashion, the Seventh Circuit
was able to conclude that plaintiffs had effectively complied with the
twenty-one day safe harbor provision. 179 The court, therefore, affirmed
the imposition of sanctions but vacated the amount of the sanctions
imposed by the district court.18 0
175 Id.
176 Id. Here again, the Seventh Circuit makes no mention of whether the separate Rule 11
motion that was served on defense counsel was actually filed in court. Id. Instead, the
court simply took "notice of the September 1996, service on [defense counsel] by
[plaintiffs]." Id. This reinforces the conclusion that plaintiffs never filed a separate Rule 11
motion with the district court.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1026-27.
179 Id. at 1027.
We find that [plaintiffs] effectively complied with the twenty-one day
safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(1)(A), and the dismissal of
[plaintiffs'] initial motion to sanction [defense counsel] as premature
did not extinguish this effective notice. Therefore the district court did
not abuse its discretion in granting [plaintiffs'] motion for sanctions
Id.
18o Id. The Seventh Circuit "reject[ed] the [district court's] blanket award of fees." Id. at
1030. The appellate court was unable to "accept the [district] court's suggestion that all
[plaintiffs'] legal expenses were costs directly resulting from [defense counsel's]
sanctionable activities." Id. The court, therefore, remanded the case to the district court to
determine which portion of plaintiffs' legal costs were the direct result of the sanctionable
conduct. Id. at 1031.
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Research revealed very little case law in the Third Circuit addressing
the safe harbor provision. The one case discovered, however, suggests
that strict compliance with the provision is not required. 181 In Zuk v.
Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute of the Medical College of
Pennsylvania,182 plaintiff sued defendant for copyright infringement. 83
On June 19, 1995, defendant filed a motion to dismiss.184 While its
motion to dismiss was pending, defendant mailed plaintiff's counsel a
notice of its intention to move for sanctions under Rule 11.185 The district
court subsequently granted the motion to dismiss. On September 15,
1995, defendant filed its motion for Rule 11 sanctions.18 6 On November
1, 1995, the district court also issued an order to show cause why Rule 11
sanctions "should not be imposed for (a) filing the complaint, and failing
to withdraw it; and (b) signing and filing each and every document
presented." 87  On February 1, 1996, the district court granted
defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions and held plaintiff and his
counsel jointly and severally liable for $15,000 in attorneys' fees payable
to the defendant.188
On appeal, plaintiff's counsel argued that the Rule 11 sanctions were
improperly imposed. 89 More specifically, he argued that he was not
given the benefit of the safe harbor provision because the complaint was
dismissed before he had had a full opportunity, i.e., twenty-one days, to
withdraw it.19° Defendant countered that the Rule 11 sanctions were
actually imposed on the court's own initiative, i.e., pursuant to the
181 On August 28, 2001, two additional searches of the Third Circuit database (CTA3) on
Westlaw were conducted specifically because only one safe harbor case was uncovered in
that circuit. The specific searches were as follows: (1) "FRCP 11" "Rule 11" /p "safe
harbor" & DA(AFT 11/30/1993); and (2) "FRCP 11(c)(1)(A)" "Rule 11(c)(1)(A)" & DA(AFT
11/30/1993). Both searches produced a single opinion, namely, Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania
Psychiatric Institute of te Medical College of Pennsylvania, 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996).
182 103 F.3d 294.
183 Id. at 296.
184 Id.
185 Id. The opinion refers to some form of "notice" being sent to plaintiff's counsel. Thus
it is not clear if a separate Rule 11 motion was served on plaintiff's counsel.
186 Id. Defendant also filed a motion for attorneys' fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 of the
Copyright Act and for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 297.
189 Plaintiff had settled his liability with defendant, paying $6,250, leaving plaintiff's
counsel liable for $8,750. Id.
190 Id.
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district court's order to show cause,191 and, therefore, no safe harbor was
required.192  At oral argument, plaintiff's counsel apparently
acknowledged that he would not have withdrawn the complaint even if
he had been provided with the full twenty-one day safe harbor period.1 93
As a result of this concession, the Third Circuit held that it did not need
to address plaintiff's counsel's safe harbor argument. 94
The Zuk opinion is troubling because the Third Circuit appeared
willing to, and in fact did, overlook the procedural defects in defendant's
Rule 11 motion, specifically, the apparent failure to comply with either
the separate motion requirement or the safe harbor provision. Therefore,
the Zuk opinion seems to imply that the safe harbor provision is not an
absolute requirement precluding a party from filing and being awarded
sanctions upon a Rule 11 motion if the non-moving party later admits
that it would not have withdrawn the challenged contention within the
safe harbor period.
The problem, however, is that Rule 11(c)(1)(A) explicitly requires the
moving party both to serve a separate Rule 11 motion and to wait
twenty-one days prior to filing it with the court, unless a shorter time
period is ordered by the court.195 It does not provide that the non-
moving party is only entitled to the benefit and protection of the safe
harbor provision if she actually takes advantage of it. Clearly, if the non-
moving party takes advantage of the safe harbor period, there would not
be a problem at all; the challenged contention would be withdrawn or
amended. A Rule 11 problem only exists where the non-moving party
191 The Third Circuit noted, however, that "[tlhe district court issued an order to show
cause, which is required only under 11(c)(1)(B), but stated that it was 'in consideration of
defendant's motion for sanctions.' In its accompanying memorandum, the district court
did not address this apparent inconsistency." Id. Of course, the problem with the
defendant's argument that the Rule 11 sanctions were imposed via an order to show cause
is that the sanction imposed, i.e., attorneys' fees, is not authorized under Rule 11 when the
district court acts on its own initiative. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
192 Zuk, 103 F.3d at 299 n.3. Unfortunately, the Zuk opinion fails to provide a couple of
critical dates. Specifically, it does not disclose: (1) when defendant's "notice" to plaintiff's
counsel was sent; or (2) when the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss.
Consequently, it is impossible to determine how much time, if any, plaintiff was given to
withdraw or correct his complaint prior to dismissal of the action. Based on the parties'
arguments on appeal, however, it seems clear that plaintiff was not given the benefit of a
full twenty-one days prior to dismissal.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
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does not take advantage of the safe harbor period. Even this statement
of the problem assumes in the first instance, however, that a safe harbor
was actually provided. The question, therefore, is whether failure to
comply with the safe harbor provision should be excused completely,
thereby authorizing Rule 11 sanctions to be imposed upon motion by a
party, where the non-moving party later admits that she would not have
withdrawn the challenged contention within the safe harbor period. The
Third Circuit in Zuk answered this question affirmatively. Based on the
explicit language of Rule 11, however, the question should have been
answered in the negative; any other interpretation would severely
undercut the effectiveness of the safe harbor provision.
c. Timing
Given that the safe harbor provision requires that the non-moving
party be given twenty-one days to correct or withdraw the challenged
contention, determining when a Rule 11 motion has to be served and filed
is critical. Can the moving party wait until after final disposition of the
case to pursue Rule 11 sanctions? The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits have all answered this question in the negative.1 96
In Ridder v. City of Springfield,197 for example, plaintiff filed a civil
rights action against the City of Springfield and individual defendants. 198
After discovery was concluded, the City moved for summary
judgment.199 On February 28, 1995, the magistrate judge dismissed all of
plaintiff's claims against all of the defendants. 200 On March 28, 1995, the
City moved for attorneys' fees and/or sanctions pursuant to several
196 See, e.g., Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2000). In Tompkins, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' Rule 11 motions for two reasons. Id. at
788. First, defendants did not file their motions until after trial had concluded, and, second,
they failed to provide plaintiffs with the twenty-one day safe harbor by serving the Rule 11
motions either on the same day they were filed or shortly before. Id. As a result,
defendants, according to the Fifth Circuit, "den[ied] the [plaintiffs] a reasonable
opportunity to correct their complaint." Id. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court appropriately denied the Rule 11 sanctions. Id.
197 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997).
198 Id. at 290. Plaintiff filed a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants
stemnming from his arrest and pre-trial incarceration for rape and related charges. Id. DNA
tests later exonerated plaintiff and all charges were dropped. Id. at 291.
199 Id.
200 Id.
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different sanctioning provisions, including Rule 11.201 On October 11,
1995, the magistrate judge granted the City's motion for Rule 11
sanctions and ordered plaintiff's counsel to pay the City $32,546.02 in
attorneys' fees.202 Rule 11 sanctions were imposed notwithstanding
defendant's failure to comply with the safe harbor provision.203
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was called upon to "determine the
propriety of sanctions under [Rule 11] as amended in 1993, when a
motion for sanctions is filed without satisfying the requisite 'safe harbor'
period and after a court has entered summary judgment."204 The Sixth
Circuit held, first, that a Rule 11 motion filed after final disposition of a
case is not timely and, second, that the safe harbor provision is an
absolute requirement that must be satisfied before sanctions can be
awarded upon a motion.2 5
With respect to the first issue, the court acknowledged that the text
of Rule 11 did not specify when a motion should be brought.2 6 The
court specifically recognized, however, that "[b]y virtue of the fact that
under the 1993 amendments, 'a Rule 11 motion cannot be made unless
there is some paper, claim, or contention that can be withdrawn,' ... it
follows that a party cannot wait to seek sanctions until after the
contention has been judicially disposed." 207 As a result, the Sixth Circuit
concluded,
A party must now serve a Rule 11 motion on the
allegedly offending party at least twenty-one days prior
to conclusion of the case or judicial rejection of the
offending contention. If the court disposes of the
offending contention before the twenty-one day (safe
harbor) period expires, a motion for sanctions cannot be
filed with or presented to the court. Any other
201 Id. The City also moved for sanctions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id.
at 291-92.
202 Id. at 292. The district court also granted the City's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927. Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 295.
205 Id. at 295-97.
206 Id.
207 Id. (citation omitted).
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interpretation would defeat the rule's explicit
requirements. 208
In the Ridder case, there was no question that the City failed to
comply with the safe harbor provision.2°9 The City argued, however,
that compliance with the safe harbor provision should be excused in this
case because it would have been "a vain act;" plaintiff's counsel had
made it abundantly clear throughout the litigation that he did not intend
to withdraw his claims against the City.210 The Sixth Circuit disagreed,
holding that the safe harbor provision was an absolute requirement and
that the City's failure to comply with it meant that its Rule 11 motion
should not have been filed with the court.211
Notwithstanding the fact that the safe harbor provision was
mandatory, the magistrate judge who imposed Rule 11 sanctions found,
and the City argued on appeal, that insisting on the safe harbor
provision was "'an empty formality' when a motion for sanctions comes
after summary judgment has been granted." 212 The Sixth Circuit agreed,
stating that "[bly virtue of its nature, the 'safe harbor' provision cannot
have any effect if the court has already rendered its judgment in the case;
it is too late for the offending party to withdraw the challenged claim."213
Rather than excusing the City's noncompliance with the safe harbor
provision, however, which was the conclusion argued for by the City,
the court held that the City had "given up the opportunity to receive an
award of Rule 11 sanctions in this case by waiting to file the motion until
after the entry of summary judgment." 214 The Sixth Circuit reasoned,
A party seeking sanctions must leave sufficient
opportunity for the opposing party to choose whether to
withdraw or cure the offense voluntarily before the
court disposes of the challenged contention. Pragmatic
208 Id. (citations omitted). A district court would be permitted, however, to defer its
ruling on the sanctions motion until after the final disposition of the case. Id. In other
words, the motion must be filed prior to final disposition but need not be decided until
after final resolution of the case. Id.
209 Id. Counsel for the City admitted that "it did not serve the motion for sanctions on
Ridder's counsel prior to filing the motion with the court .... Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 296-97.
214 Id. at 297.
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realities require such strict adherence to the rule's
outlined procedure. By delaying the motion until after
summary judgment was granted, [the City] deprived
[plaintiff's] counsel of the "safe harbor" to which the
rule says he is entitled.215
The appellate court thus held that Rule 11 sanctions are unavailable
"unless the motion for sanctions is served on the opposing party for the
full twenty-one day 'safe harbor' period before it is filed with or
presented to the court."216 Significantly, the court went on to state that
"this service and filing must occur prior to final judgment or judicial
rejection of the offending contention." 217
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar approach. In Barber v.
Miller,218 the plaintiff filed a forty-page complaint against several
defendants alleging, among other things, patent infringement,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff did not own the patent at
issue.219 The defendant's counsel gave the plaintiff repeated notice via
phone calls and letters of the deficiency and of his client's intent to seek
Rule 11 sanctions unless the complaint was dismissed.220 The defendant
eventually filed a motion to dismiss the patent claim in which it included
a request for Rule 11 sanctions. 221 Almost three months after the district
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice, the
defendant moved for sanctions under Rule 11 and served plaintiff's
attorney with the motion.222 Approximately three months later, the
district court awarded the defendant $2,500 in sanctions against the
215 Id. The court also cautioned against using hindsight to decide Rule 11 motions by
stating that "neither the opposing party nor the magistrate judge should, with hindsight,
step into the attorney's shoes to speculate as to whether the prospect of a fine or other
sanctions would have sufficiently motivated the attorney to withdraw the offense." Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. (emphasis added); see also Bernstein v. Remer, No. 96-2232, 1997 WL 685369, at *1
(6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1997) (vacating the district court's order granting the defendant's Rule 11
motion where defendant served and filed its Rule 11 motion on the same day and after the
case was dismissed); Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 123 F.3d 374, 384 (6th Cir.
1997) (affirming denial of defendants' Rule 11 motion because defendants failed to timely
file their motion, waiting until after trial and verdict to serve and file the motion).
218 146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998).
219 Id. at 709.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on October 16, 1995.
Id. On January 19, 1996, defendant filed and served its sanctions motion. Id.
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plaintiff's attorney.223 The district court concluded that complying with
the safe harbor provision in this case "would have been futile, because
the offending complaint had already been dismissed." 224 The district
court also noted that the Rule 11 motion was in fact filed and served
more than twenty-one days prior to the deadline for filing. 225
Defendant's only error with respect to the safe harbor provision,
therefore, was in filing its motion with the court too soon, "not by
serving it on Plaintiff too late." 226
The Ninth Circuit reversed. The appellate court had no doubt that
Rule 11 had been violated.227 The problem with the district court's order,
however, was twofold. First, the defendant did not follow the
procedures required by Rule 11(c)(1)(A), namely, the separate motion
and safe harbor provisions, to be awarded sanctions upon its motion.228
Second, by filing its motion after the complaint had been dismissed, the
defendant deprived the plaintiff of the protection specifically afforded
him by the safe harbor provision. 229 According to the Ninth Circuit, the
purpose of the safe harbor provision is to give the non-moving party an
opportunity to withdraw or correct a challenged pleading and thereby
escape sanctions entirely.230 Hence, a Rule 11 motion served after
dismissal of the complaint deprived the plaintiff of that opportunity. 231
Because the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to respond to the
defendant's motion by withdrawing his claim, which would have
completely immunized him against sanctions, the purpose of the safe
harbor provision was entirely defeated. 232 The Ninth Circuit thus held
that, "[iun light of the clear language and intent of the amended Rule, we
agree with the Sixth Circuit that 'a party cannot wait until after summary
judgment to move for sanctions under Rule 11."'233
2 Id.
224 Id. at 710.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 711.
228 Id. at 710.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that informal warnings, such as the phone calls and
letters, were not sufficient to trigger the safe harbor provision. Id.
233 Id. at 711 (quoting Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997)); accord
Madamba v. Certified Grocers Cal., Ltd., No. 97-15017, 1998 WL 339685, at *2 (9th Cir. May
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The Third Circuit has gone so far as to adopt a supervisory rule
applicable to all courts in that circuit, which requires "that all motions
requesting Rule 11 sanctions be filed in the district court before the entry
of a final judgment."234 According to the Third Circuit, this approach to
Rule 11 motions "serves the interest of judicial economy without risking
a significant waste of district court efforts." 235 The Third Circuit has
adhered to its supervisory rule and has reversed Rule 11 sanctions where
the motions were untimely filed. 236
At the same time, the supervisory rule was first adopted by the
Third Circuit with respect to the 1983 version of Rule 11, and most of the
cases in which it has been applied deal with the old Rule. 237 A 1999
decision by the Third Circuit, however, makes clear that the supervisory
rule adopted in 1988 has been valid and applicable to all Rule 11 cases. 238
7, 1998) (holding that, because defendant "delayed service of the Rule 11 motion until after
its summary judgment motion had been filed, and delayed filing of the Rule 11 motion
until after final judgment had been entered, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the motion for sanctions was untimely").
2M MaryAnn Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Third
Circuit went on to say that, "[wihere appropriate, such motions should be filed at an earlier
time-as soon as practicable after discovery of the Rule 11 violation." Id.
235 Id. at 99. According to the Third Circuit,
Rather than misusing scarce resources, timely filing and disposition of
Rule 11 motions should conserve judicial energies. In the district
court, resolution of the issue before the inevitable delay of the
appellate process will be more efficient because of current familiarity
with the matter. Similarly, concurrent consideration of challenges to
the merits and the imposition of sanctions avoids the invariable
demand on two separate appellate panels to acquaint themselves with
the underlying facts and the parties' respective legal positions.
Id. (citation omitted).
2M See, e.g., Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Invs., 951
F.2d 1399, 1413 (3d Cir. 1991); Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int'l, 899 F.2d 250, 251 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990);
Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 92.
237 See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
2M See Prosser v. Prosser, 186 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit extended the
Pensiero supervisory rule to sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at 405 (citing Simmerman v.
Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 1994)). In explaining its reasoning, the court stated,
Our precedent concerning Rule 11 sanctions helps guide our review
here. In Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1988),
we adopted a supervisory rule requiring parties to file all motions for
Rule 11 sanctions before entry of the court's final order .... We
extended this rule [in 1994] to apply to courts considering Rule 11
sanctions in Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Third Circuit has affirmed Rule
11 sanctions imposed by motions filed after final judgment. In Zuk v.
Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute of the Medical College of
Pennsylvania,39 defendant filed its Rule 11 motion after its motion to
dismiss was granted. 240 Almost five months later, the district court
awarded defendant $15,000 in attorneys' fees, to be paid jointly and
severally by the plaintiff and his counsel.241 On appeal, the Third Circuit
upheld the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.242 It vacated the type and
amount of sanctions imposed,243 however, and remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings.244 Because it was remanding the
case, the Third Circuit spent some time in the opinion addressing issues
that it was certain would arise in the court below.245 Notably, no
mention was ever made of the Third Circuit's supervisory rule.
The Sixth Circuit has similarly contradicted itself with respect to the
propriety of post-judgment Rule 11 motions. In Barker v. Bank One,
Lexington, N.A., 246 the district court dismissed the complaint against
some of the forty defendants sued by plaintiff, and, on April 11, 1996,
final judgment was entered.247 On May 9, 1996, defendants served
plaintiff with their Rule 11 motion.248 The motion was subsequently filed
on May 31, 1996.249 On April 29, 1997, the district court granted
defendants' motion and ordered plaintiff and his counsel jointly to pay
Id. The Third Circuit thus takes it as an established fact that the supervisory rule has
existed since 1988 and seems to assume that it has been applicable to Rule 11 decisions in
that circuit since that time. Id.
239 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996).
240 Id. at 296.
241 Id. at 297.
242 Id. at 301.
243 Id. The court found "no error in the district court's imposition of fee sanctions upon
the appellant" but concluded that "the amount may be contrary to the current spirit of Rule
11." Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. The issues that the court focused on consisted of the "proper type and amount of
sanctions to be imposed pursuant to Rule 11 under the particular circumstances of the
case." Id. at 298.
246 No. 96-1199, 1998 WL 466437 (6th Cir. July 30,1998).
247 Id. at "1.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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defendants $15,726.75 in attorneys' fees and ordered plaintiff to pay
defendants an additional $12,914.05 in fees.250
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Rule 11 sanctions on appeal in spite of
plaintiff's argument that the sanctions were improperly granted because
defendants had failed to comply with Rule 11's safe harbor provision by
filing their motion after final judgment in violation of the Ridder case.251
The panel of the Sixth Circuit that upheld the sanctions in Barker
acknowledged, first, that the purpose of the safe harbor provision was to
enable a party or its counsel to avoid sanctions by taking appropriate
corrective action and, second, that another panel of the Sixth Circuit25 2
had previously held in Ridder that "service must occur at least 21 days
before final judgment, otherwise the opportunity to invoke the safe
harbor is lost." 253 According to the Barker court, however, the two cases
were distinguishable because, in Barker, defendants had sent plaintiff
warning letters several months before the case was dismissed.254 The
plaintiff in Barker, therefore, unlike the plaintiff in Ridder, actually
received advance warning that Rule 11 sanctions would be sought and
was given ample time to correct the alleged violation.255 The court also
seemed to be swayed by the fact that defendants' post-judgment Rule 11
motion was served on plaintiff twenty-one days prior to filing.25 6
Unfortunately, there are several obvious problems with the Barker
court's holding and reasoning. First, the pre-dismissal warning letters
did not satisfy Rule 11's separate motion requirement and, hence, did not
trigger the safe harbor period prior to final judgment. Second, Barker
clearly contradicts Ridder, despite the Barker court's attempt to
distinguish the two cases. By serving and filing their Rule 11 motion
after final judgment was entered, defendants deprived plaintiff of any
meaningful opportunity to correct the alleged Rule 11 violation and
250 Id.
21 Id. at *1-2.
252 The panel that decided the Ridder case included Circuit Judges Suhrheinrich and
Moore, and District Court Judge McKinley. See Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288,
290 (6th Cir. 1997). The Barker panel included Circuit Judges Suhrheinrich and Daughtrey,
and District Court Judge McKeague. See Barker, 1998 WL 466437, at *1. Circuit Judge
Moore, who was not present on the Barker panel, authored the Ridder decision. Ridder, 109
F.3d at 290.
253 Barker, 1998 WL 466437, at *2 (citing Ridder, 109 F.3d at 294).
254 Id.
25 Id.
256 Id.
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thereby avoid sanctions, which is exactly what Ridder had held violated
the safe harbor provision of the Rule. Consequently, instead of
correcting the procedural errors in the case, the Barker court
compounded them.
But what happens if a Rule 11 motion is served twenty-one days
prior to final judgment but is not actually filed with the court until after
the conclusion of the case? According to the Third Circuit's supervisory
rule257 and the Sixth Circuit in Ridder,258 such a motion would still be
deemed untimely and Rule 11 sanctions would be precluded. A panel of
the Sixth Circuit, however, answered the question differently and
affirmed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in an unpublished
decision. 259
In Powell v. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey,260 plaintiff filed her complaint
in federal district court on April 2, 1997, stating claims for malicious
prosecution and abuse of process. 261 On July 2, 1997, defendant moved
for judgment on the pleadings.262 On the same day, counsel for the
defendant sent plaintiff's counsel a letter requesting that he voluntarily
withdraw the complaint.263 Served with the letter was a copy of
defendant's Rule 11 motion.264 Plaintiff did not withdraw her complaint,
and, on October 29, 1997, the district court granted defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings.265 On November 12, 1997, defendant
filed its Rule 11 motion in court.266 The district court subsequently
granted defendant's motion and ordered plaintiff's counsel to pay $1,000
to defendant and $10,000 to the Clients Security Fund of Ohio.267 The
257 See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
25M See Ridder, 109 F.3d at 288; see also supra text accompanying notes 197-217.
259 The panel that decided the case referenced here consisted of Circuit Judges
Krupansky, Ryan, and Suhrheinrich. See Powell v. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Nos. 98-
3668, 98-3670, 1999 WL 519186 (6th Cir. July 16, 1999). Interestingly, Circuit Judge
Suhrheinrich participated in the decisions in Ridder, Barker, and Powell. He apparently
agreed with the holding and reasoning in each of these cases as he did not file dissenting
opinions in any of them.
260 Nos. 98-3668, 98-3670, 1999 WL 519186 (6th Cir. July 16, 1999).
261 Id. at *1.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at *1-2.
267 Id. at *2.
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latter sanction never had to be paid, however, if certain conditions were
met.
268
On appeal, the sanctioned attorney based his argument on the Ridder
case. 269 More specifically, he argued that sanctions were improper under
Ridder because defendant waited to file its Rule 11 motion until after final
judgment was entered in its favor.270  While the Powell court
acknowledged that the Ridder opinion included language stating that a
Rule 11 motion must be filed prior to final judgment, the court held that
that particular language in the opinion was dicta and, therefore, not
binding on subsequent panels of the Sixth Circuit. 271 Consequently,
because defendant's Rule 11 motion was served more than twenty-one
days prior to filing and the service occurred prior to final judgment, the
court held that the safe harbor provision had been complied with272 and
the imposition of sanctions was proper.273
The Powell court's determination that the language in Ridder
requiring pre-judgment filing of Rule 11 motions was dicta is debatable
and problematic. The statement is problematic because if the Powell
court's interpretation of Ridder is correct, at least with respect to when a
Rule 11 motion should be filed, then its "dicta" argument would (or
should, to be consistent) also apply to the language in Ridder that
268 Id. The district court suspended payment of the sanction to the Security Fund on
condition that plaintiff's attorney "obtain a written opinion from a member of the
Columbus Bar Association before taking action to depose a lawyer representing a client, or
filing an action sounding in malicious prosecution or abuse of process against a lawyer
based on the lawyer's representation of a client." Id.
269 Id. at *2-3.
270 Id.
271 According to the Powell court,
The determination in Ridder that the motion was required to be filed
with the court prior to adjudication of the case was unnecessary
because the defendant failed to comply with Rule 11 when it did not
serve the motion on the plaintiff's counsel for the twenty-one day "safe
harbor" period. Accordingly, to the extent that Ridder stands for such
a proposition, it is dicta and not binding on this court.
Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
272 Id. at *2.
27 Id. at *4. While the Sixth Circuit affirmed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, it
vacated the portion of the district court's order requiring the sanctioned attorney to pay
$10,000 to the Clients Security Fund of Ohio, because, in essence, "the district court
imposed a perpetual penalty on [the sanctioned attorney] that may impede the effective
representation of future clients." Id.
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required a Rule 11 motion to be served prior to entry of final judgment.
The reason for this conclusion is simple. It is true that Rule 11 does not
explicitly state when a Rule 11 motion must be filed; the Rule only
provides that such a motion must be served twenty-one days prior to
filing. But it is also true that there is no language in Rule 11 that
explicitly requires that a Rule 11 motion be served prior to final judgment
either. Nothing in the text of Rule 11, in other words, compels either of
the positions taken by the Sixth Circuit in Ridder. Consequently, both
positions, i.e., that a Rule 11 motion must be served and filed prior to
final judgment, could arguably be deemed dicta if the Powell court's
interpretation is correct; and this result, if Ridder is later interpreted in
this fashion, is extremely problematic precisely because it would
severely undercut the effectiveness of the safe harbor provision in
reducing Rule 11's chilling effects.
The Powell court's decision to designate an important part of Ridder
as dicta is also debatable for the same reason. Again, there is nothing in
the explicit language of Rule 11 to compel either of the positions taken by
the Sixth Circuit in Ridder. Yet, several federal circuit courts of appeals,
including the Sixth Circuit, have so held.274 And at least three circuits,
again with the Sixth Circuit among them even after Ridder, have also
interpreted Rule 11 to require that Rule 11 motions must be filed prior to
final judgment.275 Therefore, compelling policy considerations that seem
to serve the purposes of the 1993 amendments, rather than the text of the
Rule, appear to have motivated the Sixth Circuit and the other federal
appellate courts deciding these issues to hold that a Rule 11 motion must
be both served and filed prior to final judgment.276 Consequently, a
strong argument can be made that Ridder's language requiring a Rule 11
motion to be filed before the case is concluded is not dicta at all. Suffice
it to say at this point that the Powell case definitely represents a lower
threshold for imposing Rule 11 sanctions than that suggested by
Ridder.277
Of the five circuits that have addressed the timing issue in some
fashion, only the Seventh Circuit has consistently held that Rule 11
motions can be filed after the case has been concluded. In Divane v.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 197-217 (discussing the Sixth Circuit decisions).
275 The three circuits are the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. See supra Part III.A.l.c.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 197-238 (discussing the Sixth Circuit decisions).
277 See infra Part IV.B.
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Krull Electric Co., 278 for example, the district court sanctioned defendant's
attorney, pursuant to plaintiffs' Rule 11 motion, and ordered the attorney
to pay $33,292 to plaintiff in attorneys' fees and $2,306.69 to the court.279
Plaintiffs' Rule 11 motion was both served and filed after a bench trial
ended in plaintiffs' favor.28 0
The sanctioned attorney argued on appeal that, "since the purpose of
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) is to deter claimants from filing frivolous motions and
pleadings, delaying the decision to allow motions for sanctions until
after final judgment 'completely defeats the interests' that the Rule hopes
to promote." 281 Once judgment is entered, the argument continued,
"imposition of sanctions cannot affect the prior filing of motions, because
parties have no opportunity to correct their sanctionable conduct."282
The Seventh Circuit disagreed and declined to establish a set time period
for filing Rule 11 motions because the Rule itself was silent on the
matter.283 Instead, the court decided to leave the timing of Rule 11
motions to the discretion of the district courts. 284
In Divane, therefore, because the district court had concluded that
"the lack of evidentiary support for defendant's counterclaim could not
have been determined until trial was completed," the Seventh Circuit
concluded that a post-judgment Rule 11 motion was appropriate. 28 5 In
support of that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "the
interest in deterring further frivolous post-judgment motions by the
same litigants or in deterring future litigants may be promoted by a post-
judgment request for sanctions." 286
The problem, of course, is that Divane did not involve a post-
judgment motion that was the subject of a Rule 11 motion.287 Instead, the
case involved a post-judgment Rule 11 motion based on pre-judgment
278 200 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1999).
279 Id. at 1024.
280 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 163-80 (discussing Divane and the safe
harbor provision).
281 Divane, 200 F.3d at 1025.
282 Id.
283 Id. ("Rule 11(c)(1)(A) does not specify any time period when a motion for sanctions
must be filed, and we see no need to establish one.").
284 Id.
285 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
296 Id.
287 Id.
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filings. 288 The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in support of the district
court's order granting plaintiffs' post-judgment Rule 11 motion is,
therefore, inapposite because it should go without saying that post-
judgment motions can themselves be the target of a Rule 11 motion.28 9
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has continued to adhere to its position
that requests for sanctions can be made following final judgment.290
d. Summary
Probably the most striking aspect of the federal appellate case law
addressing Rule 11 motion practice is its inconsistency in terms of the
interpretation and application of the 1993 procedural amendments.
More specifically, there are intercircuit conflicts on all of the following
issues: (1) warning letters and the separate motion requirement-the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits take the position that a separate
motion, not a warning letter, is required to trigger Rule 11's safe harbor
provision; the Sixth Circuit has taken the position that a warning letter
provides sufficient notice;291 (2) the safe harbor provision-the Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all strictly construed this provision as
requiring compliance or the Rule 11 motion must be denied; the Third
Circuit, however, does not appear to strictly construe this provision and,
instead, has found substantial compliance to be sufficient;292 (3) timing
(service and filing after final judgment)-the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits have all held that a Rule 11 motion served and filed after a final
judgment is entered in a case must be denied; the Seventh Circuit, on the
other hand, makes no such hard and fast rule and has decided to allow
the district courts to determine when a Rule 11 motion must be served
and filed on a case-by-case basis; 293 (4) timing (service prior to but filing
after final judgment)-here, the Third and Sixth Circuits have held that a
Rule 11 motion must be both served and filed prior to final judgment or
2M8 Id.
289 Even in that situation, however, Rule 11 sanctions can only be imposed if the
procedural requirements of the Rule are satisfied.
290 See, e.g., In re Rimsat, 212 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Divane in support of its
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions pursuant
to defendant's motion filed after the case had settled). In fact, based on the Divane opinion,
the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the Third Circuit's contrary approach to the issue.
Id.
291 See supra Part III.A.l.a.
292 See supra Part III.A.l.b.
M See supra Part III.A.l.c.
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it must be denied; again, the Seventh Circuit would leave the timing of a
Rule 11 motion in the hands of the district courts. 294
Significantly, however, there are also pronounced intracircuit
conflicts, i.e., case law from one circuit actually contradicts cases from
that same circuit with respect to the following procedural amendments:
(1) the safe harbor provision-the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held
that substantial, rather than strict, compliance with the safe harbor
provision is sufficient;295 (2) timing (service and filing before final
judgment)-the Third and Sixth Circuits have upheld district court
decisions that imposed Rule 11 sanctions where the Rule 11 motion was
not both served and filed prior to final judgment;296 (3) timing (service
before judgment, filing after final judgment)-the Sixth Circuit has
affirmed a decision imposing Rule 11 sanctions where the Rule 11
motion was served prior to final judgment but not filed until
afterwards.297
2. Rule 11 and Orders to Show Cause
A Rule 11 motion is not the only mechanism by which Rule 11
sanctions may be imposed. Such sanctions may also be imposed by a
federal district court judge upon her own initiative. Unlike practice
under the 1983 version of the Rule, however, the district court's
substantial discretion is somewhat constrained by two significant
limitations. First, before the district court judge may impose Rule 11
sanctions, she must issue an order to show cause. Second, even if the
judge determines that Rule 11 sanctions are warranted, her authority to
award monetary sanctions, particularly monetary sanctions in the form
of attorneys' fees, is significantly curtailed. 298
294 See supra Part III.A.l.c.
295 Compare supra text accompanying notes 151-57, with supra text accompanying notes
158-61 (Ninth Circuit); compare supra note 150 and accompanying text, with supra text
accompanying notes 163-80 (Seventh Circuit).
296 See supra text accompanying notes 239-45 (Third Circuit); supra text accompanying
notes 246-56 (Sixth Circuit).
297 See supra text accompanying notes 259-73.
298 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B), 11(c)(2); see also supra notes 85-100 and accompanying
text.
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a. The Order to Show Cause Procedure and Due Process
The order to show cause procedure, namely, the requirement that
the district court enter an order specifically describing the conduct
violating Rule 11,299 embodies the principle of due process, and due
process does appear to be required by the federal appellate courts.300 At
a minimum, due process requires that the party against whom sanctions
are sought be given: (1) particularized notice of the conduct alleged to
be sanctionable; (2) particularized notice of the authority or authorities
under which sanctions are being sought; and (3) an opportunity to
respond.301
The purpose of such particularized notice is to make counsel
explicitly aware of the factors she must address if she is to avoid
299 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B). "On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with
respect thereto." Id.
3o0 See, e.g., Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that Rule 11(c)(1)(B), which allows the federal district courts to impose Rule 11
sanctions via an order to show cause, "embodies the due process principle that 'a party is
entitled to notice of the provision under which sanctions are sought, in order that he be
forewarned as to the standard under which his conduct is to be evaluated"') (citation
omitted). In Baffa, the Second Circuit reversed the $45,000 Rule 11 sanctions imposed on
plaintiff because, among other things, the district court failed to enter an order to show
cause and, therefore, denied the sanctioned plaintiff notice and opportunity to respond. Id.
301 See, e.g., Sakon v. Andreo, 119 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1997).
An attorney whom the court proposes to sanction 'must receive
specific notice of the conduct alleged to be sanctionable ... , and an
opportunity to be heard on the matter,' and 'must be forewarned of the
authority under which sanctions are being considered, and given a
chance to defend himself against specific charges.'
Id. (citations omitted). See also Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The
party sought to be sanctioned is entitled to particularized notice of including, at a
minimum, 1) the fact that Rule 11 sanctions are under consideration, [and] 2) the reasons
why sanctions are under consideration .. ") (citations omitted). In the Second Circuit, the
party moving for sanctions is also required to provide notice of the standard by which the
allegedly sanctionable conduct is to be assessed. See, e.g., Sakon, 119 F.3d at 114 (reversing
$2,700 sanctions imposed by district court for, among other things, violating due process by
failing to provide adequate notice). In the Third Circuit, the moving party is required to
provide notice of the form sanctions might take. See, e.g., Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 64
(reversing sanctions imposed by district court via order to show cause for, among other
things, violating due process by failing to provide notice and opportunity to respond).
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sanctions.3 2 The mere existence of a sanctioning rule or provision, like
Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927, therefore, does not provide sufficient notice
to satisfy due process.30 3 For example, the Second Circuit in Nuwesra v.
Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 304 reversed $25,000 sanctions in the
form of attorneys' fees imposed on plaintiff's counsel by a federal district
court via an order to show cause.30 5 The appellate court held that the
sanctions violated due process when the district court failed to apprise
the sanctioned plaintiff of the particular conduct that was alleged to be
sanctionable or to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to
respond.306 The order to show cause merely informed plaintiff that the
court would be awarding sanctions based on one or more of the four
sanctioning provisions it listed, including Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.307
The district court also failed to question plaintiff at the sanctions hearing
about the "specific instances of conduct for which it later sanctioned
[plaintiffq."308
Not surprisingly, therefore, the federal circuit courts generally
appear to require the federal district courts to issue orders to show cause
before they impose Rule 11 sanctions.3° 9 In Johnson v. Waddell & Reed,
302 Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted); cf. Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 64 ("Only with this information can a party respond to
the court's concerns in an intelligent manner.").
303 See, e.g., Ted Lapidus, S.A. v. Vann, 112 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing $10,000
sanctions imposed against defense counsel by the district court on its own initiative
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 based on a finding that the sanctions violated due process
because sanctioned attorney did not receive the notice he was entitled to-the only
sanctioning provision he was adequately put on notice of was Rule 11); Zuk v. E. Pa.
Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing a district
court order imposing $15,000 sanctions against plaintiff and his counsel, jointly and
severally, pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because, among other things, the
district court failed to provide plaintiff and his counsel with adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard).
304 174 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1999).
305 Id.
306 Id. at 92-93.
307 Id. at 92. For a description of § 1927, see supra note 19.
308 Nuwesra, 174 F.3d at 93.
309 See, e.g., Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)
(reversing $45,000 Rule 11 sanctions imposed upon plaintiff by district court on its own
initiative where the district court failed to enter an order to show cause and, therefore,
denied plaintiff notice and opportunity to respond); Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 722
(5th Cir. 1999) (reversing district court imposed sanctions on a trustee, reasoning that the
sanctions could be interpreted as stemming from a sua sponte Rule 11(c)(1)(B) decsion, and
if so, "the district court was required to afford [the trustee] notice describing the offending
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Inc.,310 for example, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's order
granting defendants' Rule 11 sanctions for violations of due process.
311
Since defendants did not file a Rule 11 motion, the Seventh Circuit
concluded on appeal that the district court must have acted on its own
initiative in imposing Rule 11 sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees
against plaintiff.312 In reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit
stated,
Rule 11 was specifically and clearly amended to add
formality to the procedure by which a district court
could impose sanctions on its own initiative. Thus, a sua
sponte action by the district court concerning the
imposition of sanctions must include notice and an
opportunity to respond. An order from the court must
describe the specific conduct which appears to violate
Rule 11 and direct the party or counsel to show cause
why it has not violated the rule. 313
The appellate court also rejected defendants' argument that review
of the sanctions award by the district court via plaintiff's Rule 59(e)
motion for consideration satisfied the order to show cause requirement
and, therefore, due process. 314 The main problem with the Rule 59(e)
procedure, according to the appellate court, was that the notice and
opportunity to respond provided "occurred after the sanctions had been
imposed and while they remained in effect . . . . Such a procedure[,
therefore,] complie[d] with neither the letter nor the spirit of Rule
conduct and allow him an opportunity to show cause why sanctions should not be
imposed," yet the record revealed that the trustee was given no such notice or opportunity
and no formal order was issued); L.B. Foster Co. v. Am. Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir.
1998) (reversing Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions where plaintiff's request for
sanctions failed to satisfy Rule 11 motion requirements and the district court did not enter
an order to show cause "or otherwise give [defendant] notice as to the provisions under
which it was considering sanctions"); cf. Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994)
(vacating $500 sanction and remanding to district court with instructions that, "[wihen
acting on its own initiative, ... the district court should first enter an order describing the
specific conduct that it believes will warrant sanctions and direct the person it seeks to
sanction to show cause why particular sanctions should not be imposed").
310 74 F.3d 147 (7th Cir. 1996).
311 Id. at 152.
312 Id. at 151.
313 Id.
314 Id.
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11(c)(1)(B), which require[d] notice and an opportunity to respond before
sanctions [were] imposed."315 Thus, because the procedure mandated
for a district court's award of sanctions on its own initiative was not
followed, the district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions
against plaintiff.316
But does Rule 11, and the federal appellate courts, actually require
the district courts to issue a written order to show cause? In other words,
can statements on the record or even an oral order to show cause satisfy
Rule 11 and due process?
The text of Rule 11 only states that, "[o]n its own initiative, the court
may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate
subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause
why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto."317 Nothing
in the text, therefore, explicitly requires a written order. Nor do the
appellate opinions discussing the significance of an order to show cause
actually indicate that the order must be made in writing.318 In fact, the
Second Circuit has stated in dicta that "a judge's statements on the
record could satisfy the requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(B) in the absence of
a written order to show cause,"319 and the Ninth Circuit has held
similarly in an unpublished opinion.320
The question, however, remains-can an oral order to show cause or
statements on the record by a district court satisfy due process?
Arguably such statements, if they provide the particularized notice
required by due process, can be sufficient. The problem, however, as the
Ninth Circuit case demonstrates, is that the statements may not provide
particularized notice and meaningful opportunity to respond yet may be
deemed to satisfy the order to show cause procedure, satisfying due
process on appeal. 321
315 Id.
316 Id. at 151-52.
317 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
318 See generally the cases cited in this Part, Part III.A.2.a.
319 Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87, 92 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999)
(assuming, without deciding, that such statements would satisfy the order to show cause
procedure required by Rule 11).
320 Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying Serv., Inc., No. 98-35361, 2000 WL 11432 (9th Cir. Jan. 6,
2000).
321 See id.
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In Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying Service, Inc.,322 a federal district judge,
upon his own initiative, imposed Rule 11 sanctions in the form of
attorneys' fees upon plaintiff and his counsel for altering a document
used in their opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss.323 Plaintiff
and his counsel appealed. On appeal they argued that the district court's
failure to issue an order to show cause rendered the sanction order
procedurally defective. 324 The Ninth Circuit disagreed because the
district court: (1) had ordered plaintiff and his counsel, in open court and
by subsequent written order, to appear at an evidentiary hearing; (2)
made it unmistakably clear that the hearing would result in a sanction
order; and (3) specifically requested objections from plaintiff and his
counsel to the notice of the sanction hearing and received none.325 Under
these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that "[tihe district judge gave
more than sufficient notice that the parties would have to show cause
why sanctions should not issue."326 The court also dismissed the
sanctioned parties' argument because "this procedural issue was not
raised in the district court."327
The problem, of course, is that the order to show cause procedure is
"intended to ensure due process." 328 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's
statement, therefore, the order to show cause procedure is not simply a
"procedural issue." The question, moreover, is not whether the
sanctioned parties knew some kind of sanctions were coming. Rather,
the question is really whether the procedure the district court followed
provided the sanctioned parties with the particularized notice and
opportunity to respond that they were entitled to under due process. In
Hutchinson, one could probably safely assume, based on the facts of the
case, that plaintiff and his counsel were aware of the conduct alleged to
be sanctionable. But the district court's statements and order to appear
at a hearing do not seem to provide plaintiff and his attorney with
particularized notice of the authority or authorities under which
322 Id.
323 ld. at *.
324 Id. at *2.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id. (emphasis added).
32 See Johnson v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 74 F.3d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1996); see also supra Part
III.A.2.a.
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sanctions were being contemplated. 329 Nor does it provide a meaningful
opportunity to respond, especially not when a meaningful opportunity
presupposes that the parties against whom sanctions are being sought
are made explicitly aware of the factors they must address in order to
avoid sanctions. 330 Nothing the district court did in Hutchinson appears
to have satisfied these requirements.
Consequently, while nothing in the text of Rule 11 or in the appellate
cases discussing the issue specifically requires the district courts to issue
a written order to show cause,331 it would seem that such a requirement
would be the better practice. To the extent, however, that oral orders to
show cause and/or statements on the record are deemed sufficient to
satisfy Rule 11's order to show cause procedure, these types of "orders"
must still be examined carefully to ensure that they do in fact satisfy due
process.
b. Timing
Unlike the Rule 11 motion, when an order to show cause can be
issued is explicitly limited under Rule 11 in one circumstance. If the
district court wants to impose monetary sanctions on its own initiative, it
must issue the order to show cause prior to a voluntary dismissal or
settlement of the claims.332 But what about situations that do not involve
monetary sanctions or voluntary dismissals or settlements? Can a
district court issue an order to show cause at any time in those
circumstances, even if it is after the conclusion of a case? The Third
Circuit appears to be the only circuit, of the four federal appellate courts
examined here that have adopted a rule or policy requiring Rule 11
motions to be served and filed prior to final disposition of a case, to have
329 In fact, the Ninth Circuit rejected defendants' argument that the sanctions were
actually imposed under the district court's inherent power and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, specifically
because the sanctions award was not properly itemized in terms of sanctioning authority.
Hutchinson, 2000 WL 11432, at *1.
330 Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted); cf. Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Only with this
information can a party respond to the court's concerns in an intelligent manner.").
331 However, the Second Circuit's statement in Nuwesra, that "a judge's statements on the
record could satisfy the requirements of [Rule 11] (c)(1)(B) in the absence of a written order
to show cause," could be read as suggesting that a written order to show cause is or should
be the normal practice. Nuwesra, 174 F.3d at 92 n.2.
332 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2)(B).
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adopted a similar approach with respect to orders to show cause.333
Thus, in the Third Circuit, if a federal district court judge wants to
impose Rule 11 sanctions on her own initiative, she must issue her order
to show cause before the case is finally concluded. 334 Otherwise the
order to show cause will be deemed untimely and any Rule 11 sanctions
imposed pursuant to the order to show cause will be deemed an abuse of
discretion.335 According to the Third Circuit, the logic that impelled the
court to adopt a supervisory rule in the first instance with respect to the
filing of Rule 11 motions, namely to avoid piecemeal appeals of the
merits and fee questions, applied "equally to sua sponte consideration of
sanctions by the district court."336 Moreover, the court reasoned that
there was simply "no reason why prompt action should be required of
an opposing party and yet not similarly required by the court." 337
None of the other three circuits that adopted timing restrictions with
respect to the serving and filing of Rule 11 motions appear to have
followed suit with respect to orders to show cause. In fact, the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits have both taken the position that, since there is no safe
harbor provision when the district court acts sua sponte, nothing either
court has said with respect to the safe harbor provision, Rule 11 motions,
and timing applies to the district courts acting on their own initiative.
Consequently, the district courts in those circuits are not precluded from
issuing orders to show cause and imposing Rule 11 sanctions after final
333 Those four circuit courts are the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. See supra text
accompanying notes 196-238.
334 Cf. Simmerman, 27 F.3d 58 (reversing as abuse of discretion Rule 11 sanctions by the
district court issued three months after the case was decided).
335 Id.
336 Id. at 63. The court stated,
There is no inordinate burden in requiring the district court to raise
and resolve any Rule 11 issues prior to or concurrent with its
resolution of the merits of the case. Such timing will, furthermore,
conserve judicial energies. In the district court, resolution of the issue
before the inevitable delay of the appellate process will be more
efficient because of current familiarity with the matter. Similarly,
concurrent consideration of challenges to the merits and the imposition
of sanctions avoids the invariable demand on two separate appellate
panels to acquaint themselves with the underlying facts and the
parties' respective legal positions.
Id.
337 Id.
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judgment has been entered. 338 While research did not reveal case law
out of the Seventh Circuit addressing this particular issue, in light of that
circuit's Divane opinion, it seems highly unlikely that district courts in
the Seventh Circuit would be precluded from issuing orders to show
cause and imposing Rule 11 sanctions after final judgment.339
c. Troubling Uses of Orders to Show Cause
Finally, two very troubling uses of the order to show cause
procedure should be discussed briefly. First, federal district courts are
explicitly prohibited by Rule 11 from awarding monetary sanctions in
the form of attorneys' fees when acting on their own initiative. 34°
Notwithstanding this limitation, the district courts award such sanctions,
and, on a couple of occasions, these sanctions have been affirmed on
appeal. Second, there is some suggestion in the case law that orders to
show cause are being requested and/or issued in situations where the
procedural requirements of a Rule 11 motion have not been satisfied in
order to sidestep those requirements. 341
Out of the forty-three Rule 11 decisions rendered by the federal
circuit courts and collected for this article, 342 twelve (or 28%) involve
orders to show cause.343 Of these twelve cases, nine (or 75%) involve
338 See Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998) ("As the Sixth Circuit ...
observed, the safe harbor provision applies only to sanctions imposed upon motion of a
party .... Nothing in the Rule or the history of the 1993 amendments prevents the district
court from taking this action after judgment."); Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288,
297 n.8 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Our construction of Rule 11's 'safe harbor' provision does not in
any way preclude the ability of a district court or magistrate judge, on his or her own
initiative, to enter an order describing the offending conduct and directing the offending
attorney to show cause why Rule 11 has not been violated.").
339 See supra text accompanying notes 278-90 (discussing Divane).
340 See FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
341 See infra notes 348-64 and accompanying text.
342 This is admittedly a small sample relative to the total amount of Rule 11 activity
generated by these six federal appeals courts. Any numbers generated, therefore, would
not be deemed statistically significant. I include these numbers, however, because based
on the rather random sampling of cases selected for this Article, they suggest certain trends
in the federal courts.
343 See Vollmer v. Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2001); Van Scoy v.
Shell Oil Co., No. 00-15087, 2001 WL 338071 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2001); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
R & D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2001); Heldt v. Nicholson, No. 00-1495, 2001 WL
111648 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2001); Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52
(2d Cir. 2000); Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying Serv., Inc., No. 98-35361, 2000 WL 11432 (9th
Cir. Jan. 6, 2000); Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
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Rule 11 sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees.3" The federal appellate
courts reversed seven out of these nine cases (or 78% of them),
recognizing that the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 explicitly prohibit such
sanctions,345 but they affirmed one case on appeal (11%)346 and explicitly
approved the use of attorneys' fees as a Rule 11 sanction in another
(11%).347 It is very problematic to allow these sanctions to stand on
1999); Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 1999); Thornton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136
F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1998); Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294
(3d Cir. 1996); Wesely v. Churchill Dev. Corp., No. 95-4024, 1996 WL 616636 (6th Cir. Oct.
24, 1996); Johnson v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 74 F.3d 147 (7th Cir. 1996).
3" Van Scoy, 2001 WL 338071 ($63,944.11); United Nat'l Ins. Co., 242 F.3d 1102 ($2,058);
Heldt, 2001 WL 111648 ($6,429); Baffa, 222 F.3d 52 ($45,000); Hutchinson, 2000 WL 11432
(amount not specified); Nuwesra, 174 F.3d 87 ($25,000); Thornton, 136 F.3d 450 (amount not
specified); Zuk, 103 F.3d 294 (approximately $15,000); Johnson, 74 F.3d 147 ($800).
345 Baffa, 222 F.3d at 57 ("[Aibsent a specific motion for attorneys' fees, the court only had
authority to order sanctions payable to the court. Under Rule 11(c)(2), the court may order
payment of attorneys' fees only 'if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence.'"); Nuwesra, 174 F.3d at 94 ("[A] court may award attorneys' fees under Rule 11
only 'if imposed on motion' under Rule 11(c)(1)(A). By its own terms, the rule thus
precludes a court from awarding attorneys' fees on its own initiative.") (citations omitted);
Thornton, 136 F.3d at 455 ("[W]here sanctions are imposed under Rule 11(c)(1)(B) by a
district court on its own initiative, neither the award of attorney's fees nor the suspension
from practice before the court constitute a valid sanction. Specifically, an award of
attorney's fees is authorized only 'if imposed on motion ....'") (citation omitted); Johnson,
74 F.3d at 152 n.3.
It should also be noted that where sanctions are imposed under Rule
11(c)(1)(B) by the district judge on his own initiative, Rule 11(c)(2)
provides that payment of sanctions may be directed only to the court
as a penalty ... . [Thus,] [e]ven if the 'show cause' procedure of Rule
11 had been followed, the portion of the award of sanctions payable to
Waddell & Reed would nevertheless have been improper.
Johnson, 74 F.3d at 152 n.3. See also Van Scoy, 2001 WL 338071, at *3 ("The panel held that
the district court may only award sanctions to .. . defendants under Rule 11(c)(1)(A) if the
[defendants] had filed a separate, properly noticed motion. They had not done so.");
United Nat'l Ins. Co., 242 F.3d at 1118; Hutchinson, 2000 WL 11432, at *1 ("Attorney's fees
may only be awarded under Rule 11 after a motion by a party. Appellees did not move for
an award of attorney's fees, therefore the award of fees is not justified under Rule 11.").
346 See Heldt, 2001 WL 111648, at *1 (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees against plaintiff).
347 The Third Circuit approved the use of attorneys' fees as a Rule 11 sanction in Zuk. 103
F.3d at 301. In Zuk, a Rule 11 motion was filed by defendants and an order to show cause
was issued by the court. Id. at 296. It appears from the opinion that Rule 11 sanctions in
the form of attorneys' fees were ultimately imposed against plaintiff pursuant to
defendants' motion, but this is not absolutely certain. See id. at 297. Plaintiff argued on
appeal that the requirements of a Rule 11 motion had not been met. Id. To counter this
argument, defendants argued that the Rule 11 sanctions had actually been imposed by the
district court via its order to show cause. Id. at 298 n.3. The Third Circuit dismissed the
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appeal because it undermines the Advisory Connittee's efforts to limit
the use of monetary sanctions as the sanction of choice by the federal
district courts, and it sends the wrong message to the district courts,
namely, that the use of such sanctions is appropriate.
Lastly, some appellate case law suggests that orders to show cause
are being requested and/or issued in situations where the procedural
requirements of a Rule 11 motion have not been satisfied in order to
sidestep those requirements. For example, in Radcliffe v. Rainbow
Construction Co.,34s defendants were awarded $75,000 in attorneys' fees
as a Rule 11 sanction by the district court, notwithstanding the fact that
their Rule 11 motion failed to comply with the Rule's procedural
requirements.349 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's sanction order for precisely that reason.350 The appellate court
also rejected defendants' invitation to treat the district court's order for
sanctions as "a Rule 11 motion on the court's own initiative, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B)" because the record was clear that defendants,
not the court, requested the sanctions.351 According to the court, "it
would render Rule 11(c)(1)(A)'s 'safe harbor' provision meaningless to
permit a party's noncompliant motion to be converted automatically into
a court-initiated motion, thereby escaping the service requirement." 35 2
conflict between the Rule 11 procedures as moot, since plaintiff admitted that he would not
have taken advantage of the safe harbor provision even if it had been provided. Id. The
appellate court ultimately concluded that, "[a]lthough monetary sanctions are not
encouraged under Rule 11, they are not forbidden. Under the circumstances of this case,
we see no error in the district court's imposition of fee sanctions upon the appellant, although the
amount may be contrary to the current spirit of Rule 11." Id. at 301 (emphasis added). In
short, the appellate court did not find any error in the imposition of sanctions under Rule
11. Id. at 298. The district court's sanctions were ultimately reversed, however, because the
order did not specify how much of the attorneys' fees were awarded pursuant to Rule 11,
as opposed to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id. Unfortunately, the Third Circuit's analysis of the Rule
11 issues raised in the case was doubly wrong because: (a) if the Rule 11 sanctions were
awarded pursuant to defendants' motion, the sanctions were improper because the Rule's
motion requirements had not been satisfied; and (b) if the attorneys' fees were imposed as a
sanction by the district court via its order to show cause, they were still improper because
the district court is forbidden by Rule 11 to order such sanctions on its own initiative.
348 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001).
349 Id. at 777.
350 Id. at 789.
351 Id. ("The district court's discussion of the safe harbor provision in its order concerning
sanctions serves to emphasize this point.").
352 Id.
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A similar issue was at least implicitly raised in Zuk v. Eastern
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute of the Medical College of Pennsylvania.35 3
In Zuk, the defendant filed a Rule 11 motion after plaintiff's case was
dismissed, but apparently without satisfying the Rule's safe harbor
provision.35 Approximately a month and a half later, the district court
issued an order to show cause "in consideration of defendant's motion
for sanctions." 3 5 The district court imposed Rule 11 sanctions. 35 6 The
issue regarding whether the Rule 11 sanctions were imposed via motion
or the order to show cause was raised on appeal. 35 7 The Third Circuit,
however, determined that it did not need to address the issue.358
Finally, a case from the Fifth Circuit and another from the Ninth
Circuit could be read as specifically inviting the practice. 35 9 In Elliott v.
Tilton,360 for example, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against defendants because plaintiffs'
Rule 11 motion failed to comply with the safe harbor provision.361 Thus,
according to the Fifth Circuit, the district court's order could not be
upheld under Rule 11.362 Notwithstanding this holding, however, the
Fifth Circuit went on to state that
3- 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996).
354 Id. at 296. Plaintiff argued on appeal that sanctions were improperly imposed because
"he was not given the benefit of Rule 11's 21-day safe harbor period, because the court
dismissed the action before he had the full opportunity to withdraw it." Id. at 298 n.3.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 296.
357 Plaintiff argued that Rule 11 sanctions were improperly imposed via defendant's
motion. Id. at 298 n.3. Defendant countered by arguing that the sanctions were imposed
via the district court's order to show cause. Id.
358 Id. at 299 (concluding that they need not address the issue since plaintiff admitted at
oral argument that he would not have taken advantage of the safe harbor provision, even
had it been provided).
359 See Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co., No. 00-15087, 2001 WL 338071 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2001);
Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995). In Van Scoy, the Ninth Circuit reversed a
district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in the amount of $63,944.11 because
defendants had failed to file a Rule 11 motion that complied with the Rule's procedural
requirements. Van Scoy, 2001 WL 338071, at *3. It is not clear from the opinion, however,
whether sanctions were imposed via the defendants' Rule 11 motion or the order to show
cause, that the district court issued. Id. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit stated on appeal
that "on remand the district court may award sanctions under 11(c)(1)(B), which permits a
court to impose sanctions on its own initiative." Id.
3- 64 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995).
361 Id. at 216.
362 Id.
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We do not mean to indicate that defense counsel was
necessarily shielded from all sanctions under Rule 11.
Sanctions may be ordered if the court, on its own
initiative, enters an order describing the offending
conduct and directing the offending parties to show
cause why Rule 11 has not been violated. This sub-
section contains no 'safe harbor' provision.363
Certainly, federal district courts may impose Rule 11 sanctions on
their own initiative.364 But surely an order to show cause should not be
requested, let alone be issued, simply because a movant fails to satisfy
Rule 11's motion requirements. To permit this practice would
undermine significant portions of the 1993 amendments.
d. Summary
Here, as with Rule 11 motion practice, the federal appellate case law
appears to highlight some inter-circuit conflicts with respect to order to
show cause practice and suggests that there may be some troubling
trends regarding the ways in which orders to show cause are being used
in the federal district courts. More specifically, there appear to be
intercircuit conflicts regarding: (1) due process-the Second, Third, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits have all taken the position that an order to show
cause is an integral part of due process and, therefore, an actual order
must be issued;365 the Ninth Circuit, however, seems to regard orders to
show cause as simply a procedural requirement that can be satisfied by
statements on the record,366 and the Second Circuit has also intimated
that such statements may be sufficient, in lieu of an actual order;367 (2)
timing-the Third Circuit has applied its supervisory rule to orders to
show cause, therefore requiring a district court to issue its order prior to
final judgment or have that order be deemed untimely;368 the Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, however, impose no such limitation on
when the district courts may (or should) issue their orders to show
363 Id. (citations omitted).
364 See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(1)(B). Of course, there is a related question as to when a district
court should be allowed to issue an order to show cause. See supra Part III.A.2.b. That
particular issue will be discussed later in this work. See infra Part IV.B.
365 See supra notes 299-316 and accompanying text.
M6 See supra text accompanying notes 320-27.
367 See supra text accompanying note 319.
368 See supra notes 333-37 and accompanying text.
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cause;369 and (3) attorneys' fees-the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits have all held that awarding attorneys' fees as a sanction
pursuant to an order to show cause is not authorized by amended Rule
11;370 the Third and Sixth Circuits, however, have affirmed such fees
imposed by the district courts. 371
The appellate case law also suggests some troubling trends with
respect to the use of orders to show cause, namely: (1) attorneys' fees
seem to be the sanction of choice when a district court imposes Rule 11
sanctions pursuant to an order to show cause;372 and (2) orders to show
cause are perhaps being issued, requested, and/or invited to circumvent
the procedural requirements for a Rule 11 motion.373 Equally troubling is
the fact that such uses of the order to show cause are sometimes
authorized on appeal.374
3. "Appropriate" Sanctions
Earlier, monetary sanctions and the use of Rule 11 as a fee-shifting
device were discussed as one of the factors contributing to Rule 11's
chilling effects.375 The federal district courts imposed sanctions in thirty-
eight of the forty-three cases on appeal.376 They imposed monetary
369 See supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
370 See supra notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
371 See supra notes 346-47 and accompanying text.
372 See supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
373 See supra text accompanying notes 348-64.
374 See supra Part III.A.2.c.
375 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
376 Sanctions were granted pursuant to twelve orders to show cause and a total of
twenty-six Rule 11 motions were granted, for a total of thirty-eight. See supra note 343 and
accompanying text; see also SECOND CIRCUIT: Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2000);
L.B. Foster Co. v. Am. Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Sakon v. Andreo, 119 F.3d 109
(2d Cir. 1997); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320 (2d Cir 1995); THIRD CIRCUIT:
Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996); FIFTH
CIRCUIT: Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2001); Edwards v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1998); Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995);
SIXTH CIRCUIT: Hayden v. Sass, No. 99-1243, 2000 WL 1140516 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2000); Singh
v. Capital Univ. Law & Graduate Ctr., No. 99-3564, 2000 WL 302778 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2000);
Powell v. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Nos. 98-3668, 98-3670, 1999 WL 519186 (6th Cir. July
16, 1999); Cobleigh v. United States, No. 97-2302, 1999 WL 195738 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 1999);
Barker v. Bank One, Lexington, N.A., No. 97-5787, 1998 WL 466437 (6th Cir. July 30, 1998);
Bernstein v. Remer, No. 96-2232, 1997 WL 685369 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1997); Ridder v. City of
Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997); Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 1996);
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., Inc., 200 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1999); Harter v.
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sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees in twenty-eight 377 of those thirty-
eight cases.378 Another eight cases379 involve some kind of monetary
sanctions.380 The amount of the sanctions ranged from lows of $200381 or
Iowa Grain Co., Nos. 96-3907, 97-2671, 96-4074, 97-2041, 1999 WL 754333 (7th Cir. July 15,
1998); Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 142 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1998); Johnson v.
Waddell & Reed, Inc., 74 F.3d 147 (7th Cir. 1996); NINTH CIRCUIT: Habib v. Cruz, No. 00-
17103, 2001 WL 985637 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001); Enercon, GMBH v. Erdman, No. 00-15399,
2001 WL 777476 (9th Cir. July 11, 2001); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th
Cir. 2001); Hugo Neu-Proler Co. v. Local 13 Int'l Longshoreman and Warehouse Union,
No. 99-55322, 2000 WL 1459766 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2000); Flanagan v. Arnaiz, No. 97-15517,
1999 WL 1128641 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1999); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998).
377 See SECOND CIRCUIT: Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52 (2d
Cir. 2000) ($45,000); Margo, 213 F.3d at 59 ($22,680); Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1999) ($25,000); Sakon, 119 F.3d at 113 ($2,700); Hadges,
48 F.3d at 1324 ($2,000); THIRD CIRCUIT: Zuk, 103 F.3d at 343 ($15,000); FIFTH CIRCUIT:
Mercury Air Group, 237 F.3d at 545 ($203,641); Edwards, 153 F.3d at 245 ($46,820); Thornton
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1998) (all fees reasonably incurred by
defendant in defending suit); Elliott, 64 F.3d at 215 ($7,850); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Heldt v.
Nicholson, No. 00-1495, 2001 WL 111648 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2001) ($6,429); Crown Serv. Plaza
Partners v. City of Rochester Hills, Nos. 98-1581, 98-1666, 2000 WL 658029, *2 (6th Cir. May
8, 2000) ($24,987.21); Singh, 2000 WL 302778, at "1 ($2,000); Powell, 1999 WL 519186, at *2
($1,000); Cobleigh, 1999 WL 195738, at *1 ($360); Barker, 1998 WL 466437, at *1 ($28,640.80);
Ridder, 109 F.3d at 298 ($32,546.02); Ortman, 99 F.3d at 810 ($24,809.99); SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
Divane, 200 F.3d at 1024 ($33,292); Harter, 1999 WL 754333, at *2 ($92,000); Corley, 142 F.3d at
1057 ($200); Johnson, 74 F.3d at 150 ($800); NINTH CIRCUIT: Radcliffe, 254 F.3d at 779
($75,000); Enercon, 2001 WL 777476, at *1 ($25,000); Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co., No. 00-15087,
2001 WL 338071, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2001) ($63,944.11); Hugo Neu-Proler Co., 2000 WL
1459766, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2000) ($51,138.53); Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying Serv., Inc.,
No. 98-35361, 2000 WL 11432 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000) (amount not specified); Barber, 146 F.3d
at 710 ($2,500).
378 I collected one hundred and thirty-five circuit court and district court opinions for this
article. See Appendices 1, 2.
379 Four of the eight cases imposing other monetary sanctions also imposed attorneys'
fees as a sanction.
380 Vollmer v. Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2001) ($50,000 fine to
be paid to charity); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir.
2001) (imposing sanctions on two attorneys in the amount of $1,029 each but not specifying
whether the sanctions were paid to the opposing party or into court as a fine); Crown
Service Plaza Partners, 2000 WL 658029, at *2 ($2,380.71 in costs); Singh, 2000 WL 302778, at
*1 ($1,000 fine to be paid into court); Divane, 200 F.3d at 1024 ($2,306.69 in costs); Powell,
1999 WL 519186, at *2 ($10,000 fine to be paid to the Clients Security Fund of Ohio, but
payment was suspended upon certain conditions being met); L.B. Foster Co., 138 F.3d at 89
(awarding plaintiff part of the expenses it incurred in seeking a Rule 54(b) certification as a
Rule 11 sanction without stating whether "expenses" included attorneys' fees.); Wesely v.
Churchill Dev. Corp., No. 95-4024, 1996 WL 616636, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1996) ($2,000 fine
to be paid into court).
381 Corley, 142 F.3d 1041.
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$360382 to highs of $92,000383 and even $203,641. 384 Of the twenty-eight
cases dealing with attorneys' fees, eleven were affirmed on appeal.385
Several others were vacated and remanded to the district court to either
re-calculate the amount of sanctions to be imposed 386 or to re-impose
sanctions after curing procedural defects. 38 7
All told, the federal appellate courts approved the use of monetary
sanctions in eleven of the twenty-eight cases, or 39% of the time. In
practice, there the federal appellate courts appear to reverse or vacate
most of the Rule 11 decisions involving monetary sanctions; but a
significant percentage of them get affirmed on appeal, and the rhetoric in
some of the opinions seems to encourage continued reliance on
monetary sanctions under the 1993 version of Rule 11.388 Thus, there
382 Cobleigh, 1999 WL 195738, at "1.
383 Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., Nos. 96-3907, 97-2671, 96-4074, 97-2041, 1999 WL 754333 (7th
Cir. July 15, 1998).
384 Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 2001).
385 See Mercury Air Group, 267 F.3d at 545 ($203,641); Enercon GMBH v. Erdman, No. 00-
15394, 2001 WL 777476, at *1 (9th Cir. July 11, 2001) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions with
respect to plaintiff and vacating and remanding with respect to plaintiff's attorney)
($25,000); Heldt v. Nicholson, No. 00-1495, 2001 WL 111648 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2001) ($6,429);
Hugo Neu-Proler Co. v. Local 13 Int'l Longshoreman and Warehouse Union, No. 99-55322,
2000 WL 1459766, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2000) ($51,138.53); Crown Serv. Plaza Partners, 2000
WL 658029, at *2 ($24,987.21); Singh & Graduate Ctr., No. 99-3564, 2000 WL 302778, at "1
(6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2000) ($2,000); Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2000) ($22,680);
Powell, 1999 WL 519186, at *2 (affirming imposition of the $1,000 in attorneys' fees but
vacating order to pay $10,000 into Clients Security Fund of Ohio because it constituted a
perpetual penalty); Barker v. Bank One, Lexington, N.A., No. 97-5787, 1998 WL 466437, at
*1 (6th Cir. July 30, 1998) ($28,640.80); Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 290 (6th
Cir. 1997) ($32,546.02); Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 810 (6th Cir. 1996) ($24,809.99).
386 See Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., Inc., 200 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1999); Zuk v. E. Pa.
Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996).
37 Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2000)
(vacating Rule 11 sanctions imposed upon the court's own initiative but leaving open the
possibility for the sanctions to be reimposed on remand provided that the Rule's
procedural requirements regarding orders to show cause were met); Elliott v. Tilton, 64
F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995) (vacating Rule 11 sanctions imposed upon plaintiff's motion
because of failure to comply with the safe harbor provision but appearing to encourage
district court to impose sanctions on remand its own initiative). The Fifth Circuit in Elliott
stated that it did not intend to "indicate that defense counsel was necessarily shielded from
all sanctions under Rule 11. Sanctions may be ordered if the court, on its own initiative,
enters an order describing the offending conduct and directing the offending parties to
show cause why Rule 11 has not been violated." Id. (citation omitted).
Mi2 See, e.g., Divane, 200 F.3d at 1030 ("The 1993 amendments to Rule 11(c)(2) limited the
amount of attorneys' fees that may be imposed as a sanction ... but endorsed the use of
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seems to be some mixed messages being sent by the federal appellate
courts, which is troublesome given that the Advisory Committee
explicitly de-emphasized and limited the use of monetary sanctions in the
form of attorneys' fees as part of its effort to reduce Rule 11's chilling
effects.
4. The Role of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals in the Sanctioning
Process
Inconsistent application among the federal circuits is cited as another
factor contributing to Rule 11's chilling effects.389 One of the reasons
given for the inconsistent application that plagued the 1983 version of
Rule 11 was insufficiently rigorous appellate review.390 To determine
whether this concern is warranted under the current version of the Rule,
this section will look at how the federal appellate courts have interpreted
their role in the sanctioning process. More specifically, this section will
examine: (a) how the federal appellate courts interpret the standard of
review governing their review of district courts' Rule 11 decisions; (b)
whether the federal circuit courts of appeals have insisted that district
courts comply with the findings requirement imposed by the 1993
amendments to Rule 11 as an aid to appellate review; and (c) the kind of
direction that the federal appellate courts are providing to the district
courts.
a. The Standard of Review
Notwithstanding the concern raised about the level of appellate
review, abuse of discretion was retained by the Advisory Committee as
the standard of review applicable to all aspects of a district court's Rule
11 decision.391 Therefore, this raises the important question of how the
federal circuit courts of appeals interpret this standard.
Not surprisingly, the federal circuit courts of appeals employ many
different definitions of "abuse of discretion." 392 There does appear to be
attorneys' fees as a sanction."); Zuk, 103 F.3d at 301 ("Although money sanctions are not
encouraged under Rule 11, they are not forbidden.").
389 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
390 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
391 See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
392 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 763 (1982).
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a common definition employed by the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits. It provides that a district court abuses its discretion "if the
court 'based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence."' 393 Abuse of discretion has been
described by the Third Circuit as "a clear error of judgment, and not
simply a different result which can arguably be obtained when applying
the law to the facts of the case." 394 According to the Seventh Circuit,
however, the district court has not abused its discretion "[u]nless the
sanctioning court has acted contrary to the law or reached an
unreasonable result." 395
Perhaps of greater importance than the variations of the definition,
the more common definition quoted above appears to be much more
deferential than other formulations. For example, the Second Circuit
recognizes that abuse of discretion is a deferential standard of review.396
Nonetheless, the court had this to say about the potential problems with
such a deferential standard and its own role in the sanctioning process,
[W]e [also] appreciate that "[a] troublesome aspect of a
trial court's power to impose sanctions ... is that the
trial court may act as accuser, fact finder and sentencing
judge, not subject to restrictions of any procedural code
and at times not limited by any rule of law governing
the severity of sanctions that may be imposed." ...
Accordingly, "although the decision to impose sanctions
is uniquely within the province of a district court, we
There are half a dozen different definitions of "abuse of discretion,"
ranging from ones that would require the appellate court to come close
to finding that the trial court had taken leave of its senses to others
which differ from the definition of error by only the slightest nuance,
with numerous variations between the extremes.
Id.
393 Zuk, 103 F.3d at 298-99 (citation omitted); see also Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., Nos. 96-
3907, 97-2671, 96-4074, 97-2041, 1999 WL 754333 (7th Cir. July 15, 1998); Wesely v. Churchill
Dev. Corp., No. 95-4024, 1996 WL 616636, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1996); Elliott v. Tilton, 64
F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1995).
394 Prosser v. Prosser, 186 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
395 In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1046 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
3%6 Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We
have recognized that 'this deferential standard of review gives recognition to the premise
that the district court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent
facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard that informs its determination as to
whether sanctions are warranted.'") (citation omitted).
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nevertheless need to ensure that any such decision is
made with restraint and discretion." 397
In a similar vein, the Seventh Circuit has stated,
We have frequently reminded litigants that although our
review is deferential, it is not an empty formality ....
"Because 'Rule 11 sanctions have significant impact
beyond the merits of the individual case' and can affect
the reputation and creativity of counsel, the abuse of
discretion standard does not mean that we give
complete deference to the district court's decision." 398
Finally, a couple of the circuit courts of appeals employ several
different tiers of review under the rubric of "abuse of discretion." The
Seventh Circuit, for example, has stated that it "review[s] a decision to
grant sanctions under [Rule 11] for an abuse of discretion."399 It has
interpreted this standard to mean, however, that it "review[s] the factual
findings underlying the district court's imposition of sanctions for clear
error, ... and the choice of sanction for an abuse of discretion." 400 The
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, includes "abuse of discretion" as one of
three standards governing that court's review of sanctions decisions.
More specifically, the Ninth Circuit has stated that, "[i]n reviewing
sanctions imposed under Rule 11, we 'review findings of historical fact
under the clearly erroneous standard, the determination that counsel
violated the rule under a de novo standard, and the choice of sanction
under an abuse of discretion standard."' 401
All of the different formulations or definitions for "abuse of
discretion" currently in use by the federal courts of appeals raise a few
inferences. First, the courts' interpretations do not appear to mean the
same thing. In fact, they seem to suggest a general lack of a clearly
defined standard for deciding what constitutes an "abuse of discretion."
Second, circuit court judges appear to interpret their role in the
397 Id. at 57 (ellipses in original) (citations omitted) (vacating $45,000 sanctions).
398 Harter, 1999 WL 754333, at *3 (citations omitted) (reversing $92,000 sanctions).
399 Fin. Inv. Co. (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Geberit AG, 165 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).
400 Id. (citations omitted).
401 United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
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sanctioning process differently. Some circuit court judges review a
district court's sanctioning decision less deferentially than others. This
last inference suggests that the outcome of a district court's sanctions
decision may well depend on the makeup of the panel that decides the
appeal. Unfortunately, the consequence of this lack of uniformity is that
inconsistent results with respect to the application of Rule 11 in practice
will likely persist in the federal courts.40 2
b. The Findings Requirement
A potentially significant amendment added to Rule 11 in 1993 is the
requirement that federal district courts make findings to support any
decision imposing Rule 11 sanctions.40 3 Prior to the 1993 amendment,
however, several circuits, including the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits, had already imposed, implicitly or explicitly, a findings
requirement under the 1983 version of Rule 11.404 Experience under the
prior case law indicates that, notwithstanding the de facto findings
requirement, Rule 11's chilling effects continued unabated. 40 5 In fact,
Judge Johnson of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals lamented that,
"[u]nder the current practice[, i.e., under the 1983 Rule], many circuits
have allowed district courts to decide for themselves when factual
402 See Friendly, supra note 392, at 764. Judge Friendly argues that "[s]tudy has led me to
conclude that the differences [in the definitions of abuse of discretion] are not only
defensible but essential. Some cases call for application of the abuse of discretion standard
in a 'broad' sense and others in a 'narrow' one." Id.
403 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3) ("When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the
conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed."); see also supra text accompanying notes 70-72, 125-26 (discussing
substantive bias and potential positive effects of a findings requirement).
404 The Sixth Circuit explicitly required findings. See, e.g., In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 990-
91 (6th Cir. 1987) (subsequent history omitted) ("[A] district judge faced with a sanction
motion must make certain findings in determining that an award is appropriate. Careful
analysis and discrete findings are required, no matter how exasperating the case."). The
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, implicitly required findings as an aid
to appellate review. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Schlag, 884 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1990); Thomas v.
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Szabo Food Serv., Inc.
v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 1987) (subsequent history omitted). The case
law under the 1983 Rule, therefore, probably still constitutes good law.
405 See supra notes 28-49 and accompanying text. This is not to say that a lack of findings
from the district courts was the sole cause of Rule 11's chilling effects. But if, as was argued
above, the findings requirement was imposed at least in part to help combat those effects,
then federal court experience under the de facto rule imposed by the pre-1993 case law
indicates that such a requirement did not in fact fulfill its potential.
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findings are necessary; the result has been that factual findings are rarely
entered, and effective review is thwarted."4 0 6
Unfortunately, there is a relative dearth of case law regarding the
findings requirement imposed by the 1993 amendment. 40 7 This absence
of case law could mean a couple of different things. First, it could mean
that the district courts have been complying with the amendment and
providing findings when they impose sanctions, thereby negating the
need for any direction (or further direction, given the existence of the
prior case law) from the federal appellate courts. The lack of case law
could also mean that the federal appellate courts have allowed the
practice alluded to by Judge Johnson under the 1983 version of Rule 11
to continue. If the former situation currently exists in practice, perhaps
the findings requirement will actually play a meaningful part in
reducing Rule 11's chilling effects under the 1993 version of the Rule.
But if the latter situation is the actual practice in the federal courts, then,
obviously, it would be problematic because the findings requirement
would not be helping to fulfill that objective. There is nothing in the case
law to suggest, however, that federal court practice regarding the
findings requirement has changed dramatically since Judge Johnson
penned his comments.
c. Direction from the Federal Appellate Courts
The federal appellate courts play an important role in determining
both how Rule 11 is to be applied by the federal district courts and the
406 Johnson, supra note 63, at 675 (footnote omitted).
407 My research revealed three, possibly four, such cases. See, e.g., Sakon v. Andreo, 119
F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring findings to explain imposition of sanctions). The
Sakon court stated that "it is imperative that the court explain its sanctions order 'with care,
specificity, and attention to the sources of its power' .... [S]uch an award either without
reference to any statute, rule, decision, or other authority, or with reference only to a source
that is inapplicable will rarely be upheld." Id. (citations omitted). See also Baffa v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 2000); Zuk v. E. Pa.
Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996); cf. Vollmer v.
Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698, 711 (7th Cir. 2001) (requiring the district court on
remand to "state explicitly the evidence that it relies upon to determine the
appropriateness, and, if necessary, the amount of the sanctions"). Notably, the Seventh
Circuit also appears to require the district court to make findings when it denies Rule 11
sanctions, which is not explicitly required by the amended Rule. See, e.g., In re Dorothy
Generes, 69 F.3d 821, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court's failure to
explain its decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion.); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).
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extent to which it is used.408 Therefore, the purpose of this section is to
get a sense of the direction being provided by the federal courts of
appeals, as determined by the number of published versus unpublished
opinions and whether there are any en banc decisions.
To state the obvious, federal district courts are bound by the
opinions of the federal courts of appeals. But only published opinions
provide binding precedents beyond the case in which they were
originally decided.4° 9 The most significant published opinions are, of
course, en banc opinions, because a majority of the entire membership of
a court participates in the decision. 410 Consequently, the number of en
banc decisions and the number of published cases relative to
unpublished ones should provide some insight into how much guidance
the federal circuit courts are providing to the district courts with respect
to Rule 11.
Research for this Article did not reveal a single en banc Rule 11
decision by any of the six federal circuit courts of appeals studied for this
Article.411 Out of the forty-three appellate opinions collected for this
Article, sixteen, or 37%, were unpublished; the remaining twenty-seven,
or 63%, were published.
40 Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 24, at 441 (reasoning that appellate review is
"an important element of judicial efforts to clarify Rule 11 standards"); see also Wiggins,
supra note 37, at 13 (noting that one of the reasons given by federal district court judges for
increasing their use of Rule 11 was that "[tihe court of appeals has mandated [it] or I would
rarely impose sanctions," but that, conversely, district court judges commented that one of
the reasons for decreasing their use of Rule 11 was that "[tihere [was] no support from the
court of appeals").
409 Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 2000 A.L.R.
5th 17 (2000) ("The rules and holdings of many state and federal courts provide that
unpublished opinions cannot be considered to have precedential effect."); see also 9th Cir.
R. 36-3(a) ("Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not binding precedent,
except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel."); 7TH CIR. R. 53.
410 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 894 (1995).
411 In contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all issued en banc Rule 11 decisions
with respect to the 1983 version of the Rule. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.,
914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928
(7th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc).
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Of course, the numbers vary by circuit.412 The Sixth and Ninth
Circuits issued the most opinions (11), followed by the Second Circuit
(7), the Fifth and Seventh Circuits (6), and then by the Third Circuit (2).
What is particularly striking, however, is that of the eleven opinions
rendered by the Sixth Circuit, only three of them were published. The
Ninth Circuit published less than half of its opinions Most of the
circuits, with the possible exception of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,
however, appear to be trying to provide some Rule 11 guidance to the
district courts.
d. Summary
The appellate case law shows: there are no en banc opinions; "abuse
of discretion," as the applicable standard of review, is not clearly defined
or consistently applied; and the findings requirement is probably not
being strictly enforced. While a large percentage of the appellate
opinions collected here are published, there are still a significant number
of unpublished opinions being issued by the federal appeals courts,
which address important procedural issues under Rule 11. Indeed, as
the discussion above shows, there are several inter and intracircuit
conflicts with respect to important issues raised by the 1993 version of
Rule 1 1 ,41 3 and these conflicts are not limited to a given circuit court's
412 PUBLISHED VERSUS UNPUBLISHED RULE 11 OPINIONS:
CIRCUIT PUBLISHED UNPUBLISHED
Second 7 0
Third 2 0
Fifth 6 0
Sixth 3 8
Seventh 5 1
Ninth 4 7
See generally Appendix 1.
413 Given the intracircuit and intercircuit conflicts amongst the federal courts of appeals,
it is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion clarifying
Rule 11 standards and/or procedures under the 1993 Rule. Under the 1983 version of Rule
11, the Court issued three major opinions, all within eight years of that Rule's adoption. See
Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991) (holding
that Rule 11 imposed an objective standard of reasonable inquiry on represented parties
who signed pleadings, motions, or other papers); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384 (1990) (adopting abuse of discretion as the applicable standard of review for all
aspects of a district court's Rule 11 decision and holding that Rule 11 sanctions could be
imposed after a case is voluntarily dismissed); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group,
493 U.S. 120, 124-128 (1989) (holding that Rule 11 sanctions could not be imposed on a law
firm).
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unpublished opinions.414 Consequently, the direction provided by the
federal appellate courts still appears to be somewhat limited.
B. The Federal District Courts
A total of ninety-two district court cases were collected for this
article.415 An examination of these cases reveals that there appears to be
greater consistency in Rule 11 motion practice at the district court level
than in the federal appeallate courts. But, unfortunately, like the federal
appellate courts, the district court cases seem to reflect some of the same
disturbing trends previously suggested in the appellate opinions.
1. The Rule 11 Motion
With a few exceptions, 416 district courts in the Second, Third, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all held that warning letters do not
414 See generally supra Part III.A.1-3.
415 See Appendix 2.
416 SECOND CIRCUIT: Williams v. Perry, No. 3:99-CV-00725-EBB, 2000 WL 341259, at *6
(D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2000) (granting defendant's Rule 11 motion, despite the fact that
defendant did not serve a separate Rule 11 motion and instead "sent a four page, single
spaced, highly detailed letter to Plaintiff's counsel outlining the law of res judicata"); Gray
v. Millea, 892 F. Supp. 432, 433 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting defendants' Rule 11 motion,
despite the fact that defendants did not serve a separate Rule 11 motion and instead sent
plaintiff a letter "which outlined in great detail the numerous factual and legal infirmities
in plaintiff's various positions and importuned plaintiff to withdraw his suit prior to the
filing of motions or risk sanctions"). The district court in Gray stated that
In light of the ... letter prepared by defendants' [sic] clarifying
plaintiff's position, defendants' good faith request that plaintiff
withdraw his claims before motions and so avoid sanctions, and the
unnecessary expense borne by the defendants in prosecuting their
summary judgment motion from that point onward, the Court finds
"unusual circumstances" such that payment to defendants' [sic] of
their attorney's fees and costsfrom the ... date of that letter is appropriate.
Gray, 892 F. Supp. at 438 (emphasis added). Cf. Galonsky v. Williams, No. 96 CIV. 6207
(JSM), 1997 WL 759445, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997). In response to plaintiff's argument
that sanctions should be denied because of the failure to satisfy Rule 11 requirements, the
court stated that,
While this argument is technically correct, in this case it exalts form
over function. [Plaintiff's counsel] received the notice of the defects in
his pleading which the rule contemplates when defense counsel sent
him letters outlining the deficiencies in a similar complaint at the
direction of the District Judge in New Jersey.
Id. (emphasis added). Because defendant's motion in Galonsky appeared "technically
barred" under Rule 11 for failure to satisfy the safe harbor provision, the district court
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satisfy the separate motion requirement of Rule 11 and are therefore
insufficient to trigger the safe harbor period under that Rule.417 Indeed,
issued an order to show cause and ultimately censured plaintiff's counsel under Rule 11
and awarded attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id. at *7.
NINTH CIRCUIT: Ex rel. Eitel, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Ariz. 1998). In Eitel, prior to filing
his Rule 11 motion against the government, a party sent the government letter notices of its
alleged violations. Id. at 1160. The government disputed whether Eitel complied with Rule
11's notice requirement. Id. The district court, however, concluded that, "[allthough the
exact motion was not served on the government, the Court finds that the letters provided
sufficient notice with respect to the allegations contained therein." Id. at 1160 n.7. The Rule
11 motion was ultimately denied on other grounds. Id. at 1162-63.
417 SECOND CIRCUIT: Gamla Enters. N. Am., Inc. v. Lunor-Brillen Design U. Vertriebs
GmbH, No. 98 Civ. 992 (MGC), 2000 WL 193120 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2000) (letter insufficient);
accord Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears Realty Co., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 393, 408 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
(rejecting plaintiff's argument "that the 'safe harbor' provision was satisfied because
defendant[s were] 'offered' on two occasions [by letter and during a pretrial conference
before the court] the opportunity to withdraw their motion"). The district court in Gamla
Enterprises stated that
There is no mention, however, in either the minutes of the pretrial
conference ... or in the ... letter, that plaintiff would seek sanctions
under Rule 11 if defendant[s] refused to withdraw their motion.
Neither the letter nor the oral request to withdraw the motion
constitute sufficient notice to defendants within the meaning of the
'safe harbor' provisions of Rule 11.
Gamla Enters., 2000 WL 193120, at *3. See also Lancaster v. Zufle, 170 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (declining to accept defendant's invitation to accept its warning letter as the
equivalent of compliance with Rule 11's separate motion requirement).
THIRD CIRCUIT: Farris v. County of Camden, 61 F. Supp. 2d 307, 332 n.15 (D.N.J. 1999)
("[An informal notice, either by letter or other means, does not trigger the commencement
of the 21 day [safe harbor] period.") (citation omitted); Lopez v. Constantine, Nos. 94 CIV.
5921 DAB SEG, 95 CIV 5915 DAB SEG, 1997 WL 793595, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 1997);
Kleinpaste v. United States, No. 97-884, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22377, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19,
1997).
SIXTH CIRCUIT: Miller v. Credit Collection Servs., 200 F.R.D. 379, 380-81 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (rejecting defendant's argument that "communications from its counsel to Plaintiff's
counsel [in the form of a letter and oral conversation] constitute compliance with the safe
harbor requirement of Rule 11(c)(1)(A)"). The district court stated that,
If the drafters of that Rule had deemed a letter suggesting that
sanctions would be sought were sufficient, they could quite easily have
used language to convey that intent, instead of that which was chosen
.... [Tihe courts have uniformly -concluded that a letter from an
attorney to opposing counsel, threatening to seek sanctions under Rule
11 if an allegedly offending paper is not withdrawn or modified, is not
the functional equivalent of serving a motion for sanctions and that,
therefore, such a letter does not constitute compliance with the safe
harbor provision contained in Rule 11(c)(1)(A).
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district courts in all six of the circuits surveyed here have denied Rule 11
sanctions where a separate Rule 11 motion was not actually served on
the opposing party.418 Significantly, the federal district courts also seem
Id. at 381 (footnote omitted). See also Two Men & a Truck/Int'l Inc. v. Two Men & a
Truck/Kalamazoo, Inc., No. 5:94-CV-162, 1996 WL 740540, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 16, 1996).
The court in Two Men & a Truck stated that,
Although plaintiff's counsel requested defendants' counsel by letter on
December 6, 1995, to withdraw the motion to modify the preliminary
injunction, the 'safe harbor' period begins to run only upon service of
the motion .... In fact, plaintiff's counsel should be expected to give
this type of notice to defendants' counsel prior to preparing and
serving a Rule 11 motion.
Id.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Dearborn Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Heath, No. 98CV5222, 1999 WL
1011860, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999) ("A warning letter does not trigger the safe harbor
provision of Rule 11, and further may not substitute for formal service of the Rule 11
motion."); accord Harding Univ. v. Consulting Servs. Group, L.P., 48 F. Supp. 2d 765, 770
(N.D. Ill. 1999).
NINTH CIRCUIT: Kibbee v. City of Portland, No. CV-98-675-ST, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17205, at *34 (D. Or. Oct. 12, 2000) ("A letter warning is not a motion.").
418 SECOND CIRCUIT: See, e.g., Ping He (Hai Nam) Co. v. Nonferrous Metals (U.S.A.), Inc.,
187 F.R.D. 121, 123-124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (vacating order imposing Rule 11 sanctions for,
among other things, failing to file a separate Rule 11 sanctions motion); accord Tornheim v.
Fed. Home Loan Morgtage Corp., 988 F. Supp. 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 932 F. Supp. at 407-08; Lancaster, 170 F.R.D. 7 ("[T]he Rule expressly requires the
serving of a formal motion .... for by serving such a motion a movant itself certifies to its
own compliance with Rule 11 ... and thus places its adversary on notice."); D'Orange v.
Feely, 877 F. Supp. 152, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying defendants' request for Rule 11
sanctions where defendants did not file a separate motion.); THIRD CIRCUIT: Brunner v.
AlliedSignal, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 612, 615 (D.N.J. 2001) (dismissing defendants' motion for Rule
11 sanctions, even though it complied with the safe harbor provision, because it was not
made separately); accord Clement v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554-55
(D.N.J. 2000); FIFTH CIRCUIT: Seal v. Gateway Cos. of Del., No. 01-1322, 2001 WL 1018362,
at *5-6 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2001) (denying plaintiff's request for Rule 11 sanctions which was
included in her opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss); accord Laughlin v. Falcon
Operators, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-1484, 2001 WL 474282, at *1 (E.D. La. May 3, 2001); SIXTH
CIRCUIT: Miller v. Credit Collection Servs., 200 F.R.D. 379, 381 (S.D. Ohio 2000) ("[Tihe
language employed in the second sentence of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) clearly and expressly
requires that the motion for sanctions be served."); Simmons v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp.,
No. 99-CV-76093-DT, 2000 WL 424198, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2000) (denying plaintiff's
motion for Rule 11 sanctions for failing, among other things, to "make the attorney fee
motion separately"); accord Neighbors Concerned About Yacht Club Expansion v. Grosse
Pointe Yacht Club, No. 99-70325, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646, at *30 (E.D. Mich. May 26,
1999) (denying defendant's motion); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Birch v. Kim, 977 F. Supp. 926, 937
(S.D. Ind. 1997) ("[Elven though the substance of Defendant's counterclaim is an assertion
for sanctions under Rule 11, Defendant has failed to comply with the required form of such
motion. Specifically, the rule directs the moving party to file a motion for sanctions
separately from other requests or motions.") (citation omitted); accord Israel Travel
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to strictly construe Rule 11's safe harbor provision and have denied Rule
11 sanctions where Rule 11 motions were filed in court before twenty-
one days from service of the motion had elapsed. 419
Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., No. 92 C 2379, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 751,
at *14 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26,1994); NINTH CIRCUIT: Fat T, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Assoc. Piers 7, 8, &
9, 172 F.R.D. 411, 415 (D. Haw. 1996) (denying plaintiff's request for Rule 11 sanctions
because motion was not filed separately); accord Dunn v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co.,
850 F. Supp. 853, 856 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (denying defendant's request for sanctions where
a separate motion was not filed, but also because the suit was not meant to harass or cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation).
419 SECOND CIRCUIT: See, e.g., Camprubi-Soms v. Aranda, No. 00 Civ. 9626 (DLC), 2002
WL 10439, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002) (denying cross-motions for Rule 11 sanctions by
holding that the safe harbor provision "is strictly construed"); accord Patsy's Brand, Inc. v.
I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10175 (SSM), 2001 WL 1154669, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2001)
(denying plaintiff's motion); R.B. Ventures v. Shane, No. 91 Civ. 5678 (CSH), 2000 WL
1010400, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2000) (denying defendant's motion); Blanco v. Remington
Hotel Corp., No. 96 Civ. 6306 (WK) EJCF, 1998 WL 66009, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1998)
(denying cross-motions); Bonondona v. Stat House, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 0788 (JES) (LB), 1997
WL 43614, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1997) (denying cross-motions); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 932
F. Supp. at 407-08 (denying plaintiff's motion); Photocircuits Corp. v. Marathon Agents,
Inc., 162 F.R.D 449, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying defendant's motion and rejecting
defendant's argument that it was not bound by Rule 11's safe harbor provision because the
court had granted leave to move for sanctions and reasoning that "[tihe granting of such
leave in no way was intended, nor could it, circumvent the amended provisions of Rule
11"); FIFrH CIRCUIT: See, e.g., Porter v. Milliken & Michael, Inc., No. 99-0199, 2001 WL
104769, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2001) (denying defendant's motion); accord Seal, 2001 WL
1018362, at *5-6 (denying plaintiff's motion); Riley v. City of Jackson, 2 F. Supp. 2d 864, 879-
80 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (denying plaintiffs' motion); SIXTH CIRCUIT: See, e.g., Simmons v.
Daimler-Chrysler Corp., No. 99-CV-76093-DT, 2000 WL 424198, at *34 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13,
2000) (denying plaintiff's motion); Grosse Pointe Yacht Club, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646, at
*30 (denying defendant's motion); Allied Mech. Serv., Inc. v. Local 337 of the United Assoc.
of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indust., No. 4:98-CV-113,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4654, at *20 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 1999) (denying defendant's motion);
Two Men and a Truck Int'l, 1996 WL 740540, at *1-2 (denying plaintiff's motion); SEVENTH
CIRCUIT: See, e.g., Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Theobold, No. IPOO-0325-C-M/S, 2001 WL
484181, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2001) (denying defendants' motion); Bryant v. Polston, No.
IP 00-1064-C-T/6, 2000 WL 1670938, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2000) (denying plaintiff's
motion); Birch, 977 F. Supp. at 937-38 (denying defendant's motion); Religious Order of St.
Matthew v. Brennan, No. 3:92-CV-793 RM, 1995 WL 555102, at *19 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 1995)
(denying defendant's motion); Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 751, at
*15-16 (denying plaintiff's motion); NINTH CIRCUIT: Kibbee, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17205, at
*32-35 (denying defendants' motion and stating that "FRCP 11 does not provide for a
waiver of the 21-day 'safe harbor' requirement under any circumstances").
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2. The Order to Show Cause
The federal district courts raised Rule 11 on their own initiative in
nine out of the sample of ninety-two district court cases collected,420 or in
ten percent of the cases. 421 Orders to show cause were actually issued in
seven of the nine cases. 422 In the other two cases, the federal district
court issued no order at all.423
But what of due process? Recall that, according to the federal
appellate courts, due process requires, at a minimum, that the party
against whom sanctions is sought be given: (1) particularized notice of
the conduct alleged to be sanctionable; (2) particularized notice of the
authority or authorities under which sanctions are being sought; and (3)
an opportunity to respond.424 As a consequence, the federal appellate
courts have tended to require the district courts to actually issue orders
to show cause. 425 Clearly, in the two cases in which no order to show
cause was issued at all, the sanctioned parties were not provided with
420 SECOND CIRCUIT: Galonsky, 1997 WL 759445; THIRD CIRCUIT: Brunner, 198 F.R.D. 612;
Clement, 122 F. Supp. 2d 551; Thomason v. Norman E. Lehrer, P.C., 182 F.R.D. 121 (D.N.J.
1998); FIFTH CIRCUIT: Hicks v. Bexar County, 973 F. Supp. 653 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Toups v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 155 F.R.D. 588 (S.D. Tex. 1994); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Miller v.
United States, No. 5:96CV1237, 1998 WL 372340 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1998); SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
Cox v. Preferred Technical Group, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 786 (N.D. Ind. 2000); Lerch v. Boyer,
929 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
421 Again, despite the fact that a considerably higher number of federal district court
cases were collected for this Article (relative to the number of appellate court opinions), the
sample size is still not large enough to generate statistically significant numbers. I am
definitely aware of this limitation but include the numbers anyway because they are useful
in suggesting trends in Rule 11 practice in the federal district courts.
422 Brunner, 198 F.R.D. at 615; Clement, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 555; Thomason, 182 F.R.D. at 125;
Miller, 1998 WL 372340, at *2; Galonsky, 1997 WL 759445, at *3; Lerch, 929 F. Supp. at 325.
423 Hicks, 973 F. Supp. at 686 (concluding that there was a "wholesale lack of legal and
factual support for plaintiff's civil rights claims ... " and imposing Rule 11 sanctions by
finding that "[tihe Court may sua sponte notice the propriety of the imposition of sanctions
upon a party pursuant to Rule 11"); Toups, 155 F.R.D. at 591 (concluding that defendant's
removal to the federal court "was patently frivolous and submitted solely to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation" and ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff $1,000 as a Rule 11 sanction to cover plaintiff's costs in opposing defendant's
removal to the federal district court).
424 See supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
425 See supra text accompanying notes 309-16.
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any of the required notice, and, as a result, they were also deprived of a
meaningful opportunity to respond.426
Of the remaining seven cases in which an order to show cause was
issued, two did not include the actual order issued by the district
courts, 4 27 only three appear to satisfy due process, 428 and the remaining
426 Recall that the purpose of requiring such particularized notice is to make counsel (or
the party) threatened with sanctions explicitly aware of the factors she must address if she
is to avoid sanctions. Only if armed with this information, therefore, can a party respond
intelligently to the court's concerns. See supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
427 In both cases, the orders to show cause were issued prior to the opinion collected for
this Article. See Galonsky, 1997 WL 759445, at *3 (Second Circuit); Brunner, 198 F.R.D. at 613
(Third Circuit).
428 THIRD CIRCUIT: Clement v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556 (D.N.J.
2000). The order to show cause stated that
Lorraine Harris, Esq., shall show cause before this Court on January 19,
2001 at 9:30 a.m. whether she has violated Federal Rule 11(b)(2)
[regarding legal claims], and what sanctions, if any, should be
imposed. Specifically, Ms. Harris shall show cause whether she
conducted an "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" that the
claims she has asserted on behalf of Plaintiff in this case "are
warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law."
Id. The order also set forth a briefing schedule. Id. The order to show cause issued here,
therefore, put plaintiff's counsel on notice of the specific conduct that was alleged to be
sanctionable, i.e., the legal claims asserted against defendants; informed her of the
authority upon which the district court was relying in considering sanctions, i.e., Rule 11;
and gave her a meaningful opportunity to respond. Id. Plaintiff's counsel's first response
to the order was due fifteen days after the order issued, and her reply brief, if any, was due
over two weeks after that. Id.; see also Thomason v. Lehrer, P.C., 182 F.R.D. 121, 125, 131
(D.N.J. 1998). In Thomason, the court stated that, with respect to the order to show cause it
had previously issued,
On May 26, 1998, after recounting the procedural history of the action
and relevant legal principles with respect to section 1983 actions . . . , I
ordered Thomason to show cause: "why Count I of the Amended
Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which [relief] can be granted and why Counts II through IV should not
be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) .... Also, having
discussed why Thomason might be subject to sanctions and what
,sanctioning tools' the Court was contemplating, ... I ordered
Thomason to show cause: why sanctions should not be imposed
against Charles L. Thomason, Esq. pursuant to (1) Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927; and (3) the
Court's inherent powers."
Id. The order to show cause at issue here appears to have satisfied due process because it
gave plaintiff notice of the specific conduct alleged to be sanctionable and the authorities
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two seem to fall short of the due process requirements laid out by the
federal circuit courts.429 All told, therefore, the federal district courts
under which the district court was contemplating sanctions. Id. Whether a meaningful
opportunity to respond was provided is less clear, but the opinion indicates that plaintiff
did file a response to the district court's order to show cause. Id.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Cox v. Preferred Technical Group, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 786, 787,
(N.D. Ind. 2000) (issuing "an oral order to show cause why [plaintiff] should not be
sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for forcing a totally
meritless case to trial"). The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court was
required to enter a separate written order to show cause describing the objectionable
conduct. Id. at 788-89. The court concluded that its oral order to show cause fully
complied with Rule 11's requirements. Id. at 789. In support of its position, the court
pointed out that, when it issued its oral order to show cause, it
specifically explained to [plaintiff] that he could be subjected to
sanctions for presenting a case based on complete fabrications and not
supported by any evidence whatsoever. This court also fully insured
that [plaintiff] would have a full opportunity to respond to the order to
show cause by requesting [his court appointed counsel] to represent
[plaintiff] and prepare a written response as well as attend the
sanctions hearing. Additionally, the court invited [plaintiff] to prepare
his own explanation of why he continued to pursue his case and, when
[plaintiff] was unable to attend the hearing scheduled for May 5, 2000,
the court rescheduled the hearing to a date more convenient for
[plaintiff].
Id. This oral order satisfies due process because it gave plaintiff specific information about
the conduct alleged to be sanctionable and disclosed that sanctions were being considered
under Rule 11 and plaintiff was given ample opportunity to respond. Id.
429 SIXTH CIRCUIT: Miller v. United States, No. 5: 96CV1237, 1998 WL 372340, at *1-2
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1998) (referring the case back to the magistrate judge for the sole
purpose of holding "a post-judgment hearing at which Plaintiff must show cause why he
should not be sanctioned [for bringing this action]"). On April 18, 1997, the magistrate
judge issued an order to show cause, which provided that
the undersigned will conduct a hearing on the motions for sanctions
and reimbursement of attorney fees and expenses beginning at 9:00
a.m. on Monday, June 2, 1997 .... At the hearing, Plaintiff should be
prepared to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for bringing
this action.
Further, in order to provide Plaintiff with every opportunity to be heard
on the sanction motions. Plaintiff is granted leave of court until May 12,
1997, to file any written statement or argument as to why sanctions should
not be imposed or to respond to the pending motions for sanctions. Any
other party may file a response no later than May 27, 1997. At the June
2, 1997, hearing the undersigned will consider any written materials
filed by any party in addition to the matters noted above.
Id. at *2. First, despite the repeated references made by the magistrate judge to a sanctions
motion or motions, there is nothing in the opinion, or in the original report and
recommendation issued by this magistrate judge to indicate that such a motion, rather than
the order to show cause, was ever filed or was pending. See Miller v. Gallagher, No. 5:
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failed to satisfy due process in four of the nine instances, or 44% of the
time, in which Rule 11 sanctions were raised on their own initiative.
Significantly, Rule 11 sanctions were imposed via these nine orders
to show cause in six of the nine cases, or 67% of the time.430 These
numbers, however, are not complete. Recall that orders to show cause
were also issued by the district courts in twelve of the forty-three circuit
court opinions previously discussed.431 Sanctions were imposed by the
district courts in nine of these twelve cases.432  Combining these
numbers, therefore, reveals the following statistics: (1) orders to show
cause were issued by the federal district courts in twenty-one out of one
hundred and thirty-five cases collected for this Article, or in 16% of the
96CV1237, 1996 WL 862462 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 1996) (providing the original report and
recommendations). One can only conclude, therefore, that the magistrate judge was
referring to a "motion" brought by the court itself, i.e., via the order to show cause.
Second, and more on point, the order to show cause issued by the magistrate judge did not
comport with due process. While it certainly provided plaintiff with ample opportunity to
respond to the order to show cause, it did not put plaintiff on notice of the specific conduct
alleged to be sanctionable or the specific sanctioning authority under which sanctions were
being sought or contemplated; indeed no sanctioning authority was even mentioned.
Consequently, plaintiff was denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to the order to
show cause.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Lerch v. Boyer, 929 F. Supp. 319, 325 (N.D. Ind. 1996). In Lerch, the
court issued the following order to show cause after dismissing plaintiffs' complaint:
Pursuant to Rule 11, the plaintiffs are given thirty (30) days from the
date of this Memorandum and Order within which to SHOW CAUSE
why this court should not impose the costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees incurred by former defendants the United States Bankruptcy
Court, Robert E. Grant, Judge, and Assistant United States Attorney J.
Philip Klingenberger.
Id. Clearly, this order failed to satisfy due process-it did not specify the conduct alleged to
be sanctionable or list a single sanctioning authority. Plaintiffs were therefore denied a
meaningful opportunity to respond, notwithstanding the fact that they had thirty days
within which to do so.
430 SECOND CIRCUIT: Galonsky, 1997 WL 759445, at *7 (censure); THIRD CIRCUIT: Brunner,
198 F.R.D. at 618 (admonition); Thomason, 182 F.R.D. at 121 (monetary sanctions); FIFTH
CIRCUIT: Hicks v. Bexar County, 973 F. Supp. 653, 690 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (monetary
sanctions); Toups v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 155 F.R.D. 588, 588 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(monetary sanctions); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Miller, 1998 WL 372340, at *1 (monetary sanctions).
Order to show cause hearings were still pending in two of the remaining cases and
Rule 11 sanctions were ultimately imposed via a Rule 11 motion, rather than the order to
show cause, in the last of the nine cases. See, e.g., Clement, 122 F. Supp. 2d 551 (hearing
pending); Cox, 110 F. Supp. 2d 786 (Rule 11 motion); Lerch, 929 F. Supp. 319 (hearing
pending).
431 See supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
432 See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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cases; and (2) sanctions were imposed pursuant to the orders to show
cause in fifteen out of the twenty-one cases, or 71% of the time.
These numbers are significant because they are consistent with
findings made by others. Specifically, Professor Vairo has found that sua
sponte orders to show cause are generally issued in approximately 14.5%
of Rule 11 cases. 433 Perhaps more importantly, the AJS study concluded
that "the rate of sanctions emerging from a judicial show cause order is
far greater than the success rate of motions for sanctions: about 60% of
the judicially-initiated Rule 11 formal activity leads to sanctions as
compared with approximately 15% of the counsel-initiated motions."434
3. Timing
Despite the fact that the timing of a Rule 11 motion or an order to
show cause can have a tremendous impact on the effectiveness of the
1993 amendments to the Rule,435 timing does not appear to be much of
an issue in most federal district courts. A Rule 11 motion or order to
show cause was filed after judgment in nineteen of the ninety-two
district court cases collected for this Article, 436 or 21% of the time.
433 Simpson, supra note 22, at 505 (citing Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law
Perspectives and Preventive Measures, 1-26 (Supp. 1991)).
434 Marshall, supra note 10, at 952.
435 See supra Part III.A.l.c., 2.b.
436 ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE: SIXTH CIRCUIT: Miller v. United States, No. 5:
96CV1237, 1998 WL 372340 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1998); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Lerch v. Boyer, 929
F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
RULE 11 MOTIONS: SECOND CIRCUIT: Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 99
Civ. 101750(SH), 2001 WL 1154669 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2001); Kron v. Moravia Cent. Sch. Dist.,
No. 5:98-CV-1876 (FJS/GJD), 2001 WL 536274 (N.D.N.Y. May 3, 2001); R.B. Ventures v.
Shane, No. 91 Civ. 5671 (CSH), 2000 WL 1010400 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2000); Kahre-Richardes
Family Found., Inc. v. Vill. of Baldwinsville, New York, 953 F. Supp. 39 (N.D.N.Y. 1997);
Lancaster v. Zufle, 170 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Binghamton Masonic Temple, Inc. v. Bares,
168 F.R.D. 121 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Gray v. Millea, 892 F. Supp. 432 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); THIRD
CIRCUIT: Hockley v. Shan Enter. Ltd. P'ship, 19 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 1998); Progress Fed.
Sav. Bank v. Lenders Ass'n, No. Civ. A. 99-7425, 1996 WL 57942 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1996);
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Cox v. Preferred Technical Group, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 786 (N.D. Ind.
2000); Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, S.A., 194 F.R.D. 633 (N.D. Ill. 2000);
Harding Univ. v. Consulting Serv. Group, L.P., 48 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Smith v.
CB Commercial Real Estate Group, 947 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Sethness-Greenleaf,
Inc. v. Green River Corp., Nos. 89C 9203, 91C4373, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13796 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 20, 1995); Gazouski v. Belvidere, No. 93C 20157, 1995 WL 149438 (N.D. II. Apr. 3,
1995); NINTH CIRCUIT: Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1174
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Neither of the two order to show cause cases discussed the fact that the
orders were issued after final judgment had been entered. With the
exception of district courts in two circuits, the fact that a Rule 11 motion
was filed after final judgment simply was not an issue addressed by most
district courts; it was not raised or discussed in these opinions at all.437
District courts in the Third Circuit denied Rule 11 motions filed after
final judgment because they were untimely, but they did so without any
mention of the Third Circuit's supervisory rule.438  Interestingly
enough,439 district courts in the Seventh Circuit also denied Rule 11
motions filed after final judgment as untimely,440 but these courts, in
keeping with the Seventh Circuit's position in Divane v. Krull,
acknowledged that Rule 11 motions could be filed after final
judgment.441 Unlike the Seventh Circuit in Divane, however, a couple of
district courts in this federal circuit impose a bright-line timeliness
standard ranging from thirty to ninety days for filing a Rule 11 motion
after final judgment, based on prior Seventh Circuit case law and local
rules of court.442
(C.D. Cal. 2001); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Gerbode, No. 93-2226AWT, 1994 WL 228607 (C.D.
Cal. June 23, 1994).
437 Cases from the district courts in five of the six circuits examined involved orders to
show cause or a Rule 11 motion filed after final judgment. Those circuits are the Second,
Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth. Significantly, four of the five circuits, namely, the Third,
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth, have essentially interpreted the 1993 version of Rule 11 to require
that Rule 11 motions be filed prior to final judgment or be denied as untimely. See supra
Part III.A.l.c.
43 Hockley, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (explicitly trying to give effect to the purposes behind
the safe harbor provision and stating that "[i]mplicit in the amended Rule 11 is the policy
provision that, absent clearly abusive behavior akin to contempt of court, a party will
always have the chance to withdraw the offending papers it has submitted"); Progress Fed.
Say. Bank, 1996 WL 57942, at *2 (noting that the safe harbor provision constituted a major
element of the new Rule 11's structure and stating with respect to that provision that "the
text reflects a purposeful and delicate balancing of policy concerns").
439 Recall that the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit that has addressed the timing issue
that has refused to adopt a per se Rule regarding when a Rule 11 motion should be filed.
See supra text accompanying notes 278-86. Instead, that appellate court has left the timing
issue to the discretion of the district courts. It appears that at least some of the district
courts in the Seventh Circuit have adopted a per se timeliness rule.
440 See Northlake Mktg., 194 F.R.D. at 633; Harding Univ., 48 F. Supp. 2d at 765; Smith, 947
F. Supp. at 1282; Gazouski, 1995 WL 149438; Sethness-Greenleaf Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS
13796.
44 See infra note 442.
442 Northlake Mktg., 194 F.R.D. at 634-35 (interpreting the Seventh Circuit's Divane v. Krull
opinion as reaffirming the timeliness standard established in a pre-1993 case called Kaplan
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4. Troubling Trends
Several of the troubling trends that were discussed in conjunction
with the federal appellate court cases actually stem from Rule 11 practice
in the federal district courts, namely, the emphasis on monetary
sanctions and the uses of the order to show cause procedure. More
specifically, it is the district courts that decide in the first instance
whether to issue orders to show cause and for what purpose and what
kind of Rule 11 sanction to impose. Perhaps it is therefore not surprising
that these troubling trends continue, and are more pronounced, in the
district court cases collected for this Article.443
a. Using Orders to Show Cause to Sidestep Rule 11 Motion
Requirements
A particularly troubling use of the order to show cause is the
apparent use of that procedure to sidestep the Rule 11 motion
requirements. In other words, it appears that orders to show cause are
being issued in situations where the Rule 11 motion requirements have
not been satisfied specifically because those requirements have not been
met.
Here are some numbers. Out of the ninety-two cases collected here,
the federal district courts issued a total of nine orders to show cause.444
Four of the nine orders, or 44% of them, were issued in circumstances in
v. Zenner, 956 F.2d 149, 151 (7th Cir. 1992), "which directed that any Rule 11 motions
should be filed 'as soon as practicable after discovery of a Rule 11 violation,"' and
according to the district court, Kaplan also imposed a "bright-line component of the
timeliness test," which would require all Rule 11 motions to be filed within 90 days of final
judgment, id.); Smith, 947 F. Supp. at 1284. The court in Smith took the position that
The Seventh Circuit [in Kaplan v. Zenner] has established the "outer
parameter" of timeliness for purposes of a Rule 11 motion [to be] the
deadline under local rules for filing a bill of costs or a request for
attorney fees[; and] ... the latest a motion for sanctions could be filed
was either 30 days or 90 days after entry of final judgment, depending
on whether costs or attorney fees were being sought.
Smith, 947 F. Supp. at 1284 (citations omitted).
443 The numbers that follow are simply suggestive of a trend in the federal district courts;
they are not statistically significant, given the relatively small number of cases collected for
this article.
4" See supra note 420.
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which the Rule 11 motion requirements were not satisfied. 445 At the
appellate level, four of the twelve cases at least raised the issue of
whether it was proper to use an order to show cause to sidestep the Rule
11 motion requirements.4 6 Putting these numbers together yields the
following results: (1) out of the one hundred and thirty-five cases
collected, only twenty-one orders to show cause, or 16%, were issued by
the federal district courts; (2) of the twenty-one orders to show cause
issued, however, four, or 19% of them, appear to have been issued
specifically because the Rule 11 motion requirements were not satisfied;
(3) in another four cases of the twenty-one in which orders to show cause
were issued, or 19%, using an order to show cause specifically to get
around the motion requirements was raised as an issue; and, therefore,
(4) the appropriate use of an order to show cause was at least raised in
eight of the twenty-one order to show cause cases, or in 38% of these
cases.
b. Orders to Show Cause and Attorneys' Fees
Again, the federal district courts raised Rule 11 on their own
initiative in 10% of the ninety-two district court cases collected, or in nine
445 SECOND CIRCUIT: Galonsky v. Williams, No. 96 Civ. 6207(JSM), 1997 WL 759445, *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997) (stating that, because defense counsel's motion appeared to be
technically barred for failing to follow the safe harbor provision of Rule 11 but counsel's
conduct appeared to merit sanctions, the court gave counsel notice it was considering
imposing sanctions on its own motion, ultimately censuring plaintiff's counsel under Rule
11 and awarding $15,000 in attorneys' fees pursuant to § 1927); THIRD CIRCUIT: Brunner v.
AlliedSignal, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 612, 615, 618 (D.N.J. 2001) (issuing an order to show cause
against plaintiff's counsel and ultimately admonishing him on the record as a Rule 11
sanction, even though defendants' Rule 11 motion was dismissed for failure to comply
with the separate motion requirement because the district court was convinced that
plaintiff's counsel's conduct had in fact violated Rule 11); Clement v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555 (D.N.J. 2000) (denying the defendants' motion for sanctions
because they failed to comply with the separate motion requirement of Rule 11(c)(1)(A),
but issuing an order to show cause with the opinion, which directed plaintiff's counsel to
show cause whether she had violated Rule 11(b)(2) and what sanctions, if any, should be
imposed); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Lerch v. Boyer, 929 F. Supp. 319, 321, 325 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(concluding, after the United States Bankruptcy Court and an Assistant United States
Attorney were dismissed as defendants and after the remaining defendants had been
dismissed and had moved for Rule 11 sanctions, that, because neither the United States
Bankruptcy Court nor the Assistant United States Attorney "filed formal motions for Rule
11 sanctions prior to their termination as parties to this action ... , the plaintiffs are hereby
ordered to show cause within thirty (30) days why this court should not impose costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the affidavits provided by [defense counsel]").
446 See supra text accompanying notes 348-63.
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cases. 447 Rule 11 sanctions were awarded pursuant to six of the nine
orders to show cause, or 67% of the time.448 Of the six orders resulting in
sanctions, four of them, or 67%, awarded attorneys' fees.449 With respect
to the appellate cases, nine of the twelve orders to show cause issued by
the federal district courts resulted in an award of attorneys' fees. 450
Combining these numbers, therefore, yields the following results: (1) out
of the one hundred and thirty-five cases collected, a total of twenty-one
orders to show cause, or 16%, were issued by the federal district courts;
(2) of the twenty-one orders to show cause, sanctions were imposed
pursuant to eighteen of them, or 86% of the time; and (3) of the eighteen
sanctions awards, thirteen, or 72% of them, imposed attorneys' fees.
These figures are significant, of course, because Rule 11 precludes the
federal district courts from awarding monetary sanctions in the form of
attorneys' fees when acting upon their own initiative.451
c. Emphasis on Monetary Sanctions
The district court case law collected for this Article makes it very
clear that monetary sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees are still the
sanction of choice under Rule 11. This point is underscored by
statements made by federal district court judges and also by the
447 See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
448 See supra note 430 and accompanying text.
449 THIRD CIRCUIT: Thomason v. Lehrer, P.C., 182 F.R.D. 121, 122 (D.N.J. 1998) (ordering
plaintiff to pay a $2,000 "fine"-"1,000 to be paid directly to [defendant] and $1,000 to be
deposited into the Court's Registry"); FIFTH CIRCUIT: Hicks v. Bexar County, Texas, 973 F.
Supp. 653, 690, 691 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (awarding defendants their entire amount of
attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred "in defending against plaintiff's claims herein,"
with the amount to be established by affidavits to be filed with the court); Toups v. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., 155 F.R.D. 588, 591 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff $1,000 "for the Plaintiff's reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney's fees,
in opposing [the] removal"); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Miller v. United States, No. 5:96CV1237, 1998
WL 372340, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1998) (ordering plaintiff to pay a total of $5,000 in
attorneys' fees to be apportioned between four defendants).
450 See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
451 The relevant portion of Rule 11 provides:
Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction
may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, or an
order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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numbers. For example, a federal district judge sitting in the Southern
District of New York stated,
The Court has the discretion to fashion an appropriate
sanction for a Rule 11 violation. The critical
consideration in exercising this discretion is that the
policy underlying Rule 11 is to "sanction" rather than to
"reimburse[ ]." ... However, the typical sanction
imposed is the payment of the other party's reasonable
attorneys' fees which were incurred as a result of the
violation.452
Another federal judge, sitting in the Central District of California
stated that "Rule 11(c)(1)(A) now makes it discretionary with the court as
to whether or not to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party
'incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.' The rule does not
require the presence of any exceptional circumstances for the award of
such fees, but only that the award be 'warranted.'" 453
Of the ninety-two district court cases collected, a total of ninety-
seven Rule 11 motions were filed,454 twenty-two of which were
granted.455 So, a Rule 11 motion was granted in 23% of the cases in
452 Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Coerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
453 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Gerbode, No. 93-2226AWT, 1994 WL 228607, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
May 2, 1994) (footnote omitted).
454 See Appendix 3.
455 SECOND CIRCUIT: Williams v. Perry, No. 3:99-CV-00725EBB, 2000 WL 341259 (D.
Conn. Feb. 23, 2000); Howard, 977 F. Supp. 654; Kahre-Richardes Family Found., Inc. v.
Village of Baldwinsville, New York, 953 F. Supp. 39 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Chauvet v. Local 1199
Drug Hospital, & Healthcare Employees Union, Nos. 96 Civ. 2934(SS), 96 Civ. 4622(SS),
1996 WL 665610 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1996); Wright v. Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman &
Dicker, No. 95 CIV 7970 (MGC), 1996 WL 447773 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1996); Binghamton
Masonic Temple, Inc. v. Bares, 168 F.R.D. 121 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); O'Brien v. Alexander, 898 F.
Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Gray v. Millea, 892 F. Supp. 432 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); THIRD CIRCUIT:
Lal v. Borough of Kennett Square, 935 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Watson v. City of Salem,
934 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.J. 1995); Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1994); FIFTH CIRCUIT:
Muhammad v. Louisiana., Nos. Civ., A. 99-3472, Civ. A. 99-2694, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18807 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2000); Tolbert v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3-96-CV-0428-R,
1997 WL 135606 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 1997); Prewitt v. Alexander, 173 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Miss.
1996); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Kratage v. Charter Township of Commerce, 926 F. Supp. 102 (E.D.
Mich. 1996); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Cox v. Preferred Technichal Group, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d
786 (N.D. Ind. 2000); Smith v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 98C5903, 2000 WL 549483
(N.D. Ill. May 1, 2000); Cooper v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 95 C 2616, 1997 U.S. Dist.
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which one was filed. As previously noted, sanctions were also imposed
in six out of the nine orders to show cause cases.45 6 Together, therefore,
sanctions were imposed by the federal district courts in twenty-eight of
the ninety-two cases. This means that sanctions were imposed in 30% of
all the cases. Significantly, however, monetary sanctions in the form of
attorneys'fees were imposed in twenty-five of these twenty-eight cases.45 7
LEXIS 5299 (N.D. 111. Apr. 14, 1997); Vildaver v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
Nos. 94 C 3041, 94 C 3413, 1997 WL 7562 (N.D. I11. Jan. 2, 1997); Lerch v. Boyer, 929 F. Supp.
319 (N.D. Ind. 1996); NINTH CIRCUIT: Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 151 F.
Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Religious Tech. Ctr., 1994 WL 228607.
456 See supra note 430 and accompanying text.
457 ON MOTION-SECOND CIRCUIT: Williams, 2000 WL 341259, at *7 (ordering plaintiff's
counsel to pay defendant's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending the action, with the
amount to be determined after defense counsel filed a fee application); Howard, 977 F.
Supp. at 667 (sanctioning plaintiff's counsel in an amount to be determined after defense
counsel "submit[s] to [the] Court detailed billing records reflecting the work expended on
the instant motion so that an appropriate sanction award may be established"); Kahre-
Richardes Family Found., Inc., 953 F. Supp. at 42-43 (awarding a total of $9,892.10 in
attorneys' fees and making plaintiffs responsible for half, or $4,946.05, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and plaintiffs' counsel responsible for the other half, or $4,946.05, pursuant to
Rule 11); Wright, 1996 WL 447773, at *4 (imposing Rule 11 sanctions against defense counsel
and his law firm, as well as sanctioning defense counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 in an
amount to be determined after plaintiff's counsel "submit[s] a statement describing the
costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of defendants' and
counsel's sanctioned conduct"); Binghamton Masonic Temple, Inc., 168 F.R.D. at 128-29
(holding both of plaintiff's counsel jointly and severally liable to defense counsel for his
"defense of Plaintiff's claims, the Plaintiff's Rule 59 motion .... and the Defendants'
prosecution of their Rule 11 claim," with total fees and costs awarded amounting to
$13,153.10); O'Brien, 898 F. Supp. at 176 (sanctioning plaintiff's counsel a total of $1,500, of
which $750 was "to be paid to the Clerk of the Court and $750 ... to be paid to
defendants"); Gray, 892 F. Supp. at 439 (ordering plaintiff's attorney to pay $22,374.69 in
attorneys' fees and expenses for all defendants from the date that plaintiff received a
warning letter from defense counsel up to and including the date that defendants' motions
for summary judgment were heard); THIRD CIRCUIT: Lal, 935 F. Supp. at 578 (ordering
plaintiff "to pay the reasonable attorneys [sic] fees and costs incurred by tall defendants] in
defending this lawsuit," with defendants ordered to submit affidavits detailing their fees, as
well as imposing a $1,500 fine to be paid to the court, representing "$100 for each of the 15
defendants seeking sanctions") (emphasis added); Watson, 934 F. Supp. at 665 (requiring
plaintiff's counsel to pay "[diefendants for the reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred as a
result of the institution of this lawsuit" and ordering defendants to submit affidavits detailing
fees and costs); Kramer, 156 F.R.D. at 111 (ordering plaintiff, an attorney in an underlying
action, to pay defendants $70,289.00 in attorneys' fees and costs under both Rule 11 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and imposing other sanctions, including dismissing the complaint, referring
the matter for disciplinary proceedings, and referring the matter for criminal investigation);
FIFrH CIRCUIT: Muhammad, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18807, at *11 (ordering plaintiff's counsel
to pay defendants attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against plaintiffs' claims and
ordering defendants to file a statement of fees and costs); Tolbert, 1997 WL 135606, at *4
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In other words, the federal district courts resorted to imposing monetary
sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees in 89% of the cases in which
sanctions were granted. The awards ranged from lows of $500, $750, and
$825.50 to highs of $70,289, $80,917, and even $105,149.79.458 It was also
not uncommon for the district courts to award all of the "reasonable"
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in an entire litigation. In fact, out of
(requiring pro se plaintiff to pay $825.50 in monetary sanctions to defendant); Prewitt, 173
F.R.D. at 440, 441 (determining that "the appropriate form of Rule 11 sanctions in this
matter is an award of attorney's fees and case expenses in favor of each of the defendants
who have requested such an award" and ordering pro se civil rights plaintiff, a licensed
attorney, to pay a total of $49,468.75); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Kratage, 926 F. Supp. at 106 (ordering
plaintiffs to pay $5,000, "representing the total amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred by the defendants in connection with the defense of this and previous actions" and
enjoining plaintiffs "from filing any future civil lawsuit based upon or arising out of any of
the legal or factual claims alleged in this action and the actions underlying it") (emphasis
added); Ortman v. Thomas, 906 F. Supp. 416, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (ordering plaintiff to
"pay a monetary sanction in the amount of $24,809.99, representing the total amount of
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the defendants in connection with the defense of this
action") (emphasis added); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Cox, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (ordering plaintiff
to pay a total of $80,917.00 to defendant in attorneys' fees for "forcing the case to trial");
Smith, 2000 WL 549483 at *6 (ordering plaintiff to pay $500); Cooper, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5299, at *8 (ordering plaintiffs' counsel to pay defendants all of their "attorneys' fees and
costs attributable to the defense of this lawsuit," totalling $105,149.78 in fees and costs);
Vildaver, 1997 WL 7562, at *3 (ordering plaintiffs' counsel to pay defense counsel a total of
$54,742.07 in attorneys' fees and costs); NINTH CIRCUIT: Truesdell, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 1191
(ordering plaintiff's counsel to pay defendant $4,945 as reasonable attorneys' fees);
Religious Tech. Ctr., 1994 WL 228607, at *5 (holding plaintiff's counsel and her law firm
jointly and severally liable to pay defendants $8,887.50 "as partial reimbursement for
attorneys' fees incurred in defending against the amended complaint," as well as making
plaintiff's counsel and her firm jointly and severally liable to pay a $8,887.50 fine into
court).
VIA ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE-THIRD CIRCUIT: Thomason v. Lehrer, P.C., 182
F.R.D. 121, 122 (D.N.J. 1998) (ordering the district court plaintiff to pay a $2,000 "fine" with
"1,000 to be paid directly to [defendant] and $1,000 to be deposited into the Court's
Registry..."); FIFTH CIRCUIT: Hicks v. Bexar County, Texas, 973 F. Supp. 653, 690 (W.D.
Tex. 1997) (awarding defendants their entire amount of attorneys' fees and costs actually
incurred "in defending against plaintiff's claims herein," with the amount to be established
by affidavits to be filed with the court); Toups v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 155 F.R.D.
588, 591 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (ordering defendant to pay plaintiff $1,000 "for the Plaintiff's
reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, in opposing this removal"); SIXTH
CIRCUIT: Miller v. United States, No. 5:96CV1237, 1998 WL 372340, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6,
1998) (ordering plaintiff to pay a total of $5,000 in attorneys' fees to be apportioned
between four defendants).
45 LOWS-SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Smith, 2000 WL 549483, at *6 ($500); SECOND CIRCUIT:
O'Brien, 898 F. Supp. at 176 ($750); FIFrH CIRCUIT: Tolbert, 1997 WL 135606, at *4 ($825.50).
HIGHS-THIRD CIRCUIT: Kramer 156 F.R.D. at 111 ($70,289); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Cox,
110 F. Supp. 2d at 791 ($80,917); Cooper, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5299 ($105,149.78).
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the twenty-five cases awarding monetary sanctions in the form of
attorneys' fees, fourteen of them, or 56%, made just such an award.45 9
459 ON MOTION-SECOND CIRCUIT: Williams, 2000 WL 341259, at *7 (ordering plaintiff's
counsel to pay defendant's attorneys'fees and costs incurred in defending the action in an amount
to be determined after defense counsel filed a fee application); Binghamton Masonic Temple,
Inc., 168 F.R.D. at 128-29 (holding both of plaintiff's counsel jointly and severally liable to
defense counsel for his "defense of Plaintiff's claims, the Plaintiff's Rule 59 motion .. and
the Defendants' prosecution of their Rule 11 claim," with total fees and costs awarded by
the court amounting to $13,153.10); Gray, 892 F. Supp. at 439 (ordering plaintiff's attorney
to pay $22,374.69 in attorneys' fees and expenses for all defendants from date that plaintiff
received a warning letter from defense counsel up to and including date that defendants'
motions for summary judgment were heard); THIRD CIRCUIT: Lal, 935 F. Supp. at 578
(ordering plaintiff "to pay the reasonable attorneys [sic]fees and costs incurred by [all defendants]
in defending this lawsuit," with defendants ordered to submit affidavits detailing their fees,
as well as imposing a $1,500 fine to be paid to the court, representing "$100 for each of the
15 defendants seeking sanctions") (emphasis added); Watson, 934 F. Supp. at 665 (ordering
plaintiff's counsel to pay "[diefendants for the reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred as a
result of the institution of this lawsuit" and ordering defendants to submit affidavits detailing
fees and costs) (emphasis added); Kramer, 156 F.R.D. at 111 (ordering plaintiff, an attorney
in an underlying action, to pay defendants $70,289.00 in attorneys' fees and costs under
both Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, "due to the filing of his Complaint," and imposing other
sanctions including dismissing the complaint, referring the matter for disciplinary
proceedings, and referring the matter for criminal investigation) (emphasis added); FIFTH
CIRCUIT: Muhammad, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18807, at *11 (ordering plaintiff's counsel to pay
defendants their attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against plaintiffs' claims and
ordering defendants to file a statement of fees and costs); Prewitt, 173 F.R.D. at 440
(determining that "the appropriate form of Rule 11 sanctions in this matter is an award of
attorney's fees and case expenses in favor of each of the defendants who have requested
such an award" and ordering the pro se civil rights plaintiff, a licensed attorney, to pay a
total of $49,468.75); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Kratage, 926 F. Supp. at 106 (ordering plaintiffs to pay
$5,000, "representing the total amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the
defendants in connection with the defense of this and previous actions" and enjoining plaintiffs
"from filing any future civil rights lawsuit based upon or arising out of any of the legal or
factual claims alleged in this action and the actions underlying it") (emphasis added);
Ortman, 906 F. Supp. at 424 (ordering plaintiff to "pay a monetary sanction in the amount
of $24,809.99, representing the total amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the
defendants in connection with the defense of this action") (emphasis added); SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
Cox, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (ordering plaintiff to pay a total of $80,917.00 to defendant as
their reasonable attorneys' fees for "forcing the case to trial"); Cooper, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5299, at *8 (ordering plaintiffs' counsel to pay defendants all of their "attorneys' fees and
costs attributable to the defense of this lawsuit," totalling $105,149.78 in fees and costs);
Vildaver, 1997 WL 7562, at *3 (ordering plaintiffs' counsel to pay defense counsel a total of
$54,742.07 in attorneys' fees and costs, representing all of the reasonable attorney's fees that
defense counsel incurred in defending the case).
VIA ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE-FFTH CIRCUIT: Hicks, 973 F. Supp. at 690-91
(ordering pro se civil rights plaintiff to pay defendants their entire amount of attorneys'
fees and costs actually incurred "in defending against plaintiff's claims herein" in an
amount to be established by affidavits to be filed with the court).
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Perhaps more significantly for purposes of this paper, of the fourteen
district court cases that awarded all litigation costs as an "appropriate"
Rule 11 sanction, all fourteen were imposed against plaintiffs or their
counsel,46° and eight of the fourteen involved civil rights claims.461
Here again, these numbers do not provide a complete picture. The
federal district courts also imposed Rule 11 sanctions in thirty-eight of
the forty-three appellate decisions collected for this Article.462 Monetary
sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees were the sanction of choice by the
federal district courts in twenty-eight out of those thirty-eight cases, 463 or
460 See supra note 459.
461 ON MOTION-SECOND CIRCUIT: Williams, 2000 WL 341259, at *7 (complaining of
wrongful discharge in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights; imposing
sanctions on plaintiff's counsel); THIRD CIRCUIT: Lal, 935 F. Supp. at 578 (seeking relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; imposing sanctions on plaintiff's counsel); Watson, 934 F. Supp. at
665 (alleging Title VII race discrimination and seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
imposing sanctions on plaintiff's counsel); FIFTH CIRCUIT: Prewitt, 173 F.R.D. at 440-41
(alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, et seq., 1981, 1981A, 1983, 1985, 2000e et seq., and
3601 et seq. for, among other things, wrongful discharge; imposing sanctions on pro se
plaintiff); SIXTH CIRCUIT: Kratage, 926 F. Supp. at 106 (alleging violations of civil rights
statutes and race discrimination in connection with denial of a site plan to develop
property in a township; imposing sanctions on plaintiffs); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Cox, 110 F.
Supp. 2d at 791 (seeking relief from employment discrimination; imposing sanctions on
plaintiff); Cooper, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5299, at *8, *20 (complaining of wrongful
termination based on intentional discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; imposing
sanctions on plaintiff's counsel).
VIA ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE-FIFrH CIRCUIT: Hicks, 973 F. Supp. at 690-91 (alleging
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; imposing sanctions on pro se civil rights plaintiff).
462 See supra notes 343-47 and accompanying text (noting the twelve orders to show cause
that were granted); supra note 376 and accompanying text (stating that a total of twenty-six
motions were granted).
463 See SECOND CIRCUIT: Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52 (2d
Cir. 2000) ($45,000); Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
1999) ($25,000); Sakon v. Andreo, 119 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1997) ($2,700); Hadges v. Yonkers
Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320 (2d Cir. 1995) ($2,000); THIRD CIRCUIT: Edwards v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 153 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1998) ($46,820); Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll.
of Pa., 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996) ($15,000); Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir. 1995)
($1,000); Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1994) ($7,000); FIFTH CIRCUIT: Thornton
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1998) (all fees reasonably incurred by
defendant in defending suit); Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995) ($7,850); SIXTH
CIRCUIT: Heldt v. Nicholson, No. 00-1495, 2001 WL 111648 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2001) ($6,429);
Powell v. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Nos. 98-3668, 98-3670, 1999 WL 519186 (6th Cir. July
16, 1999) ($1,000); Cobleigh v. United States, No. 97-2302, 1999 WL 195738 (6th Cir. Mar. 23,
1999) ($360); Barker v. Bank One, Lexington, N.A., No. 97-5787, 1998 WL 466437 (6th Cir.
July 30, 1998) ($28,640.80); Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997)
($32,546.02); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Divane v. Krull Elec., Inc., 200 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1999)
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in 74% of the cases in which sanctions were awarded. Adding these
totals together yields the following results: (1) out of the one hundred
thirty-five cases collected for this Article, Rule 11 sanctions were
imposed by the federal district courts in sixty-six of those cases, 464 or 49%
of the time; and (2) of those sixty-six cases imposing sanctions, monetary
sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees were awarded as the Rule 11
sanction of choice by the federal district courts in fifty-three of the cases,
or 80% of the time.465
5. Summary
The federal district courts seem to be much more consistent than the
federal appellate courts when it comes to Rule 11 motion practice. More
specifically, the district courts appear to be fairly uniform in rejecting
warning letters as adequate notice, in requiring separate motions, and in
insisting on full compliance with the twenty-one day safe harbor period
prior to filing a Rule 11 motion in court.466 But it is also fair to say that
Rule 11 practice as a whole in the district courts is more troubling. First,
the district courts, for the most part, do not address when a Rule 11
motion or an order to show cause should be filed or issued, and this issue
can have a dramatic impact on the effectiveness of the 1993
amendments.467 Second, the district courts seem to have difficulty
complying with due process either because they do not issue an order to
show cause or because the order that is issued fails to satisfy the
minimum requirements set out by the appellate courts.468 Third, there is
a much stronger suggestion that orders to show cause are being used to
sidestep the Rule 11 motion requirements or that such use is being
contemplated.469 Finally, it seems clear that the Rule 11 sanction of
($33,292); Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., Nos. 96-3907, 97-2671, 97-2041, 1999 WL 754333 (7th
Cir. July 15, 1998) ($92,000); Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir.
1998) ($200); Johnson v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 74 F.3d 147 (7th Cir. 1996) ($800); NINTH
CIRCUIT: Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001) ($75,000);
Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying Serv., Inc., No. 98-35361, 2000 WL 11432 (9th Cir. Jan. 6,
2000) (amount not specified); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998) ($2,500); see also
supra note 448 for the remaining six cases that awarded monetary sanctions via orders to
show cause.
464 See supra notes 430, 455, 462.
465 See supra notes 457, 463.
46 See supra Part III.B.1.
467 See supra Part III.B.3.
468 See supra text accompanying notes 424-29.
469 See supra Part III.B.4.a.
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choice in the district courts, regardless of whether the sanction is
imposed pursuant to motion or by order to show cause, remains
attorneys' fees.470
IV. THE CHILLING EFFECTS CONTINUE
A. The Impact on Civil Rights Cases
So, are the amendments working? Have they been successful in
reducing Rule 11's chilling effects? Some commentators have observed
anecdotally that Rule 11 use seems to have declined following the 1993
amendments.471 This observation appears to have some empirical
support. For example, Professor Vairo reports that, by the time Rule 11
was amended in 1993, there were 600 published federal appellate court
decisions dealing with the 1983 version of the Rule.472 In contrast, my
research indicates that, by December 18, 2001-eight years after the 1993
amendments went into effect-there was a total of 442 federal appellate
court decisions, a decrease of approximately 26%. Of the total number of
appellate cases, however, only 233 represent published opinions, the
470 See supra Part III.B.4.b-c.
471 See, e.g., Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining: Decrease Attributed to 1-Year-Old
Safe Harbor Amendments to Rule 11, 81 A.B.A. J. 12 (1995) (concluding that "initial results
show a marked decline in reported cases under the new Rule 11, a trend confirmed by
interviews with federal judges, lawyers and law professors"); Hirt, supra note 106, at 1026
("To date, there is relatively little academic or practitioner commentary on how the
amended Rule operates. There is, however, some 'anecdotal' reporting, with some
commentators stating that there are fewer sanctions motions filed under the amended
Rule."). Hirt goes on to comment that,
Despite the passage of over five years since the amended Rule went
into effect, there has been relatively little commentary on it in reported
cases. Although some courts have commented on the impact of the
1993 amendments in the course of their rulings, their commentary has
been brief; only a small number of decisions express opinions as to the
reforms intended by the amended Rule.
Hirt, supra note 106, at 1029 (footnotes omitted); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 Update, SC01
ALI-ABA 277, 279 (1997) (" [T]he volume of Rule 11 activity is greatly diminished. Some
judges report that nobody is making Rule 11 motions any more .... My experience
confirms these anecdotal reports. When the rule was in its heyday, I would rip handfuls of
Rule 11 cases out of each advance sheet reporter."); see also Spiegel, supra note 72, at 159
n.19 (noting that "[t]he commentary on the 1983 version of Rule 11 was voluminous" and
finding over 100 articles on the 1983 version, compared to only 20 on the 1993 version).
472 See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 599 (1998)
[hereinafter Vairo, Profession]. Professor Vairo's article refers to "reported" decisions. Via
an email exchange between Professor Vairo and me, I was able to confirm with her that her
statistics only included published opinions.
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remaining 209 are unpublished. 473 The decrease in published appellate
decisions, therefore, is approximately 61%. As one would probably
expect, given the appellate court numbers, some preliminary evidence
suggests that the decline in Rule 11 use is present in the federal district
courts as well.474 This reduction in Rule 11 activity could certainly
support an argument that the 1993 amendments have been at least
partially successful in reducing the Rule's chilling effects in the federal
courts. Based on the research conducted for this Article, however, I do
not believe that this reduction in Rule 11 use, by itself, warrants this
conclusion.
By way of very brief review, recall that Rule 11's chilling effects take
two different, but related forms: first, Rule 11 chilled creative advocacy
by stifling the development of the common law and inhibiting vigorous
advocacy; second, Rule 11 was used disproportionately against certain
kinds of litigants and their attorneys, namely, those asserting civil rights
claims.475 Recall also that the primary causes of the Rule's chilling effects
were previously identified as including: the amount of discretion
committed to federal district court judges, the inconsistent application of
the Rule, the lack of uniform sanctioning procedures, insufficiently
rigorous appellate review, the use of Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device,
47 1 conducted the following two Westlaw searches in Westlaw's CTA database: (1) on
August 31, 2000, I ran the following query: "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11" "Rule 11"
"Fed R Civ P 11" /p sanction! & Da(aft 11/30/1993); and (2) on December 18, 2001, I ran
the following query: "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11" "Fed R Civ P 11" "FRCP 11"
"Rule 11" /p sanction! & Da(aft 8/31/2000). The first of the two searches produced 834
cites; the second of the two searches produced 108 cites. I then had my research assistants,
MaryAnne Carlson and Eric Lenz, go through each of the cases: (a) to determine whether
the case was in fact a case discussing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(b) to make sure that the cases we counted did indeed discuss the 1993 Rule. From this we
gathered the totals cited in the text. I am extremely grateful to Ms. Carlson and Mr. Lenz
for their assistance in this endeavor.
474 Two districts were selected in the Ninth Circuit, namely the Northern and Central
Districts of California, in which to test the hypothesis that Rule 11 use has declined in the
federal courts since the 1993 amendments. My research assistant, Kristin M. Schuh, ran
searches on LEXIS in each district for the following five-year time periods: January 1, 1986,
through December 31, 1991, for the 1983 version of the Rule, and January 1, 1996, through
December 31, 2001, for the 1993 version. This limited sample reveals the following: Rule
11 was raised in 75 cases under the 1983 version of the Rule (23 cases in the Central District,
52 cases in the Northern District) and in a total of 54 cases under the 1993 Rule (17 cases in
the Central District, 37 cases in the Northern District), for a decrease in Rule 11 use of
approximately 28%. See infra Appendix 4.
475 See supra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
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and, finally, the substantive bias in the federal courts against certain
kinds of litigants bringing certain types of claims.476 The only way that
the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 could reduce the Rule's chilling effects
was if those amendments addressed the causes and, more particularly, if
they successfully addressed those causes. Ultimately, whether the
amendments successfully addressed those causes turned, in large part, on
how the federal courts chose (and continue to choose) to interpret and
apply the 1993 amendments to the Rule.
One hundred and thirty-five cases were collected for this Article.
But even this number constitutes a small sample relative to all of the Rule
11 activity conducted in the six federal circuits studied.477  Any
conclusions reached here, therefore, are anecdotal.478 Notwithstanding
these limitations (or criticisms), however, enough data was collected and
analyzed to at least draw some preliminary conclusions with respect to
Rule 11 practice in the federal courts. 479 Based on the research conducted
476 See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
477 See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 72, at 169 ("The majority of Rule 11 cases are not reported
in published opinions, even if we include within our definition of published opinions
decisions available on Lexis or Westlaw."). In 1989, Professor Burbank remarked that,
even viewed in gross, published opinions are not a reliable index of
what is happening in district courts, at least in the Third Circuit. Only
9.1% of the decisions on Rule 11 issues in the period June 30, 1987
through July 1, 1988 ... have been or are scheduled to be, published in
Federal Supplement or Federal Rules Decisions. Only 39.1% of those
decisions are available on Lexis.
Burbank, Transformation, supra note 61, at 1955-56. Theodore Hirt has also stated that,
Although the above discussion reflects how the amended Rule is being
applied in published rulings, only limited conclusions can be drawn
from it. First, reported cases do not reflect court rulings that, for
whatever reason, do not appear in published services. Second,
reported cases do not reveal the behavior of other litigants that may be
affected by the amended Rule.
Hirt, supra note 106, at 1042-43.
478 In 1989, Professor Burbank commented that the debate surrounding the 1981 proposal
to amend Rule 11 was "too often ... a debate characterized by 'cosmic anecdote[s],' on the
one hand and confident assertions on the other, both largely uninformed by data, except
perhaps the selective reading of published opinions." Burbank, Transformation, supra note
61, at 1955-56.
479 For example, Professor Tobias has stated that
It is too soon to discern all of the implications of judicial enforcement
for civil rights litigants and attorneys, while caution should be
exercised in relying primarily on reported decisions. Nevertheless, the
reported opinions issued thus far, considerable unreported activity,
and some anecdotal evidence related to rule 11 reveal certain ways in
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here, an argument can be (and is being) made that the 1993 amendments
have not been successful in reducing Rule 11's chilling effects primarily
because many of the causes of the chilling effects continue to exist in
practice.
Let's start with the district courts' discretion. Even under the 1993
amendments, a federal district judge still has an enormous amount of
discretion. 480 Based on the research collected, the best examples, not only
with respect to the amount of discretion committed to the district courts,
but also with respect to its uses, are orders to show cause and the choice
of sanctions. Clearly, decisions as to whether to issue an order to show
cause and for what purpose, and whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions
pursuant to that order are left entirely to the discretion of the district
courts. Again, there is some indication that the district courts are issuing
orders to show cause specifically to circumvent the Rule 11 motion
requirements. 481
In addition, while the percentage of orders to show cause issued was
(and is) relatively low compared to the number of Rule 11 motions filed,
the percentage of orders to show cause that were (and are) actually
granted is substantially higher than the success rate of motions. 4 2 One
explanation for the higher sanctioning rate under orders to show cause is
that, "'[i]n even a close case, . . . it [is] extremely unlikely that a judge,
who has already decided that the law is not as a lawyer argued it, will
also decide that the loser's position was warranted by existing law."' 483
But even this explanation only serves to highlight the amount of
discretion the district courts continue to have because it is ultimately the
district court judge who decides whether the argument being made has
"evidentiary support"484 and/or is "warranted by existing law or by a
which its application has adversely affected civil rights litigants and
their lawyers.
Tobias, Litigation, supra note 23, at 489.
480 See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
481 See supra Part III.B.4.a.
482 See supra text accompanying notes 433-34.
4 Simpson, supra note 22, at 505 (citation and footnote omitted).
4MFED. R. ClV. P. 11(b)(3).
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nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law."485
The district courts are also very clear that they have great discretion
in deciding what constitutes an "appropriate" Rule 11 sanction,486 and
they have made it abundantly clear that the "appropriate" sanction in
the vast majority of cases in which sanctions were awarded is monetary
sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees.487 It seems fairly obvious,
therefore, that Rule 11 is still being used as a fee-shifting device in the
federal courts, especially given the size of some of the sanctions
awards488 and the fact that the district courts seem to award all of a
litigant's "reasonable" attorneys' fees incurred in defending an action in
a significant percentage of the cases.489
While there appears to be more uniformity in sanctioning
procedures, particularly at the district court level (at least with respect to
Rule 11 motion practice),49° there is also evidence from the research that
Rule 11 continues to be interpreted and applied inconsistently between
and within federal circuits, with the inconsistent application being most
485 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); see also, Chauvet v. Local 1199 Drug, Hosp. & Health Care
Employee Union, Nos. 96 Civ. 2934(65), 96 Civ. 4622(55), 1996 WL 665610, at *16 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1996) ("In deciding whether to impose sanctions, '[d]istrict courts generally have
wide discretion.'") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
486 See, e.g., Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96, 100 (D.N.J. 1994) (reiterating that the district
courts have broad discretion in fashioning an "appropriate" Rule 11 sanction).
487 See supra Part III.A.3, B.4.c. In Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Coerdeler, for example,
the court found that it
has the discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction for a Rule 11
violation. The critical consideration in exercising this discretion is that
the policy underlying Rule 11 is to "'sanction'" rather than to
"'reimburse[]."' ... However, the typical sanction imposed is the
payment of the other party's reasonable attorney's fees which were
incurred as a result of the violation.
977 F. Supp. 654, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Similarly, in Religious Technology Center v. Gerbode,
the court stated that
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) now makes it discretionary with the court as to
whether or not to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party
"incurred in presenting or opposing the motion." The rule does not
require the presence of any exceptional circumstances for the award of
such fees, but only that the award be "warranted."
No. 93-2226AWT, 1994 WL 228607, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 1994) (footnote omitted).
488 See supra text accompanying notes 383-84, 458.
489 See supra text accompanying note 459.
490 See supra Part III.B.1.
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pronounced at the federal appellate court level. 491 Nor does it look likely
that these inter and intracircuit conflicts will be resolved any time soon,
given that the federal appellate courts are not issuing en banc opinions,
they are not publishing a significant percentage of their opinions, and
the United States Supreme Court has yet to be heard on amended
Rule 11.492
Is appellate review more rigorous now after the 1993 amendments?
This is a difficult question to answer, based on the research conducted.
Obviously, abuse of discretion remains the applicable standard of review
for all Rule 11 decisions.493 The cases indicate, however, that the abuse of
discretion standard is not clearly defined or consistently applied by the
federal appellate courts. In fact, some of the appellate courts continue to
employ multiple tiers of review under the rubric of "abuse of
discretion."494 The evidence is also unclear as to whether the findings
requirement is being strictly enforced. 495 Absent detailed findings by the
district courts, the effectiveness of appellate review will be severely
impacted. 496 Based on these two limited indicia, therefore, it does not
appear that appellate review of district court sanctioning decisions is any
more rigorous now than it was prior to the 1993 amendments.
Probably the most controversial cause contributing to Rule 11's
chilling effects is the claim that there is a substantive bias in the federal
courts against plaintiffs bringing civil rights claims in the federal courts.
This claim was based in part on empirical evidence that plaintiffs were
the target of sanctions much more frequently than defendants and that
plaintiffs in civil rights cases were targeted at a rate disproportionate to
litigants in other cases. 497 The research conducted here is consistent with
these findings. 498 Specifically, the research here supports all of the
following: (1) plaintiffs were targeted much more frequently for Rule 11
491 See supra Part III.A.1-2.
492 See supra Part lII.A.4.c.
493 See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
494 See supra Part III.A.4.a.
495 See supra Part III.A.4.b.
496 See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
497 See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
498 1 want to emphasize again that the size of the case law sample collected for this article
is not large enough to generate statistically significant results. I include the numbers,
however, because they are consistent with earlier findings and, therefore, suggest that
certain trends continue to exist in the federal courts.
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sanctions than defendants, 77% versus 23% of the time, respectively; 499
(2) with the exception of plaintiffs in personal injury cases (88%),
plaintiffs in civil rights cases (85%) were targeted at a much higher rate,
relative to plaintiffs in contracts (61%) or other commercial cases
(72%);500 and, perhaps most significantly, (3) plaintiffs in civil rights cases
were actually sanctioned more frequently (71%) than plaintiffs in any of
the other categories of cases, namely, personal injury (27%), contract
(43%), or other commercial cases (46%).501
The Second Circuit also appears to believe that a substantive bias
exists. In Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp.,502 the Second Circuit reversed
Rule 11 sanctions imposed on a civil rights plaintiff and his attorney,
Kunstler.5 3 In reversing the sanctions imposed on Kunstler, the Second
Circuit stated that "the remarks by the district court[5°4] ... contribute to
our conclusion that the sanction against Kunstler was unjustified. These
remarks have the appearance of a personal attack against Kunstler, and
499 See infra Appendix 5.
500 Id.
501 Id.
- 48 F.3d 1320 (2d Cir. 1995).
503 Id. at 1329, 1331.
504 These remarks included the following:
Mr. Kunstler is apparently one of those attorneys who believes
that his sole obligation is to his client and that he has no obligations to
the court or to the processes of justice. Unfortunately, he is not alone
in this approach to the practice of law, which may be one reason why
the legal profession is held in such low esteem by the public at this
time.
Id. at 1324.
Finally, Mr. Kunstler claims that he is entitled to "consideration"
because of his representation of unpopular clients. Undoubtedly an
attorney who assumes or is assigned the defense of an unpopular case
or client and does so at risk to his practice or standing in the
community (such as the fictional attorney Atticus Finch in Harper
Lee's "To Kill a Mockingbird") is entitled to some consideration.
However, an attorney who aggressively and repeatedly seeks to
represent unpopular causes or questionable clients for personal
reasons of his own is not deserving of any particular consideration.
And an attorney who places himself and his causes above the interests
of justice is entitled to none.
Id. at 1325. Also, in denying Kunstler's application to reargue the sanctions, the district
court "quoted at length from a recent New York state court opinion criticizing Kunstler's
law partner... in an entirely unrelated case." Id.
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perhaps more broadly, against activist attorneys who represent unpopular
clients or causes."505
A substantive bias is also suggested by the heightened pleading
standards that continue to be imposed in civil rights cases.50 6  Two
"tirades" by a federal district judge sitting in the Fifth Circuit,
specifically, the Western District of Texas, against a pro se civil rights
plaintiff are particularly troubling. In one, the judge made the bald
statement that filing a "frivolous" civil suit against a judge-and
apparently the plaintiff's lawsuit fell into this category-"warrants the
imposition of sanctions under Rule 11."507 In the other, the court
discussed at great length the impact that frivolous civil rights cases in
particular had on his docket.5°8
Since one of the reasons that Rule 11 was (and arguably still is)
wielded so disproportionately against plaintiffs filing civil rights claims
is because of a substantive bias against these types of claims and litigants
in the federal courts, the only sure way that the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11 could successfully address this issue is if it changed that bias.
Unfortunately, a rule of procedure, or any law for that matter, does not
and cannot accomplish this task.50 9
-05 Id. at 1331 (emphasis and footnote added).
506 See, e.g., Hicks v. Bexar County, Texas, 973 F. Supp. 653, 673 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
7 Id. at 688. The district judge stated,
The filing of frivolous civil lawsuits against judicial officers deserves a
special place in the cornucopia of evils plaguing our judicial system
because such lawsuits are not only an affront to the dignity of the
courts but also an assault upon the integrity of our judicial system.
The filing of such lawsuits warrants the imposition of sanctions under
Rule 11.
Id.
5w Id. at 689. More specifically, the district judge stated,
[Tihe filing of this frivolous civil rights lawsuit by plaintiff has not
been without its impact on the docket of this Court. The filing of this
lawsuit, and the flow of many similar, equally frivolous, federal civil
rights lawsuits flooding into this Court in recent months has placed a
great strain on this Court's ability to timely address the many
potentially meritorious federal habeas corpus actions pending in this
Court.
Id.
5o9 Armour, Practice, supra note 55, at 776-77.
The [1993] amendments cannot fully lay to rest the two major concerns
of critics challenging the discretionary nature of the courts' sanctions
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Thus, because it seems likely that the causes of Rule 11's chilling
effects still exist, it is also very likely, if not probable, that Rule 11's
chilling effects continue to exist in practice as well. The result, of course,
is that Rule 11 can potentially chill all litigants who file claims in federal
court. But the more particular and unfortunate result, and one that
cannot be overlooked, is that certain kinds of litigants asserting certain kinds
of claims are more likely to bear the brunt of the Rule's chilling effects.
We know, for example, that plaintiffs, and more particularly plaintiffs
bringing civil rights lawsuits, are sanctioned much more frequently in the
federal courts than defendants and other plaintiffs bringing other types
of claims.510 We also have some idea as to why.511 We also know that
practice. The first is the potential for bias disguised as the personal,
experiential basis of the courts' subjective, intuitive judgments ....
The second is the problem of defining acceptable variability in the
application the Rule in a way that guides or limits the courts'
decisionmaking. These are inevitable by-products of discretionary
decisionmaking ....
Id. (footnote omitted). In writing about the then proposed amendments to the 1983 version
of Rule 11, Professor Tobias wrote, "The proposal ... attempts to correct or ameliorate
numerous difficulties the highly controversial 1983 revision has posed. These
complications have been attributed more to judicial application than to the wording of the
Rule, and this is a conundrum which few amendments, no matter how carefully drafted,
can fully address." Tobias, Plaintiffs, supra note 31, at 1788 (footnote omitted). Then,
commenting on the amended Rule 11, Professor Tobias wrote that
It is important to evaluate and to make recommendations for
implementing the new Rule because many difficulties that the 1983
version posed were attributable more to judicial enforcement and to
lawyers' and litigants' invocation of the provision than to its actual
phrasing. Nevertheless, few rule revisions, particularly revisions
which attempt to remedy problems as complex as those that the
revisers sought to rectify when they amended Rule 11 in 1983, and as
vexing as the complications presented by that version's effectuation,
can perfectly address all of these difficulties. These assertions are true
even when the Rule revisers crafted amendments as carefully as the
drafters of the 1993 revision of the Rule did.
Tobias, Revision, supra note 20, at 188 (footnote omitted).
510 The statistics and studies show that plaintiffs will be the target of Rule 11 sanctions
more frequently than defendants, plaintiffs will be sanctioned at a much higher rate than
defendants, and Rule 11 sanctions will actually be imposed against plaintiffs and their
attorneys in civil rights cases at a rate significantly higher than other litigants in other cases.
See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
511 Plaintiffs initiate lawsuits, so a higher sanctioning rate here is to be somewhat
expected. See supra text accompanying note 71. As to why civil rights cases are sanctioned
at a disproportionately higher rate, two reasons are suggested. First, as previously
discussed, there appears to be a substantive bias in the federal courts against these types of
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prior exposure to some kind of Rule 11 activity actually causes attorneys
to change the way they counsel their clients512 and that court decisions
that impose Rule 11 sanctions have more impact on a legal community
than decisions not to sanction.5 13 Thus, because plaintiffs bringing civil
claims. See supra notes 70-72, 497-508 and accompanying text. Second, civil rights cases are
often not based on well-settled principles of law and instead involve new or novel theories
of law, which may not be recognized as valid or meritorious by the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Wiggins, supra note 37, at 24 ("We found in all five districts ... that by far the most
common reason given for imposing sanctions in civil rights cases was an inadequate legal
inquiry."); Tobias, Litigation, supra note 23, at 496-97. According to Professor Tobias,
The inherent characteristics of civil rights cases and the constraints on
civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers, over most of which they have little
control, can make them seem to contravene the amendment. This is
true of rule 11's requirements regarding the law. Certain
characteristics intrinsic to many civil rights actions can leave
impressions that the legal inquiries which preceded their filing were
insufficient. Instructive illustrations are afforded by the substantial
number of civil rights suits that attempt to assert new or comparatively
untested theories of law. These concepts are at the cutting edge of
legal development, which means that they are difficult to
conceptualize and substantiate, that discovery can be essential to
drafting a very specific complaint or to articulating a precise theory of
the case, and that the concepts, once formulated, look nontraditional
and even implausible-all of which can contribute to appearances of
inadequacy.
Tobias, Litigation, supra note 23, at 496-97.
512 According to the AJS study, "lawyers who had previously been exposed to some
degree of Rule 11 activity-ranging from having been involved in a case in which sanctions
were imposed to cases involving out-of-court threats-were more likely to report having
changed their behavior in counselling clients." Marshall, supra note 10, at 980.
513 Professor Armour writes,
In a Rule 11 context, consider two similar cases decided by different
judges with different outcomes; one results in sanctions, the other
doesn't, and both are affirmed on appeal under the abuse of discretion
standard. Neither case should be treated as anything other than
affirming the court's discretion to act as they did, and a third judge
facing the problem is free to decide either way. However, the deterrent
impact of the sanction case poses a serious threat, since in the sanction case
law, it will be the adverse sanctions cases that begin to define the boundaries
of Rule 11 and guide a litigant's behavior. Thus, the two cases are not treated
equally in the real world of practice ....
Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the Conundrum of the Close
Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 566 (1997) [hereinafter Armour, Rethinking] (emphasis added).
The AJS study appears to be in agreement. According to that study,
One of the most significant questions that needs to be asked about Rule
11 ... is how it has affected lawyers' practice. For the impact of a
sanctions order or threat can extend far beyond the case in which it is carried
out or the lawyers who are directly affected by it. Lawyers who hear and read
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rights claims in the federal courts are targeted and sanctioned under Rule
11 more frequently than other litigants bringing other kinds of claims,
this category of litigant and claim is much more likely to be chilled by
Rule 11.514
As a result of Rule 11, therefore, a significant percentage of civil
rights attorneys counsel their clients not to file claims that the attorneys
think have merit, do not file papers that they would like to file in a given
case, and even discourage their clients, or potential clients, from filing
lawsuits.5 15 All of this, of course, results in stifling the development of
about these sanctions must, to some extent, process the information and shape
their own conduct based on their assessment of the risk that various kinds of
conduct they are contemplating creates.
Marshall, supra note 10, at 960 (emphasis added).
514 As Professor Yamamoto notes,
Rule 11 sanctions escalate the professional and financial risk of
litigating cases that are important to bring but difficult to win.
Contingent fee, reduced fee, and pro bono lawyers and public interest
firms are most likely to represent minorities raising difficult issues. In
so doing, they accept a financial risk. If their clients lose, and they
often will, the attorneys receive little or no compensation. For a small
firm or a public interest law organization, that risk can be significant.
If losing, however, means not only uncompensated time but also out-
of-pocket payment of defendants' attorney's fees, the risk expands
exponentially.
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 370 (footnote omitted). Professor Tobias
also takes the position that
it is important to remember that the resource constraints of civil rights
lawyers make them peculiarly susceptible to the rule's potential
chilling effects; the prospects of spending large sums to complete
prefiling inquiries that will be deemed sufficient, to appeal adverse
rule 11 decisions, or to litigate nice questions of the amendment's
interpretation, can be nearly as discouraging as the threat that
sanctions will be imposed.
Tobias, Litigation, supra note 23, at 509.
5S More specifically, the authors of the AJS study found that
civil rights defense lawyers appear to be disproportionately unaffected
by Rule 11 .... [Riespondents who identified themselves as spending
more than 50% of their time doing civil rights plaintiffs' work were far
more likely to be affected by Rule 11 than other lawyers in virtually
every response category that was measured. For example, 44% of the
self-identified civil rights plaintiffs' lawyers reported that they had
advised a client not to pursue a lawsuit that had little or no merit,
compared to 13.2% of those who spend most of their time on civil
rights defense work. That this disparity is not attributable purely to
the plaintiff orientation of this specific question can be seen by looking
at the response rates to the question of whether the lawyer decided not
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the common law and discouraging court access for marginal litigants
asserting claims that challenge the existing status quo.516 Consequently,
even if Rule 11 were being wielded disproportionately against plaintiffs
bringing civil rights cases simply because more civil rights cases tend to
be "losers," 517 rather than because of a substantive bias in the federal
courts, 518 the result would remain the same-Rule 11 would still produce
its chilling effects and would still disproportionately chill plaintiffs
bringing civil rights claims.
to assert a claim or defense that the lawyer felt had potential merit.
This question is not particularly plaintiff-oriented, yet 31% of civil
rights plaintiffs' lawyers reported having taken this action, compared
to 17.9% of those who do civil rights work on the defense side[, and
compared to 19.3% of all the respondents surveyed for this study].
Similarly, 24% of civil rights plaintiffs' lawyers reported that they had
not filed particular papers in a given case that they would have liked
to file, compared to 10% of those doing civil rights defense work[, and
compared to 12.2% of all the respondents surveyed].
Marshall, supra note 10, at 971 (footnotes omitted).
516 Professor Cutler writes that,
because plaintiffs commence litigation while defendants merely
respond to allegations, and since plaintiffs are required to produce
evidence at trial while defendants typically are not, judges may
examine plaintiffs' conduct more carefully and punish plaintiffs more
severely to eliminate frivolous claims early in the judicial process and
deter similar future claims. This stricter standard for plaintiffs,
intended to minimize frivolous claims, could chill efforts of litigants
with limited resources who cannot afford to pay a Rule 11 sanction
and also dissuade litigants from filing novel or marginal claims. This
could ultimately hamper the development of the law, especially in
unsettled areas.
Cutler, supra note 22, at 282-83 (footnotes omitted). According to Professor Yamamoto,
[R]ecent federal procedural reforms [including Rule 11] have subtly yet
measurably discouraged judicial access for those outside the political
and cultural mainstream, particularly those challenging accepted legal
principles and social norms. The reforms assume and facilitate a
procedural system hospitable to litigants with disputes involving well-
settled legal principles. Efficiency reforms [again including Rule 11]
make expendable those raising difficult and often tenuous claims that
demand the reordering of established political, economic and social
arrangements, that is, those at the system's and society's margins.
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 345. See also infra Part IV.C.
517 This is the position taken by Professor Yablon. See generally Yablon, supra note 45.
518 Professors Yablon and Spiegel acknowledge that Rule 11 has a disproportionate
impact on plaintiffs bringing civil rights claims and that this impact is problematic. Both
professors question, however, whether the disproportionate impact is the result of a
substantive bias in the federal courts against civil rights claims. See generally Spiegel, supra
note 72; Yablon, supra note 45.
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Unfortunately, another problem under the 1993 version of the Rule is
that we will probably no longer have the same amount of statistics to
prove that Rule 11's chilling effects continue to exist in practice either
because: (1) a civil rights plaintiff will either decide, or be counseled by
an attorney, in the first instance not to file a given claim(s) or lawsuit in
federal court, even one with merit, for fear of potentially devastating
Rule 11 sanctions; 19 or (2) the civil rights plaintiff who is served with a
Rule 11 motion will take advantage of the safe harbor provision and
withdraw the claim, regardless of its potential merit, to avoid
sanctions. 520 In either case, and assuming in the latter instance that the
Rule 11 motion is not filed with the district court after withdrawal, no
sanctions activity would be recorded and, hence, available to be counted.
If the foregoing prediction is correct, then any interested observer
should expect to find less reported Rule 11 activity in the federal courts.
Indeed, as previously noted, there is already some suggestion that Rule
11 use at both the federal appellate and district court levels has in fact
declined following the 1993 amendments.5 21 Rather than supporting the
theory that the amendments have been successful in reducing Rule 11's
chilling effects, therefore, I believe, for all of the reasons discussed above,
that the reduction in reported Rule 11 activity is actually consistent with
a finding that Rule 11's chilling effects continue to exist in practice.
519 Indeed, a district court warned civil rights plaintiffs' attorneys that they face personal
financial consequences for a Rule 11 violation. See Watson v. City of Salem, 934 F. Supp.
643, 665 (D.N.J. 1995) (writing in a civil rights case, the district court stated that "[tlhe
'effective deterrence' standard of Rule 11(c)(2) is met in this case because attorneys who fail to
withdraw baseless claims should know they may risk personal financial consequences for the harm
they cause to innocent litigants") (emphasis added); cf. Tobias, Recalibrated, supra note 28, at
109 n.2 ("One court and a few commentators asserted that it was impossible to determine
how many valid lawsuits were abandoned out of concern about expensive satellite
litigation or substantial assessments.") (citations omitted).
520 Indeed, this ability to withdraw a claim is one of the very purposes for which the safe
harbor provision was added. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
These provisions [i.e., the safe harbor provision] are intended to
provide a type of "safe harbor" against motions under Rule 11 in that a
party will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's
motion unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that
position or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently have
evidence to support a specified allegation.
Id.
521 See supra notes 471-73 and accompanying text.
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B. Solutions
1. Repeal or Amendment?
The 1983 version of Rule 11 was amended specifically because of the
problems it engendered.5 22 Based on the research conducted here,
however, it does not appear that the 1993 amendments were successful
in rectifying what was probably the most troubling problem created by
the former Rule, namely, its chilling effects. Therefore, I believe that, at a
minimum, the debate over whether Rule 11 should be repealed or
amended once again to include a subjective bad-faith standard should be
re-opened, not only because of the conclusion reached here with respect
to the Rule's chilling effects, but for several other reasons as well.
First, Rule 11's primary purpose is to deter "frivolous" litigation.
Indeed, teeth were originally added to the Rule in 1983 in an effort to
curb the "explosion" of "frivolous" cases being filed in the federal
courts.523 This last statement rests on two assumptions, namely, that
there was in fact a "litigation explosion" in the federal courts and that a
significant portion of the cases being filed were "frivolous." Both
assumptions are questionable at best. In fact, the FJC study, which
surveyed federal district court judges, and other commentators strongly
suggest that the problem of frivolous lawsuits in the federal courts may
very well be illusory.524  Commentators have also concluded that a
majority of lawyers do not file "frivolous" claims.5 25
52 See supra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
523 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
524 See, e.g., Armour, Rethinking, supra note 513, at 501-02.
Overall, the amended rule [11] was greeted with enthusiasm as one of
the court reforms most likely to increase judicial efficiency by deterring
the filing and pursuit of frivolous litigation. This justification for Rule
11, however, is routinely cited without any empirical basis in the
supporting commentary to the rule. Recited with almost mantra-like
regularity at the beginning of most Rule 11 articles, the "litigation
explosion" has become an article of faith-an unquestioned assumption
underlying Rule 11. Yet, there is a growing consensus among
commentators that the assumption is unfounded.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
There is no data linking the alleged litigation explosion with an
increased filing of frivolous litigation-that is the ultimate 'cosmic
anecdote' and the driving force behind Rule 11. In light of the plethora
of empirical evidence of Rule 11 undertaken to date, it is ironic that the
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impetus for procedural reform resulting in the amendment of Rule 11
had no empirical justification. Reformers relied instead on the
anecdotal experience of judges with individual cases and dockets to
support the conclusion that frivolous litigation was adversely
impacting the courts. There is no data indicating that docket
congestion and litigation delays are due in any significant way to
frivolous litigation or the 'lack of a reasonable pre-filing inquiry.' Nor
is there any empirical baseline data reflecting statistical profiles of
federal dockets which show that cases intercepted prior to trial,
through summary judgment or motions to dismiss, raise legal or
factual issues that could have been resolved prior to filing by more
'investigation.' It is worth noting that empiricism is raised defensively
at the amendment stage to refute the critiques of Rule 11, yet it was
never raised at the outset of the highly politicized process of judicial
reform culminating in the 1983 amendments to the rules to document
the court's need for the reform.
Id. at 502 n.40 (citations omitted). See also Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 27, at 480 (stating
that "approximately three-quarters of the responding judges thought groundless litigation
was either only a small problem or no problem at all") (footnote omitted); Wiggins, supra
note 37, at 4 ("Our survey of district judges revealed that most judges ... find that
groundless litigation presents only a small problem on their dockets[.]").
525 See, e.g., Yablon, supra note 45, at 67, 81. Professor Yablon argues that many civil
rights plaintiffs' attorneys may decide to file long-shots, that is, claims that have "a low
(but not zero) probability of success." Id. at 67. Such claims, he argues, are not frivolous
because "[frivolous claims], [u]nder the standard view ... are baseless claims that no
reasonable lawyer would ever have brought." Id. at 81. By definition, therefore, because a
long-shot has some, albeit a minimal, probability of success, such claims are not frivolous.
Id. In comparison, Professor Armour discusses the "close case" and argues that Rule 11
sanctions should not be imposed in such cases. Armour, Rethinking, supra note 513, at 551-
53. She explains the process by which an attorney decides whether to file a "close case." Id.
She writes,
As a practicing attorney, the question of whether to pursue a close
case, or any case in which there are compelling reasons to bring the
litigation and yet experience tells you that you might not be successful
in the trial court, poses a number of difficult judgments. Attorneys
and judges, '[w~hen faced with data and the need to make judgments
derived from that data, [like] all humans may be characterized as
intuitive scientists.' Information is processed through beliefs, theories,
propositions, and schemas. These knowledge structures enable us to
label and categorize objects rapidly and, in most cases, correctly.'
Acting as an 'intuitive scientist,' it seemed to me, as a practicing
attorney, that if I could articulate the balance of factors considered in
deciding whether a case had sufficient merit to warrant suit as a 'close
call' or a 'close case,' not necessarily equal or balanced, then the
'possibility' or even 'probability' of failure should not be determinative
of the legal and ethical decision to file the litigation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
This whole notion of a "frivolous" claim is also problematic. The FJC study
indicates that the amount of Rule 11 activity generated by a given federal district judge
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/8
2002] Rule 11 119
Second, even assuming that frivolous litigation is a problem in the
federal courts, federal district court judges themselves do not think that
depends on that judge's assessment of the amount of frivolous litigation she is confronting.
See Wiggins, supra note 37, at 13.
We found that the number of orders issued, either sua sponte or in
response to a motion, is related to the judges' assessment of whether
there is a problem with groundless litigation. That is, judges who see
no problem or a slight problem report fewer orders for sanctions than
do judges who see a greater problem. This suggests that variations in
judicial use of Rule 11 are rationally related to the rule's purpose of
deterring groundless litigation, or in the alternative, that some judges see a
problem where other judges do not.
Id. (emphasis added). The difficulty, of course, is that whether a case is "frivolous"
depends on how that term is defined; and, unfortunately, there is no clear definition.
Instead, what is "frivolous" is left to each judge's subjective interpretation of the term. See,
e.g., Tobias, Revision, supra note 20, at 197.
The problems of defining and applying the term "frivolous" remain
.... When interpreting the 1983 version of Rule 11, judges formulated
numerous articulations of the term, which ranged across a broad
spectrum. Some courts strictly defined the concept, finding a "legally
unreasonable filing to be frivolous." A similar number of courts
leniently defined the term, stating that only legal contentions which
are "baseless," "meritless," or have "no chance of success" can be
frivolous. Most courts employed a rather moderate definition, holding
that a complaint which was not "well-grounded in law" could be
sanctioned as frivolous.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Samuel J. Levine, Seeking a Common Language for the
Application of Rule 11 Sanctions: What is "Frivolous"?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 677, 682 (1999)
("[Elven a brief survey of some of the standards articulated by the courts in a number of
circuits reveals broad differences in formulation that betray both lack of uniformity among
courts and a more general lack of a clearly defined standard for frivolous activity.");
Yablon, supra note 45, at 65-66.
Frivolity is frowned upon in the world of civil litigation. Although the
term "frivolous" never appears in the text of Rule 11 .... the
determination that a claim is frivolous, and an objective determination
at that, has been a primary criterion for imposing liability under Rule
11 for the last thirteen years. This raises the obvious question-exactly
what makes a claim frivolous?... Not surprisingly, courts have had a
fair amount of trouble developing standards for distinguishing
frivolous cases from ordinary losers.
Yablon, supra note 45, at 65-66 (footnote omitted). See also Burbank, Transformation, supra
note 61, at 1933 ("[So long as the abuses at which Rule 11 is directed are defined to include
papers deemed legally frivolous, the detection of violations will be as determinate, and
hence as uniform, as the notion of frivolousness itself.") (footnote omitted). As a result, we
end up where we started, namely, with serious concerns about the amount of discretion
vested in the federal district courts and its noted impact on Rule 11's chilling effects. See
supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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Rule 11 is very effective in curbing it.526 Instead, they find other tools to
be much more effective. More specifically, the FJC study found that
Rule 11 is one of several devices available for controlling
groundless litigation .... [Wihen we look at the judges'
assessment of the degree of effectiveness of each device
..., we find that Rule 11 does not compare especially
well with most other tools for managing groundless
litigation.
Although the judges find Rule 11 more effective
than fee shifting, they find it less effective than the other
devices we listed. The methods seen as most effective
for controlling groundless litigation are prompt rulings
on motions to dismiss and prompt rulings on motions
for summary judgment (51% said "very effective" for
each). Also effective are Rule 16 conferences to narrow
issues (40% said "very effective"). In contrast, only 23%
of the judges said Rule 11 is "very effective." 527
526 See Wiggins, supra note 37, at 33.
Although most judges have found Rule 11 at least moderately effective
as a deterrent to groundless litigation, the findings presented so far do
not suggest a strong judicial endorsement for amended [19831 Rule 11.
While only a minority of judges see a negative impact on the conduct
of litigation, it is a sizable minority and suggests that at least some
problem exists.
Id.
527 Id. at 31 (emphasis in original); see also Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 27, at 481
(arguing that the FJC study "implies that frivolous litigation is no problem at all and that
Rule 11 may not be the best cure for whatever ails the system"). Indeed, even the Advisory
Committee appears to agree with the district courts' assessment that Rule 11 should not be
the courts' primary means of curbing frivolous litigation. Vairo, Where We Are, supra note
27, at 494.
After considering the responses for its Call for Comments and the
testimony taken at the public hearing, the Advisory Committee
published an Interim Report that incorporated its findings .... The
Interim Report also described some of the preliminary findings of the
Federal Judicial Center Study and presented the Advisory
Committee's Chair's preliminary observations on the questions in the
Call for Comments. Some of the important observations were that: (1)
Rule 11 should not be viewed as the primary means for controlling and
deterring groundless litigation ....
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Third, federal courts have a panoply of other sanctioning provisions
at their disposal, should sanctions be warranted. 528 Fourth, and related,
if litigants and/or the federal courts cannot satisfy Rule 11's procedural
requirements, whether by motion or via order to show cause, there is a
fairly strong indication from the case law that they will invoke other
sanctioning authorities, particularly 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's
inherent power, to sidestep Rule 11 anyway.5 29
In light of all of the problems that Rule 11 continues to pose in the
federal courts, particularly with respect to civil rights plaintiffs and their
attorneys, and given all of the other factors discussed above, there
should be further discussion about the fate of Rule 11. Should it be
repealed? Should it be amended again and, if so, how?5 30 In the interim,
however, until these questions are answered once again, the federal
courts should adopt high sanctioning thresholds in interpreting and
applying Rule 11.
2. High Sanctioning Thresholds
"High sanctioning thresholds," as that term is used here, essentially
describes interpretations of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 that
discourage both finding Rule 11 violations except in exceptional
circumstances and using the Rule as a fee-shifting device. As a
preliminary matter, therefore, it should be clear that "the abusive, not
merely the wrong-headed, should be the targets of Rule 11"531 and that
528 See supra text accompanying note 19; see also Marino, supra note 39, at 968 n.241.
The question also remains whether Rule 11 is the proper tool for
punishing attorneys who file claims lacking a legal and factual
foundation. Given the array of discretionary and statutory powers
that federal judges possess, it is doubtful that Rule 11 is needed at all.
Additionally, if we are indeed as litigious as some commentators have
claimed, a rule like this only exacerbates the problem by giving
attorneys and their clients one more issue to litigate.
Marino, supra note 39, at 968 n.241.
529 The specific issue of whether § 1927 and the court's inherent power are being used to
avoid or sidestep Rule 11's procedural requirements, and the interaction of these three
sanctioning provisions generally, will be the subject of a forthcoming article.
530 In 1991, a majority of the federal district court judges surveyed by the FJC indicated
that they did not favor amending Rule 11 "to return its pre-1983 language," i.e., its
subjective bad faith standard. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 34.
531 Vairo, WAhere We Are, supra note 27, at 502.
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in "close cases,"5 32 Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed at all.533
Rule 11 is simply not intended to be a panacea for all of the perceived ills
plaguing the civil litigation system.5 34 Specific suggestions for high
sanctioning thresholds are laid out in the next Parts of this Article.
532 According to Professor Armour, a close case for purposes of Rule 11 "is one in which
after careful application of the rule, its underlying policies, commentary, and 'precedent';
[sic] one judge might decide that sanctions are needed, another might not, and both
decisions would stand up on appeal." Armour, Rethinking, supra note 513, at 539-40
(footnote omitted).
53 Professor Armour argues that, in close cases, Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed
because they would simply not be warranted, based on the acceptable norms of practice in
that community. Id. at 553-54 (footnote omitted).
If practitioners and jurists could agree that the sanctions call was
"close," either because it was a close call on the adequacy of prefiling
inquiry and analysis, on the merits whether factual or legal, on the
purpose in bringing the litigation, or on the need to sanction for
deterrent purposes, there should not be sanctions.
Id.
In a Rule 11 case where this level of uncertainty can be articulated and
disagreement within the interpretive community predicted or
projected-if the trial judge can consciously articulate the proposition
that some portion of the professional interpretive community would
disagree with the decision to sanction-it cannot be said that the lawyer
has violated the acceptable norms of practice in a manner requiring
sanctions.
Id. at 555 (footnote omitted). See also Tobias, Revision, supra note 20, at 212-13.
One critical means of achieving the goal of minimizing the Rule's use
would be for courts to eschew sanctions in all situations involving Rule
11 violations which could be characterized as less than serious.
Helpful, straightforward examples are those types of activities
described as insignificant infractions when parsing papers for the
purpose of ascertaining whether Rule 11 is triggered. Similarly
illustrative are prefiling inquiries that implicate simple negligence,
papers which include one comparatively unimportant legal contention
that is rather frivolous, and papers which include relatively few
mistakes in factual allegations which are not material. These examples
are intentionally overdrawn to illustrate the phenomena which are
clearly less than serious; judges should treat considerably worse
activity as insufficiently serious to warrant sanctions.
Id.
534 See, e.g., Sakon v. Andreo, 119 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) (Rule 11 "'does not license a
district court to sanction any action by an attorney or party that it disproves of ....'")
(ellipsis in original) (citation omitted); Lopez v. Constantine, No. 94 CIV. 5921 DAB, 1997
WL 793595, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1997) ("Rule 11 cannot be used to sanction an attorney's
'obnoxious' conduct toward another attorney, even if it forces an adversary to make
motions which would otherwise be unnecessary.").
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a. The Rule 11 Motion
A warning letter is not sufficient to trigger the safe harbor provision
of Rule 11.535 But, the party who intends to move for Rule 11 sanctions
should be required, as a preliminary matter, to provide informal notice
to the other party, preferably in writing, before it prepares and serves its
Rule 11 motion. This is the position taken by the Advisory Committee,
commentators, and at least a couple of federal district courts.536 If the
informal warning is unsuccessful, then the party seeking Rule 11
sanctions must be required to prepare a separate sanctions motion,
which can, in accordance with the Sixth Circuit's position,537 include
alternative bases of sanctions, in addition to Rule 11. The sanctions
motion must then be served on the opposing party, and only this service
will trigger Rule 11's safe harbor period.5 38 If a separate Rule 11 motion
is not served prior to filing, then that motion must be denied.
After service, the moving party should, as a general rule, be required
to wait a full twenty-one days before filing its Rule 11 motion with the
court. The twenty-one days is important because it provides the non-
moving party with time to conduct additional investigation if required
535 See supra notes 76-77, 136-37.
-36 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note (1993) ("In most cases ... counsel
should be expected to give informal notice to the other party, whether in person or by a
telephone call or letter, of a potential violation before proceeding to prepare and serve a
Rule 11 motion."); Harding Univ. v. Consulting Serv. Group, 48 F. Supp. 2d 765, 770 (N.D.
Ill. 1999) (noting in the context of a moving party's duty to mitigate that "[clounsel is even
expected to give informal notice to the opposing party whether in person, by telephone, or
letter, of a potential violation before preparing and serving a Rule 11 motion"); Two Men &
a Truck/Int'l Inc. v. Two Men & a Truck/Kalamazoo, Inc., No. 5:94-CV-162, 1996 WL
740540, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 16, 1996).
[Alithough plaintiff's counsel requested defendants' counsel by letter
on December 6, 1995, to withdraw the motion to modify the
preliminary injunction, the 'safe harbor' period begins to run only
upon service of the motion. In fact, plaintiffis counsel should be expected
to give this type of notice to defendants' counsel prior to preparing and
serving a Rule II motion.
Two Men & a Truck/Int'l, 1996 WL 740540, at *2 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also
Simpson, supra note 22, at 504 ("When appropriate, an attorney should encourage, in
writing, opposing counsel to investigate possible factually or legally infirm positions using
the threat of Rule 11 sanctions."); Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 88 (arguing that
"[elarly notice, in any reasonable form, makes eminent sense" because it may well avoid
the need for a later sanctions motion).
537 See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
538 See supra text accompanying notes 77-79, 136-37.
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or an internal review of the challenged contention, etc. At the same time,
Rule 11 does "contemplate[ I situations in which it may be difficult or
impossible to comply with the 21 day provision," 39 for example, when a
Rule 11 motion is filed in response to a complaint.540 In these situations,
however, the burden should be placed squarely on the party seeking
Rule 11 sanctions to request a variance from the court from the twenty-
one day safe harbor period either by moving to extend time to give it
more than twenty days to file its answer (or other paper, depending on
the circumstances) or to shorten time to file its Rule 11 motion.541
Variances should only be requested and granted under circumstances
that make waiting a full twenty-one days before filing the Rule 11
motion in court impracticable, for example, where the targeted pleading,
motion, or other paper is one that has less than a twenty-one day
response time, such as a complaint. If such a variance is not requested,
then the Rule 11 motion must be denied if it is filed in court before
twenty-one days have elapsed since service.542 In short, the fact that a
full twenty-one days is not available for serving and filing a Rule 11
motion should not be interpreted as a reason to circumvent the safe
harbor provision of the Rule.S43 This sanctioning threshold, therefore,
539 Neighbors Concerned About Yacht Club Expansion v. Grosse Pointe Yacht Club, No.
99-70325, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646, at *28 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 1999). The Rule provides in
pertinent part that Rule 11 motions "shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless
within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the
challenged paper ... is not withdrawn or appropriately amended." FED. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
540 Defendants are required to file their answers to a complaint within twenty days after
service. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Given that Rule 11's safe harbor period is twenty-one days, it
would be impossible to comply with it if the pleading being targeted is the complaint.
541 Clearly, the higher threshold would be to require the party seeking sanctions to move
to extend time, thereby allowing the non-moving party to take full advantage of the entire
twenty-one day safe harbor period.
542 See, e.g., Grosse Point Yacht Club, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646, at *29. In denying
defendants' Rule 11 motion, the district court stated that defendants "did not have an
opportunity to comply with the safe harbor provision because only 11 days passed
between the filing of the motion for preliminary injunction and the hearing on that
motion." Id. "However, in accordance with the rule, the [defendants] could have requested a
variation from tie time period, but failed to do so." Id. (emphasis added).
543 My colleague Katherine C. Sheehan points out that a strict construction of the safe
harbor provision along the lines that I have suggested above can be problematic in a couple
of different respects. First, requiring the party seeking Rule 11 sanctions to file a motion to
shorten or extend time would impose additional burdens on the litigants and the court-
more paperwork would be created, and more time and expense would be required to draft
and resolve this other motion. Second, and perhaps more troubling, she notes that the safe
harbor provision does not work well with motions and other papers that have less than a
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specifically rejects the holding and reasoning of cases like Religious
Technology Center v. Gerbode.544
twenty-one day response time. Consequently, the type of paper that will probably be
targeted most frequently for Rule 11 sanctions will be pleadings, with the most likely target
in this category of documents being complaints. Complaints are already targeted more
frequently than other documents. A strict construction of the safe harbor provision,
therefore, may increase this frequency, which is very problematic for civil rights plaintiffs.
I believe that Professor Sheehan's comments are well-taken. A strict construction of the
safe harbor provision may very well create unlooked-for problems. I remain convinced,
however, that the best interpretation of the safe harbor provision, and the 1993
amendments to Rule 11 in general, is one that decreases the chances of Rule 11 sanctions
being imposed. A strict interpretation that requires a party to comply with the safe harbor
provision, or file a motion to extend or shorten time, before filing its motion for Rule 11
sanctions, comports with this philosophy. Failing either of these options, that party's
motion should be denied.
544 No. CV 93-2226 ANT, 1994 WL 228607 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 1994). In Religious Technology
Center, defendants' filed a Rule 11 motion in response to plaintiff's complaint. Id. at *1.
The motion was filed a month after the case was dismissed and, more importantly, in
violation of Rule 11's safe harbor provision. Id. The district court granted defendants' Rule
11 motion over plaintiff's safe harbor objection. Id. at *2, *5. According to the district court,
it simply was not "practicable" to require defendants to comply with the safe harbor
provision when the pleading at issue was the complaint. Id. at *2. The district court
elaborated on its position in a footnote:
It would appear to be problematical [sic] to comply with the "safe
harbor" provision in any case involving a.challenge to a complaint.
Even if the frivolousness is immediately apparent on the face of the
pleading at the time of service, does service of a motion for sanctions
under Rule 11 toll the 20-day period to answer under Rule 12(a)(1)(A)?
If not, what purpose does compliance with the "safe harbor" provision
serve if the complaint must be responded to before the 21-day waiting
period expires? If the frivolousness is not immediately apparent and
the Rule 11 motion is not made until after the complaint is dismissed,
what useful purpose is served by compliance with the "safe harbor"
provision at that point? Certainly, by that juncture, it is too late for the
complaint to be "withdrawn or appropriately corrected."
Id. at *2 n.6.
The district court questions the purpose served by the safe harbor provision, at least
as that provision is applied to complaints. The purpose of the provision, regardless of the
pleading, motion, or other paper at issue, is made abundantly clear by the Advisory
Committee, which writes that
these provisions are intended to provide a type of 'safe harbor' against
motions under Rule 11 in that a party will not be subject to sanctions on the
basis of another party's motion unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to
withdraw that position or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently
have evidence to support a specified allegation.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). There are also two
responses with respect to the more specific points made by the district court in its footnote.
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Finally, the federal courts should follow the approach suggested by
the Advisory Committee and adopted by the Third Circuit via its
supervisory rule and by the Sixth Circuit in Ridder, which require all
Rule 11 motions to be served and filed prior to final disposition of the
case. 545 Thus, if a Rule 11 motion is not served and filed prior to final
judgment, that motion should be denied.
Requiring service of the motion prior to final judgment is absolutely
critical if the safe harbor provision is to have any effect at all. The reason
for this conclusion is simple-the safe harbor provision literally
presupposes that there is "a pleading, written motion, or other paper"
that can in fact be amended or withdrawn.546 If it is too late to amend or
withdraw the challenged contention, i.e., because final judgment has
already been entered, then the safe harbor provision would serve no
useful purpose whatsoever. A litigant would no longer be able to avoid
sanctions by correcting the alleged violation because there would be
nothing left to correct, and this would defeat the very reason the safe
harbor was added in 1993. An interpretation that permitted service of
the motion after final judgment, therefore, would, in effect, write the safe
harbor provision, which is the heart of the 1993 amendments, out of the
rule.547
First, the sanctioning threshold discussed in the text above, namely, requiring the party
seeking sanctions to request a variance from the twenty-one day safe harbor period,
specifically resolves the district court's concern that compliance with the safe harbor
provision is impracticable when the challenged pleading is the complaint. Second, the
district court's concern that compliance with the safe harbor is "impracticable" once the
complaint has been dismissed is addressed and resolved by another sanctioning threshold,
namely, requiring Rule 11 motions to be served and filed prior to final disposition of the
case. See infra text accompanying notes 548-51.
545 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("Given the safe harbor
provisions ... , a party cannot delay serving its Rule 11 motion until conclusion of the case
(or judicial rejection of the offending contention)."); supra text accompanying notes 234-38
(Third Circuit); supra text accompanying notes 196-217 (Sixth Circuit).
546 See Vairo, Prologue, supra note 83, at 65. Professor Vairo states what should otherwise
be obvious when she writes that, "[u]nder the 1993 amendment, a Rule 11 motion cannot
be made unless there is some paper, claim, or contention that can be withdrawn." Id.
(footnote omitted).
547 Gazouski v. Belvidere, No. 93 C 20157, 1995 WL 149438, at *2 (N.D. I11. Apr. 3, 1995).
[Tihe court denies defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs
because defendants did not serve their motion under Rule 11 until
after the conclusion of the case. The advisory notes expressly prohibit
the service of a Rule 11 motion after the conclusion of the case. To
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A party seeking Rule 11 sanctions should also be required to file its
motion prior to final judgment. This approach definitely represents a
high sanctioning threshold because it would deny Rule 11 sanctions to
litigants who fail to take prompt action once a Rule 11 violation is
discovered. 548 From a more tactical standpoint, this threshold also aims
to prevent the party seeking sanctions from taking advantage of
hindsight by only filing the Rule 11 motion if, as it turns out, she is
actually the prevailing party.549 From a fairness standpoint, if the Rule
11 violation is that clear, the moving party should be required to file its
motion prior to final judgment and thereby expose herself to a potential
Rule 11 violation should that motion later be denied and be deemed to
have not satisfied Rule 11's certification requirements. 55° If further
factual development is necessary to determine whether Rule 11 has been
violated, then the district court can simply take the Rule 11 motion under
advisement until such time as the necessary facts are made clear through
discovery or even trial. The district court should, however, be extremely
cautious in imposing Rule 11 sanctions, particularly if it decides not to
rule on the motion until after final judgment.5 51
allow defendants to do so under these circumstances would circumvent the
,safe harbor' provision which is at the heart of the new Rule 11.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also supra text accompanying notes 197-238
(discussing the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits' positions regarding service prior to filing).
w~ This approach is consistent with the one suggested by the Advisory Committee. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("Ordinarily the motion should be served
promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed and, if delayed too long, may be viewed as
untimely.").
549 It is critical to keep in mind that a challenged contention does not violate Rule 11
simply because it "loses" in court. Most Rule 11 sanctions, however, whether by motion or
via order to show cause, are almost always going to be directed at losing cases. Cf. Yablon,
supra note 45, at 87 ("Winning cases almost never get sanctioned."). Extreme caution must
therefore be employed in deciding whether a "losing claim" is also sanctionable under Rule
11 because, as Professor Yablon points out, "the likelihood that a claim will be sanctioned
as frivolous seems directly correlated with the likelihood that the claim will be a loser." Id.
550 A Rule 11 motion is itself subject to the requirements of the Rule. This Rule 11 liability
is only "potential," however, because, as previously noted, a Rule 11 violation should not
be automatically established just because the motion loses. See supra note 549.
551 The case of United National Insurance Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.
2001), makes this very point. The Ninth Circuit wrote,
The fact that the district court later altered its views concerning the key
legal issue and thereupon concluded-in the same order in which the
district court announced its new legal analysis concerning the impact
of the reimbursement claim on the jurisdictional issue-that Rule 11
sanctions were appropriate illustrates, if anything, one of the reasons
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b. Orders to Show Cause
The potential for "chilling" appears to be especially great when it
comes to orders to show cause for the following reasons: decisions as to
whether to issue them (and for what purpose) and whether to sanction
pursuant to them are left entirely to the discretion of the federal district
courts; 552 a much higher percentage of orders to show cause result in the
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, compared to the success rate for Rule 11
motions;553 the sanction of choice, even when such sanctions are
prohibited by the plain language of Rule 11, appears to be attorneys'
fees; 554 and there is no safe harbor provision to protect a litigant whom
the court concludes has violated Rule 11. 55
The first part of the solution to this aspect of the "chilling" problem,
therefore, is to require all federal district courts to actually issue orders to
show cause; and all orders to show cause must be required to satisfy due
courts must be cautious in imposing Rule 11 sanctions. Even when we
begin with an open mind, ... many of us, lawyers and judges alike, have
difficulty in recognizing opposing legal arguments as plausible once we have
thought through an issue and come to a firm conclusion regarding the proper
legal principles applicable to a particular transaction.
Id. at 1117 (reversing sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions) (emphasis added).
552 See supra text accompanying notes 480-85.
553 See supra text accompanying notes 433-34.
554 See supra Part III.A.2.c., B.4.b.
555 In United National Insurance Co., for example, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Rule 11
had to be strictly construed, especially when the district court acted on its own initiative
because there was no safe harbor available to protect the litigant in those situations. 242
F.3d at 1115-16. The Ninth Circuit wrote,
Judges ... should impose sanctions on lawyers for their mode of
advocacy only in the most egregious situations, lest lawyers be
deterred from vigorous representation of their clients. In recognition
of [this] critical concern, Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed only in
response to claims that are not "warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law." This standard is applied with particular stringency where, as
here, the sanctions are imposed on the court's own motion. In that
circumstance-unlike the situation in which an opposing party moves for Rule
11 sanctions-there is no "safe harbor" in the Rule allowing lawyers to correct
or withdraw their challenged filings.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also, FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note ("Since show-cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to
a contempt of court, the rule does not provide a 'safe harbor' to a litigant for withdrawing a
claim, defense, etc., after a show cause order has been issued on the court's own
initiative.").
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process, which, at a minimum, must include: (1) particularized notice of
the conduct alleged to be sanctionable; (2) particularized notice of the
authority or authorities under which sanctions are being sought; and (3)
opportunity to respond.556 The district courts should also be required to
issue their orders to show cause as a separate written order. This latter
requirement, while not explicitly required by Rule 11 or the case law
interpreting the 1993 amendments,5 57 is intentionally raised here as a
high sanctioning threshold, but one that would also make clear to the
parties, their attorneys, and the appellate courts that due process was in
fact satisfied. 558
Second, and very importantly, attorneys' fees cannot, and must not, be
awarded pursuant to an order to show cause. The language of the Rule
explicitly prohibits this type of monetary sanction from being awarded
when the court acts on its own initiative,559 and there should be
absolutely no exceptions from this rule in the federal courts.560
Third, orders to show cause should not be issued in circumstances in
which it seems clear that such an order is being used to sidestep Rule
556 See supra Part III.A.2.a.
557 See supra text accompanying notes 317-20.
558 More specifically, requiring the district courts to issue separate written orders to show
cause would achieve two related and important objectives. First and foremost, it would
ensure that due process was in fact satisfied because the federal circuit courts would have a
clear record, i.e., the order itself, by which to decide that issue. Second, and assuming due
process was in fact satisfied by the order, this result would preclude the parties and their
attorneys from being able to argue later that their rights were somehow violated by the
sanctioning process employed by the district courts.
559 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
560 Limiting the federal district courts' use of attorneys' fees would be an important step
in reducing the use of Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device and, hence, may reduce the impact of
one of the factors contributing to Rule 11's chilling effects. See infra Part IV.B.2.c. The
district courts may, however, require a sanctioned party to "pay a penalty into court." See
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). As Professor Tobias points out, "[clivil rights plaintiffs who would
be exposed to less risk of being assessed attorney's fees may remain concerned about
having to pay a monetary penalty into court, because they probably would be indifferent as
to the assessment's recipient." Tobias, Plaintiffs, supra note 31, at 1788. Despite the fact that
fines paid into court will probably be substantially less than the amounts that are awarded
as attorneys' fees, Professor Tobias makes a very good point. As long as monetary
sanctions, whether in the form of attorneys' fees to the opposing party or penalties paid
into court, remain the Rule 11 sanction of choice in the federal courts, civil rights plaintiffs
will continue to be "risk averse and vulnerable to such deployment of the Rule." Id.
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11's motion requirements. 561 There are two reasons, one policy-driven
and one tactical, that should compel this result. As a matter of policy, to
permit orders to show cause to be issued to get around Rule 11's motion
requirements would literally render the motion requirements
meaningless. Such an interpretation would, in effect, read the motion
requirements out of the Rule.562 Second, the tactic of seeking and/or
issuing an order to show cause under the circumstances described above,
should be fruitless anyway. That is, what appears to motivate the party
in seeking and/or the district court in issuing the order to show cause in
these situations is a desire to obtain and/or award attorneys' fees as a
Rule 11 sanction.5 63 As previously discussed, this type of sanction is
simply not available when a court acts on its own initiative.564
Finally, the Third Circuit's approach with respect to when an order to
show cause must be issued should be adopted. More specifically, as
with a Rule 11 motion, the federal district courts should be required to
issue their orders to show cause prior to final judgment. This
sanctioning threshold is consistent with the Advisory Committee's
philosophy that a Rule 11 violation should be called to the offending
party's attention as soon as practicable after its discovery. 565 There is
simply "no reason why prompt action should be required of an opposing
party and yet not similarly required of the court."566 This approach will
also avoid the problem of hindsight and, as the Third Circuit points out,
piecemeal appeals of the merits and sanctions questions.567 As with a
Rule 11 motion, the district court can decide whether to impose sanctions
561 In other words, if a party either failed to file a Rule 11 motion or filed one that did not
satisfy the Rule's procedural requirements for motions, an order to show cause should not
be issued to avoid either or both of those Rule 11 motion problems. See supra Part III.A.2.c,
B.4.a (discussing this "phenomenon" in the federal district courts.).
562 See supra text accompanying notes 348-52 (discussing Ninth Circuit cases).
%3 See supra Part III.A.2.c, B.4.a-b.
564 Thus, if attorneys' fees are simply not available pursuant to an order to show cause,
the number of situations in which parties and/or the district courts attempt to sidestep
Rule 11's motion requirements should be greatly reduced.
565 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("Ordinarily the motion should be
served promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too long, may be
viewed as untimely.").
66 Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 1994).
567 See supra note 333-37 and accompanying text.
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pursuant to its order to show cause after the case has reached final
judgment, if necessary.5 68
c. Deterrence, Discretion, and "Appropriate" Sanctions
As previously discussed, the research conducted here supports a
finding that Rule 11 is still being used as a fee-shifting device, despite the
1993 amendments.5 69 This over-emphasis on monetary sanctions is
unsettling and problematic, for several reasons. First, the text of Rule 11
explicitly limits the use of monetary sanctions.57 0 Second, the Advisory
Committee Note makes clear that monetary sanctions should not be the
sanction of choice in the federal courts and, instead, should be reserved
for "unusual circumstances."5 7 Finally, encouraging monetary sanctions
will only serve to perpetuate and encourage Rule 11's chilling effects,
which is antithetical to one of the reasons for the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11.572
This over-reliance on monetary damages, and specifically attorneys'
fees, also suggests very powerfully that the federal courts are using Rule
11 to compensate litigants. The obvious problem with a compensation
rationale is that the clearly articulated primary purpose of Rule 11
sanctions is to deter, not to compensate.5 73  This emphasis on
compensation also misperceives the harm Rule 11 seeks to remedy.
More specifically, a compensation rationale for Rule 11 essentially
focuses "on the harm done the defendant by a frivolous pleading .... ,574
As Professor Kelleher points out, however, "recent rulings of the
Supreme Court and the Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments, are
based on a different assumption-that Rule 11 is not primarily concerned
with harm to parties, but with the harm done to the court and the
judicial system by frivolous filings." 575
568 See supra text accompanying notes 548-51 (urging caution in imposing Rule 11
sanctions after final judgment).
569 See supra Part III.A.3, B.4.c.
570 See supra text accompanying notes 94-100.
571 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
572 See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
573 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note; supra text accompanying notes
84-86.
574 Kelleher, supra note 74, at 71.
575 Id.
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At a minimum, it must be made absolutely clear to the federal
courts, and the attorneys and parties appearing before them, that
deterrence, not compensation, is Rule 11's most important goal. The
deterrence rationale can be reinforced in a couple of ways: first, by
encouraging, if not requiring, the use of non-monetary sanctions576 and,
second, by requiring very specific findings on the record anytime the
federal district courts decide to impose Rule 11 sanctions of any kind.5 77
According to Judge Sam Johnson of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
those findings should include:
(1) what pleading, motion, or other paper is in violation
of Rule 11,
(2) why it is in violation,
(3) what factors the court considered in choosing an
appropriate sanction,[578]
576 The use of non-monetary sanctions under Rule 11 is expressly encouraged by the
Advisory Committee. Some of the non-monetary sanctions specifically mentioned by the
Committee, include:
striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or
censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational
programs;... referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the
case of government attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector
General, or agency head), etc.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note; see also supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
577 Should findings be required when district courts decide not to impose Rule 11
sanctions? The short answer is, no. Findings should not be required when a district court
denies Rule 11 sanctions because the text of Rule 11 does not require findings under these
circumstances; a Rule 11 movant does not have the right to a sanctions award, and a district
court's decision whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions, even if a violation is found, is
discretionary, not mandatory, under the 1993 version of the Rule. See Vairo, Prologue, supra
note 83, at 62. Notwithstanding these reasons and the fact that not requiring findings when
sanctions are denied clearly represents a higher sanctioning threshold, a couple of the
circuits examined here, namely the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, require such findings by
the district courts. See supra note 407. If such findings are going to be required in practice,
the district courts should only be required to provide a reasoned basis for denying
sanctions.
578 The Advisory Committee provides a non-exhaustive list of factors a court should
consider in deciding whether to impose a sanction, including:
Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it
was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it
infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense;
whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation;
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(4) what sanctions, if any, were considered and rejected,
and
(5) why the court believes that the sanction imposed is
the least severe sanction necessary to deter similar
misconduct.579
When a district court decides to award monetary sanctions for a Rule
11 violation, the district courts should also be required to include
findings specifying why a non-monetary sanction would not be
sufficient to deter the violation at issue, documenting the reasonableness
of the fees sought or fine imposed, and documenting the party or
attorney's ability to pay.580
Emphasizing non-monetary sanctions and requiring specific findings
to support an award of Rule 11 sanctions will constrain, without
overriding, the exercise of discretion by the federal district courts. This
sanctioning threshold therefore attempts to balance two competing
considerations. On the one hand, the federal district courts must have
discretion to control the litigants and litigation before them. On the
other hand, the amount of discretion invested in the federal district
courts is one of the main reasons cited for Rule 11's chilling effects.5 81
The balance struck under this sanctioning threshold would simply
require the federal district courts to explain the use of their discretion
when they decide to impose Rule 11 sanctions.5 82 Such a requirement
whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation
process in time or expense; whether the responsible person is trained
in the law ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
579 Johnson, supra note 63, at 674 (footnote added).
w These additional findings are either expressly mentioned in the following sources or
are clearly suggested by them. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note
(stating that the court should consider "what amount, given the financial resources of the
responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case")
(emphasis added); Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 84-85.
581 See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
582 According to Judge Johnson,
Although it may seem somewhat bothersome to require district courts
to consider each of these issues and to note their conclusions for the
record, the requirement is well justified. First, the bother is not that
great. The factors listed are the factors a district court ought to
consider in any event when imposing sanctions; all that is required
here is that the court make a record of its deliberations. Second, given
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will hopefully get the federal courts to "tak[e] seriously the duty to
exercise discretion in selecting a sanction appropriate to the goal of
deterrence .... ."583 The approach that seems to be employed by the
federal courts now, i.e., routine use of Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device, is
not only inconsistent with the district courts' duty, it is also
unacceptable.584 Implementing this sanctioning threshold will probably
not be easy,585 but it must be done.5 86
d. Discretion and Appellate Review
The federal district courts' exercise of discretion is widely believed to
be one of the main causes of Rule 11's chilling effects.5 7 The question, of
course, is how to constrain a district court's discretion without
unnecessarily impeding the court's ability to manage its own docket.
the potential size and effect of Rule 11 sanctions, a certain amount of
care is warranted in the imposition of sanctions. Third, factual
findings on each of these ... issues would encourage federal district
courts to consider more seriously the least sanction adequate doctrine,
a doctrine which, if fully implemented, would eliminate the worst of
the problems with the present rule.
Johnson, supra note 63, at 674.
583 Burbank, Transformation, supra note 61, at 1942 (emphasis added).
581 Id. at 1934. It is also "inconsistent with the trial court's duty to exercise discretion in
selecting a sanction appropriate to the goal of specific deterrence and its duty to avoid
over-deterrence, specific or general." Id. (footnote omitted).
585 Id. at 1942 ("[Tiaking seriously the duty to exercise discretion in selecting a sanction
appropriate to the goal of deterrence, as opposed, for instance, to routine expense-shifting
on an attorney's fee model, will not be a simple exercise for judges, which may help to
explain why so many of them have shirked that duty.").
-16 According to Professor Burbank,
The difficulty has not to do with the doctrine but with the agony of
judgments about human conduct and what is likely to affect conduct,
both of the individuals before the court and of others. But, again, that
is a duty that the Rule imposes and, more important for present
purposes, a reason it does so is evidently awareness of the differential
impact of sanctions, whether viewed from the perspective of specific or
general deterrence. From those perspectives, predictability is critical,
and it cannot be achieved through routine, let alone uniform, resort to
expense-shifting as a sanction under Rule 11.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
M7 See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
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One of the most effective methods to limit the district courts' exercise of
discretion is rigorous appellate review.588
But, if rigorous appellate review is needed to curb judicial discretion
in the district courts and, hence, reduce some of the problems associated
with Rule 11, the question remains how to accomplish that. Based on the
Rule 11 literature and commentary, at least three things would need to
happen to increase the level of appellate scrutiny. First, the federal
appellate courts have to publish clear and consistent Rule 11 opinions.
589
Second, the federal circuit courts have to insist that the district courts
comply with Rule 11's findings requirement.59 0 Third, the federal
58 See, e.g., Wiggins, supra note 37, at 13 (finding that the district court judges themselves
indicate that their decisions about whether to increase or decrease use of Rule 11 sanctions
is directly linked to the mandates of the federal appellate courts.); see also infra note 589.
s19 Federal district court judges surveyed in the FJC study "generally expressed
unhappiness with appellate rulings" and the impact they had on Rule 11 practice in the
federal courts. Wiggins, supra note 37, at 36. One judge commented that "[t]he courts of
appeals have a great deal of blame to shoulder in the almost total lack of confidence in the
trial judge's ability to recognize the need for sanctions in particular cases." Id. Another
judge said that "[it is useless to have Rule 11 when it is never enforced at the appellate
level." Id. The solution, or at least part of one, is spelled out in yet another comment by a
district court judge who stated,
While I do not suggest that Rule 11 has no beneficial effect in
discouraging frivolous litigation, I do feel that consistent, precedential
decisions at the appeals court level will greatly assist trial courts in correctly
applying Rule 11. Moreover, clear and consistent published opinions would
provide guidance to attorneys practicing in federal court as to the standards
they are expected to meet.
Id. (emphasis added).
590 According to Professor Armour,
Appellate review is deemed essential ... to ensure that the correct
decision was reached, or at least that everything was done to ensure
that the [district] court arrived at the best decision possible. The
assumption that underlies the adjudicative process is that the openness
and thoroughness of the analysis at the trial court level, when coupled
with a commitment to provide a detailed record for appeal, fosters
judicial neutrality, objectivity, and adherence to external legal
standards. This element of public and institutional scrutiny is
intended to restrict the courts' reliance upon highly personalized,
subjective, or internalized standards or the influence of bias in
reaching the final result.
Armour, Practice, supra note 55, at 728. See also Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 89.
Professors Yamamoto and Hart argue, in the context of the 1983 version of Rule 11, which
did not have an explicit findings requirement, that
findings and a statement of reasons ... are deemed necessary for
appellate review, "demonstrating that the trial court exercised its
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appellate courts must conscientiously decide how the "abuse of
discretion" standard should be applied to each Rule 11 case they review.
This last suggestion requires some further explanation.
Abuse of discretion is the standard of review currently applicable to
all Rule 11 decisions by the district courts.591 The abuse of discretion
standard of review was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 592 and endorsed by the Advisory
Committee with respect to the 1993 amendments to the Rule.5 93 Many
commentators argue that this standard of review is simply not rigorous
enough, and that, as a result, Rule 11's problems will continue in
practice. 594 If Rule 11 is amended further, then perhaps the question of
discretion in a reasoned and principled fashion." Findings serve
additional functions. "[Tihey help to assure litigants, and incidentally
the judge as well, that the decision was the product of thoughtful
deliberation; and ... their publication enhances the deterrent effect of
the ruling."
Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 26, at 89 (ellipses in original); see supra text accompanying
notes 24-25 (discussing the potential benefits of Rule 11's findings requirement).
591 See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
592 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
59 See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
594 See, e.g., Tobias, Plaintiffs, supra note 31, at 1785.
[Abuse of discretion as the applicable standard of review for Rule 11
decisions] place[s] too much discretion in trial courts and prescribe[s]
insufficiently demanding review. It simply lacks adequate rigor,
especially for monitoring determinations of district judges who
vigorously apply the Rule against civil rights plaintiffs. Indeed, overly
deferential review of such decisions in recent high profile cases
tellingly illustrates these problems.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Evan S. Nadel, The Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on
Appeal: Reconsidering Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corporation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 665,
668, 669-70 (1996) (arguing that the abuse of discretion standard "fosters-indeed mandates-
inappropriate review of sanctions."). According to Nadel,
The abuse of discretion standard of review that the Supreme Court
was determined should apply to every facet of Rule 11 was devised
under the 1983 version of the Rule. However, since the Advisory
Committee endorsed that unitary standard in its 1993 notes, the
standard has been unquestioningly applied to the more technical 1993
version of the Rule. This failure to reconsider the appropriate standard
of review under the 1993 Rule has resulted in bad justice and a
potentially crippled judicial ability to control the legal system and its
participants.
Nadel, supra (footnotes omitted). See also Simpson, supra note 22, at 512.
[T]o effectuate the "least-severe sanction adequate" provision, the Rule
must provide for more rigorous appellate review .... Circuits have, in
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which standard of review should be applicable to Rule 11 decisions by
the district courts will be revisited. Until then, however, abuse of
discretion remains the applicable standard of review for all aspects of a
district court's Rule 11 decision and, therefore, has to be addressed.
As previously discussed, there are different formulations of this
standard in use in the federal courts.5 95 Senior Judge Henry J. Friendly of
the Second Circuit argues that "the differences are not only defensible
but essential" because "[s]ome cases call for application of the abuse of
discretion standard in a 'broad' sense and others in a 'narrow' one." 596
According to Judge Friendly, therefore,
In those situations "where the decision depends on first-
hand observation or direct contact with the litigation,"
the trial court's decision "merits a high degree of
insulation from appellate revision." At the other
extreme, when Congress has declared a national policy
and enlisted the aid of the courts' equity powers in its
enforcement, the Supreme Court has said that the fact
that "the [trial] court's discretion is equitable in nature
... hardly means that it is unfettered by meaningful
standards or shielded from thorough appellate review."
In some instances, the need for uniformity and
predictability demand thorough appellate review. In
short, the "abuse of discretion" standard does not give
the past, articulated a "least-severe sanction adequate" policy ... ;
nonetheless, district courts still award excessive monetary judgments.
Thus, as the circuit court relies on the discretion of the district court
and the district court sidesteps the recommendations of the circuit
court, the "least severe sanction adequate" policy is not realized.
Based on this exception, the proposal, which codifies an abuse of
discretion standard, may have a similar result.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Armour, Rethinking, supra note 513, at 557-58.
[T]he Cooter Court's adoption of the unitary abuse of discretion
standard as the appellate standard for all aspects of the Rule 11
decision, accepts variability in outcomes, including competing sanction
decisions, defines variability widely to include a limited right to be
wrong, and then shifts the risk of conflicting outcomes in close cases to
the sanctioned litigant. It is the sanctioned party who bears the risk of
what the institution has decided is a "tolerable level of error."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
sg9 See supra Part III.A.4.a.
5% Friendly, supra note 392, at 764.
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nearly so complete an immunity bath to the trial court's
rulings as counsel for appellees would have reviewing
courts believe. An appellate court must carefully scrutinize
the nature of the trial court's determination and decide
whether that court's superior opportunities for observation or
other reasons of policy require greater deference than would be
accorded to its formulations of law or its application of law to
the facts. In cases within the former categories, "abuse of
discretion" should be given a broad reading, in others a
reading which scarcely differs from the definition of error.
Above all, an appellate court should consider whether the
lawmaker intended that discretion should be committed solely
to the trial judge or to judges throughout the judicial
system.597
In short, there are differing levels of appellate scrutiny under the
abuse of discretion standard, depending on the district court's
analysis.5 98 It is therefore each federal appellate court's responsibility to
conscientiously decide whether a "broad" or "narrow" formulation of
the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate to deciding the Rule 11
issue (or case) before it. Clearly, in keeping with the high sanctioning
thresholds being espoused here, "close cases," or cases involving novel
or unsettled areas of law, should require applying the narrow
formulation.
C. High Sanctioning Thresholds and Value Judgments
Rule 11 is a deterrent device and, as such, it "suffers from the
inevitable weakness of all deterrent devices," namely, that "it cannot be
calibrated with precision. There is always some risk of overdeterrence
just as there is a risk that the intended target may escape." 599 How any
deterrent device will be interpreted and applied in practice will largely
turn on value judgments. By adopting high sanctioning thresholds for
-97 Id. at 783-84 (ellipsis in original) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
598 See also, Vairo, Prologue, supra note 83, at 72-78 (endorsing and elaborating on an
approach to the abuse of discretion standard that recognizes the differing levels of
scrutiny).
599 Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1642 ("To the extent that Rule 11 deters
frivolous litigation, it does so at the risk of chilling meritorious claims. This trade-off is not
remarkable-chilling and deterrence are directly related. If Rule 11 were no deterrent, it
would have no chilling effect."); Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 12.
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Rule 11, it is clear that some people who may be the "intended targets"
of Rule 11 sanctions will indeed escape without liability. This result is
intentional, however, because high sanctioning thresholds, like the ones
suggested here, intentionally privilege access to court over other values
that may be served by the Rule, such as efficiency.600
Access to court is critical for litigants asserting non-mainstream
claims that challenge the existing socio-political order. It is critical for
two very related reasons: first, because minority groups are typically
outside of the political decision making process and, as a result, subject
to the will of the majority,6 1 and, second, because of the integral part
courts play in our constitutional system and democratic form of
government.6° 2 More specifically, under a separation of powers ideal,60 3
6W As Professor Armour notes,
The regulatory line of Rule 11 that defines frivolous litigation and
distinguishes it from merely meritless litigation, also limits disputants'
access to a powerful arm of the state and the legitimating function that
power plays in resolving social conflicts. The power and authority of
the judiciary to enforce Rule 11 does not simply refer to its power to
regulate lawyers' conduct and their potential for abusing that power
by imposing undeservedly large fines. The judiciary's power under
Rule 11 includes defining what disputes may be brought into the
judicial arena, and by implication, what disputes may not be brought
without risk of public censure and sanction. When sanctions are
issued under Rule 11, the Rule explicitly excludes the availability to...
"others similarly situated." These sanctions decisions will inevitably
shape the courts of the future.
Armour, Practice, supra note 55, at 698-99 (footnotes omitted).
601 See Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 417.
602 Justice Stevens once wrote that
Freedom of access to the courts is a cherished value in our democratic
society .... There is, and should be, the strongest presumption of
open access to all levels of the judicial system. Creating a risk that the
invocation of the judicial process may give rise to punitive sanctions
simply because the litigant's claim is unmeritorious could only deter
the legitimate exercise of the right to seek a peaceful redress of
grievances through judicial means.
Talamani v. All-State Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070-71 (1985) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
W3 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1307-09 (1976).
Separation of powers comes in for a good deal of veneration in our
political and judicial rhetoric, but it has always been hard to classify all
government activity into three, and only three, neat and mutually
exclusive categories. In practice, all governmental officials, including
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courts operate to prevent oppression of minorities by the majority;6°4
they function, at least in part, to hold government accountable by
constitutional standards; 605 and they are an important forum in which
judges, have exercised a large and messy admixture of powers, and
that is as it must be.
Id. See also Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 121, 125 (1982).
In my view, courts should not be viewed in isolation but as a
coordinate source of governmental power. They should be viewed as
an integral part of the larger political system ... . In America, the
legitimacy of the courts, and the power they exercise in structural
reform or for that matter in any type of constitutional litigation, is
founded on the unique competence of the judiciary to perform their
distinctive social function, which is ... to give concrete meaning and
application to the public values embodied in the Constitution.
Id. See also Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 418.
Diminished minority participation in the process of negotiating public
values strikes at the very heart of the structure of American society and
its system of governance. One role of the judiciary is to provide a
formal forum in which to address disputes about group interests and
public values arising out of severe imbalances in power among social
groups. Diminished minority access to judicial forums for negotiating
public values threatens that separation of powers ideal.
Id.
W4 Indeed, according to Judge Stephen Reinhardt, "[t]he vindication of the rights of the poor
and the powerless, those most in need of government protection, was perhaps the most important
function that the federal courts served." Stephen Reinhardt, Limiting Access to the Federal
Courts: Round Up The Usual Victims, 6 WHITIER L. REV. 967, 968 (1984) (emphasis added);
see also Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 399 ("The public law dimension to
adjudication builds upon traditional political theory embracing a separation of powers
ideal. That political theory is concerned with the potential for oppression of the powerless
inherent in the pure form of majoritarian rule.") (footnote omitted).
As H.L.A. Hart wrote, "It seems fatally easy to believe that loyalty to democratic
principles entails acceptance of what may be termed moral populism: the view that the
majority have a moral right to dictate how all should live. This is a misunderstanding of
democracy which still menaces individual liberty .... " H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY 79 (1963). The greatest danger, however, is "not that ... the majority might use
their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might
come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so." Id. at 77-78.
60 Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 399-400. Professor Yamamoto writes,
One function of the courts is to hold government's elective branches
accountable to constitutional standards and protect "discrete and
insular minorities" from intemperate majorities. Especially where the
political will of the majority encourages restriction of minority
liberties, an accessible judiciary furthers societal interest and, in
particular, those of the minority, by providing a formal public forum
for testing government conduct according to constitutional ideals.
Rights assertion is the mechanism for triggering judicial scrutiny.
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public values60 6 and group rights60 7 can be discussed, renegotiated, 6 8 and
vindicated.609 Access to courts "for minorities asserting rights," is
Id. (footnotes omitted).
606 Fiss, supra note 603, at 124. According to Professor Fiss,
[T]he Constitution that we know today ... is a constitution that does
far more than simply establish a form of government. It identifies a set
of values such as equality, liberty, no cruel and unusual punishment,
due process, security of the person, and freedom of speech. These
values transcend the private ends implied by the [private] dispute
resolution model and inform and limit the function of our government.
They stand as the core of a public morality and serve as the substantive
foundations of structural litigation. The social function of
contemporary litigation is not to resolve disputes, but rather to give
concrete meaning to that morality within the context of the
bureaucratic state.
Id.
607 Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 401. According to Professor
Yamamoto, "[w]hether a government hiring scheme is discriminatory, a county's electoral
structure constitutes gerrymandering, or welfare benefits have been improperly
terminated, all involve disputes about 'rights' both of the individual directly involved and
the group indirectly affected." Id.; see also Chayes, supra note 603, at 1291 (exemplifying the
use of class actions as the "emergence of the group as the real subject or object of ...
litigation"). Professor Chayes writes that
The class suit is a reflection of our growing awareness that a host of
important public and private interactions-perhaps the most important
in defining the conditions and opportunities of life for most people-are
conducted on a routine or bureaucratized basis and can no longer be
visualized as bilateral transactions between private individuals. From
another angle, the class action responds to the proliferation of more or
less well-organized groups in our society and the tendency to perceive
interests as group interests, at least in very important aspects.
Chayes, supra note 603, at 1291.
608 Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 412-13. Professor Yamamoto argues
that
Many declared judicial principles disfavor the disadvantaged. Some
that appear to be favorable are later weakened by judicial
interpretation. Some principles are cast so broadly that they provide
little meaningful guidance for day-to-day public behavior. Some legal
arguments reinterpreting notions of appropriate social relations never
prevail. Some rights claims, however, are rejected by courts as
untenable, if not outlandish, until "developing lines of legal or social
thought" make them acceptable. Central to the renegotiation process
is the opportunity of those affected to participate meaningfully. One
key to meaningful participation is an accessible judiciary.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
609 This conception of civil rights litigation rejects the traditional model of adjudication,
which "presupposes a dispute between private individuals of roughly equal bargaining
power ... who, through their zealous advocates, present an impartial decision maker with
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therefore a "part of a dynamic process of cultural transformation," 610 and
Rule 11 should not be used to impede that process.611
V. CONCLUSION
Rule 11 was amended in 1983 in an effort to provide federal district
courts with a tool to curb frivolous litigation and, hence, to help control
their dockets. In practice, however, the Rule produced severe chilling
effects on plaintiffs asserting civil rights claims in the federal courts.
Rule 11 was therefore amended again ten years later to reduce or
all the relevant information necessary for that decision maker to deliver a 'fair' decision[,]"
i.e., "one that attempts to return the private individuals to the status quo ante." Danielle
Kie Hart, Same-Sex Marriage Revisited: Taking a Critical Look at Baehr v. Lewin, 9 GEORGE
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1, 109 (1998) (footnotes omitted). Rather,
[clourts are no longer used solely to establish and enforce private
rights. Instead, they are being used by minority groups asserting
rights claims as forums to develop and express their own narratives
that counter the current understandings of existing rights, duties, and
categories that classify events and relationships. These counter-
narratives challenge existing power structures and systems of
domination by challenging the entrenched and often unspoken
assumptions and vantage points that create and perpetuate them. By
offering a previously unaccepted framework, therefore, a counter-
narrative "'stretch[es] or chang[es] accepted frameworks for
organizing reality[;]" and, in so doing, it "undermines the clarity and
strength of" current understandings, "infusing complexity and
providing a competing perspective."
Id. at 109-10 (footnotes and citations omitted).
610 Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 72, at 349. I have written elsewhere that
[civil] rights litigation: builds community; it shapes public discourse
over the meaning(s) of, and significance to be attached to, rights,
values, and the differences among us; it educates and informs the
public thereby raising public awareness of non-mainstream
perspectives; and it transmits a powerful political message
"'concerning 'the kind of society we want to live in."'
Hart, supra note 609, at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).
611 Judge Johnson reminds us that
Whether for good or ill, the federal courts have become great engines
of social change in this country. As long as the federal courts occupy
this role, they must remain open to, and willing to hear from, those
who advance good faith arguments to change existing law. The threat
of imposition of large awards of attorneys' fees, however, effectively
closes the courts to such arguments. The impending danger of large
monetary sanctions inexorably discourages practitioners from pressing
positions which, while tenable, depart from the current state of the
law.
Johnson, supra note 63, at 650.
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alleviate, among other things, these effects. Unfortunately, the research
conducted here suggests that, because of the way the 1993 amendments
are being interpreted and applied in the federal courts, the chilling
effects continue to exist today. The more particular result of this finding
is that, in all likelihood, plaintiffs bringing civil rights claims are, and
will continue to be, disproportionately affected by Rule 11.
Hopefully these preliminary findings will stimulate additional
research and further discussion about the future of Rule 11. Until then,
however, this Article strongly recommends that the federal courts adopt
an approach to Rule 11 that employs high sanctioning thresholds. Only
by recognizing that Rule 11 should be an exceptional remedy for use in
exceptional circumstances will we protect access to courts for civil rights
plaintiffs.
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VI. APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: FEDERAL APPELLATE CASES*
SECOND CIRCUIT (7): Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities
Corp., 222 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000); Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55 (2d Cir.
2000); Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87 (2d
Cir. 1999); L.B. Foster Co. v. America Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.
1998); Sakon v. Andreo, 119 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1997); Ted Lapidus, S.A. v.
Vann, 112 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1997); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48
F.3d 1320 (2d Cir. 1995).
THIRD CIRCUIT (2): Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute
of the Medical College of Pennsylvania, 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996); Mary
Anne Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1988).
FIFTH CIRCUIT (6): Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 731
(5th Cir. 2001); Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2000); Goldin v.
Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 1999); Edwards v. General Motors
Corp., 153 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1998); Thornton v. General Motors Corp.,
136 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1998); Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995).
SIXTH CIRCUIT (11): Heldt v. Nicholson, No. 00-1495, 2001 WL 111648
(6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2001); Hayden v. Sass, No. 99-1243, 2000 WL 1140516
(6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2000); Singh v. Capital University Law & Graduate
Center, No. 99-3564, 2000 WL 302778 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2000); Powell v.
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Nos. 98-3668, 98-3670, 1999 WL 519186 (6th
Cir. July 16, 1999); Cobleigh v. United States, No. 97-2302, 1999 WL
195738 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 1999); Barker v. Bank One, Lexington, N.A., No.
97-5787, 1998 WL 466437 (6th Cir. July 30, 1998); Bernstein v. Remer, No.
96-2232, 1997 WL 685369 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1997); Morganroth &
Morganroth v. DeLorean, 123 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 1997); Ridder v. City of
Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997); Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807
(6th Cir. 1996); Wesely v. Churchill Development Corp., No. 95-4024,
1996 WL 616636 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1996).
SEVENTH CIRCUIT (6): Vollmer v. Publishers Clearing House, 248
F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2001); Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v.
NACCO Materials Handling Group, Inc., 202 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2000);
* None of the cases cited here has been reversed. All subsequent history has been omitted.
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Divane v. Krull Electric Co., 200 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1999); Harter v. Iowa
Grain Co., Nos. 96-3907, 97-2671, 96-4074, 97-2041, 1999 WL 754333 (7th
Cir. July 15, 1998); Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. of Peoria, 142
F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 74 F.3d 147
(7th Cir. 1996).
NINTH CIRCUIT (11): Habib v. Cruz, No. 00-17103, 2001 WL 985637
(9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001); Enercon, GMBH v. Erdman, No. 00-15399, 2001
WL 777476 (9th Cir. July 11, 2001); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Construction
Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001); Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co., No. 00-15087,
2001 WL 338071 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2001); United National Insurance Co. v.
R & D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2001); Hugo Neu-Proler Co. v.
Local 13 International Longshoreman & Warehouse Union, No. 99-55322,
2000 WL 1459766 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2000); Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying
Service, Inc., No. 98-35361, 2000 WL 11432 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000);
Flanagan v. Arnaiz, No. 97-15517, 1999 WL 1128641 (9th Cir. Dec. 7,
1999); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998); Madamba v. Certified
Grocers California, Ltd., No. 9715017, 1998 WL 339685 (9th Cir. May 7,
1998); Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1994).
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APPENDIX 2: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CASES*
SECOND CIRCUIT (36): Camprubi-Soms v. Aranda, No. 00 Civ. 9626
(DLC), 2002 WL 10439 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002); Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B.
Realty, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10175 (JSH), 2001 WL 1154669 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1,
,2001); Garone v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 00-CV-6722 (ILS), 2001
WL 984914 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2001); Kron v. Moravia Central School
District, No. 5:98-CV-1876 (FJS/GJD), 2001 WL 536274 (N.D.N.Y. May 3,
2001); R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, No. 91 Civ. 567 (CSH), 2000 WL
1010400 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2000); Fowler v. Transit Supervisors
Organization, No. 96 Civ. 6796 (JGK), 2000 WL 303283 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23,
2000); Williams v. Perry, No. 3:99-CV-00725EBB, 2000 WL 341259 (D.
Conn. Feb. 23, 2000); Gamla Enterprises North America, Inc. v. Lunor-
Brillen Design U. Vertriebs GMBH, No. 98 Civ. 992 (MGC), 2000 WL
193120 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2000); Ping He (Hai Nam) Co. v. Nonferrous
Metals (U.S.A.), Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Brady v. Marks, 7
F. Supp. 2d 247 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); Blanco v. Remington Hotel Corp., No.
96 Civ. 6306 (WK) JCF, 1998 WL 66009 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1998); Galonsky
v. Williams, No. 96 Civ. 6207 (JSM), 1997 WL 759445 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,
1997); Tornheim v. Federal Home Loan Morgtage Corp., 988 F. Supp. 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Honeywell, Inc. v. Firequench, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 694
(DLC), 1997 WL 570514 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1997); Howard v. Klynveld
Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Lopez v.
Constantine, Nos. 94 Civ. 5921 (DAB)(SEG), 95 Civ. 5915 (DAB)(SEG),
1997 WL 337510 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1997); Banfield v. UHS Home
Attendants, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 4850 (JFK), 1997 WL 342422 (S.D.N.Y. June
23, 1997); Revson v. Brod, No. 96 Civ. 5608 8HS RLE, 1997 WL 317369
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1997); Weeks Stevedoring Co. v. Raymond
International, 174 F.R.D. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Weiss v. Weiss, 984 F. Supp.
682 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Succession Picasso v. Spedding, No. 96 Civ. 4546
(SAS), 1997 WL 65911 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1997); Kahre-Richardes Family
Foundation, Inc. v. Village of Baldwinsville, 953 F. Supp. 39 (N.D.N.Y.
1997); Bonondona v. Stat House, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 0788 (JEG)(LB), 1997
WL 43614 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1997); Lancaster v. Zufle, 170 F.R.D. 7
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Chauvet v. Local 1199 Drug, Hospital, & Health Care
Employees Union, Nos. 96 Civ. 2934 (SS), 96 Civ. 4622 (SS), 1996 WL
* None of the cases cited here has been reversed on appeal. Some of the cases may have
been modified. My purpose in collecting and citing these cases, however, was to see what
Rule 11 practice was like in the federal district courts. Consequently, all subsequent history
has been omitted.
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665610 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1996); Wright v. Wilson Elser Moskowitz
Edelman & Dicker, No. 95 CIV 7970 (MGC), 1996 WL 447773 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 8, 1996); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears Realty Co., 932 F. Supp. 392
(N.D.N.Y. 1996); Binghamton Masonic Temple, Inc. v. Bares, 168 F.R.D.
121 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
Philadelphia v. Vergara, No. 91 Civ. 5657 KID RLE, 1995 WL 746379
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1995); Chi v. Age Group, Ltd., No. 94 CIV 5253 (AGS),
1995 WL 564159 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995); Bowler v. United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 901 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); O'Brien v. Alexander, 898 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Photocircuits Corp. v. Marathon Agents, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 449 (E.D.N.Y.
1995); Gray v. Millea, 892 F. Supp. 432 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Anyanwu v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 887 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
D'Orange v. Feely, 877 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
THIRD CIRCUIT (13): Brunner v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 612
(D.N.J. 2001); Clement v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 122 F. Supp.
2d 551 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales
Practices Litigation, 63 F. Supp. 2d 516 (D.N.J. 1999); Farris v. County of
Camden, 61 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D.N.J. 1999); Cannon v. Cherry Hill Toyota,
Inc., 190 F.R.D. 147 (D.N.J. 1999); Thomason v. Norman E. Lehrer, P.C.,
182 F.R.D. 121 (D.N.J. 1998); Hockley v. Shan Enterprises Ltd.
Partnership, 19 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 1998); Lopez v. Constantine, Nos.
94 CIV. 5921 DAB SEG, 95 CIV. 5915 DAB SEG, 1997 WL 793595 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 23, 1997); Kleinpaste v. United States Internal Revenue Service, No.
97-884, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22377 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 1997); Lal v.
Borough of Kennett Square, 935 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Progress
Federal Savings Bank v. Lenders Ass'n, No. CIV. A. 94-7425, 1996 WL
57942 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1996); Watson v. City of Salem, 934 F. Supp. 643
(D.N.J. 1995); Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1994).
FIFTH CIRCUIT (10): Porter v. Milliken & Michael, Inc., No. 99-0199,
2001 WL 104769 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2001); Seal v. Gateway Cos. of
Delaware, No. 01-1322, 2001 WL 1018362 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2001);
Laughlin v. Falcon Operators, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-1484, 2001 WL 474282
(E.D. La. May 3, 2001); Muhammad v. State of Louisiana, Nos. C1V. A.
99-3472, Civ. A. 99-2694, 2000 WL 1876350 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2000); Riley
v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 2 F. Supp. 2d 864 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Hicks
v. Bexar County, Texas, 973 F. Supp. 653 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Columbia
Gulf Transmission Co. v. United States, 966 F. Supp. 1453 (S.D. Miss.
1997); Tolbert v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3-96-CV-0428-R, 1997
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WL 135606 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 1997); Prewitt v. Alexander, 173 F.R.D.
438 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Toups v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 155 F.R.D.
588 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
SIXTH CIRCUIT (7): Miller v. Credit Collection Services, 200 F.R.D. 379
(S.D. Ohio 2000); Simmons v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., No. 99-CV-76093-
DT, 2000 WL 424198 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2000); Neighbors Concerned
About Yacht Club Expansion v. Grosse Pointe Yacht Club, No. 99-70325,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 1999); Allied Mechanical
Services, Inc. v. Local 337 of the United Association of Journeymen &
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry, No. 4:98-CV-113,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4654 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 1999); Miller v. United
States, No. 5:06-CV-1237, 1998 WL 372340 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1998); Two
Men & a Truck/International Inc. v. Two Men & a Truck/Kalamazoo,
Inc., No. 5:94-CV-162, 1996 WL 740540 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 16, 1996);
Kratage v. Charter Township of Commerce, 926 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Mich.
1996).
SEVENTH CIRCUIT (18): Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Theobold,
No. IPOO-0325-C-M/S, 2001 WL 484181 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2001); Bryant v.
Polston, No. IPOO-1064-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1670938 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2000);
Klefstad Companies, Inc. v. New Boston Allison Ltd. Partnership, No.
IP98-0771-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1469701 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2000); Cox v.
Preferred Technical Group, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 786 (N.D. Ind. 2000);
Northlake Marketing & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, S.A., 194 F.R.D. 633
(N.D. Ill. 2000); Smith v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, No. 98 C
5903, 2000 WL 549483 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2000); Dearborn Financial
Services Corp. v. Heath, No. 98 CV 5222, 1999 WL 1011860 (N.D. Ill.,
Sept. 30, 1999); Harding University v. Consulting Services Group, L.P.,
48 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. 111.1999); Birch v. Kim, 977 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.
Ind. 1997); Cooper v. Chicago Transit Authority, No. 95 C 2616, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5299 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 1997); Vildaver v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Nos. 94 C 3042, 94 C 3143, 1997 WL 7562
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1997); Smith v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Lerch v. Boyer, 929 F. Supp. 319 (N.D.
Ind. 1996); Erg v. Stern, No. 94C3729, 1996 WL 131743 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11,
1996); Sethness-Greenleaf, Inc. v. Green River Corp., Nos. 89C9203,
91C4373, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13796 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1995); Religious
Order of St. Matthew v. Brennan, No. 3:92-CV-79SRM, 1995 WL 555102
(N.D. Ind. June 8, 1995); Gazouski v. Belvidere, No. 93C20157, 1995 WL
149438 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1995); Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v.
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Israel Identity Tours, Inc., No. 92C2379, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 751 (N.D.
Il. Jan. 26,1994).
NINTH CIRCUIT (8): Truesdell v. Southern California Permanente
Medical Group, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Ca. 2001); Kibbee v. City of
Portland, No. CV-980675-ST, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17205 (D. Or. Oct. 12,
2000); McMahon v. Best, No. C-00-00616 CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10872 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2000); Ex rel. Eitel v. Reagan, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1151
(D. Ariz. 1998); Fat T, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Associates Piers 7, 8, 9, 172
F.R.D. 411 (D. Haw. 1996); Curl v. Wilson, No. C93-2376FMS, 1994 WL
323998 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 1994); Religious Technology Center v.
Gerbode, No. 93-2226AWT, 1994 WL 228607 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 1994);
Dunn v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 850 F. Supp. 853 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
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APPENDIX 3: RULE 11 MOTIONS-DISTRICT COURT CASES*
SECOND CIRCUIT (42): Camprubi-Soms v. Aranda, No. 00 Civ. 9626
(DLC), 2002 WL 10439 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002) (cross motions); Patsy's
Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10175 (JSH), 2001 WL
1154669 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2001); Garone v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No.
00-CV-6722 (ILJ), 2001 WL 984914 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2001); Kron v.
Moravia Central School District, No. 5:98-CV-1876 (FJS/GJD), 2001 WL
536274 (N.D.N.Y. May 3, 2001); R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, No. 91 Civ.
5678 (CSH), 2000 WL 1010400 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2000); Fowler v. Transit
Supervisors Organization, No. 96 Civ. 6796 (JGK), 2000 WL 303283
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2000); Williams v. Perry, No. 3:99-CV-00725EBB, 2000
WL 341259 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2000); Gamla Enterprises North America,
Inc. v. Lunor-Brillen Design U. Vertriebs GMBH, No. 98 Civ. 992 (MGC),
2000 WL 193120 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2000); Ping He (Hai Nam) Co. v.
Nonferrous Metals (U.S.A.), Inc., 187 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Brady v.
Marks, 7 F. Supp. 2d 247 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); Blanco v. Remington Hotel
Corp., No. 96 Civ. 6306 (WK) JCF, 1998 WL 66009 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1998)
(cross motions); Galonsky v. Williams, No. 96 Civ. 6207 (JSM), 1997 WL
759445 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997); Tornheim v. Federal Home Loan
Morgtage Corp., 988 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Honeywell, Inc. v.
Firequench, Inc., No. Civ. 694 (DLC), 1997 WL 570514 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12,
1997); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Banfield v. UHS Home Attendants, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 4850
(JFK), 1997 WL 342422 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1997); Lopez v. Constantine,
Nos. 94 Civ. 5921 (DAB)(SEG), 95 Civ. 5915 (DAB)(SEG), 1997 WL 337510
(S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1997); Revson v. Brod, No. 96 Civ. 5608 SHS RLE, 1997
WL 317369 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1997); Weeks Stevedoring Co. v. Raymond
International, 174 F.R.D. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (cross motions); Weiss v.
Weiss, 984 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Succession Picasso v. Spedding,
No. 96 CV 4546 (SAS), 1997 WL 65911 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1997), affid on
reargument, 1997 WL 107462 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1997); Bonondona v. Stat
House, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 0788 (JES)(LB), 1997 WL 43614 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
1997) (cross motions); Kahre-Richardes Family Foundation, Inc. v.
Village of Baldwinsville, 953 F. Supp. 39 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Lancaster v.
Zufle, 170 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Chauvet v. Local 1199 Drug,
Hospital, & Health Care Employees Union, Nos. 96 Civ. 2934 (SS), 96
* Some cases involved cross-motions for Rule 11 sanctions filed by both plaintiff and
defendant. In those situations, two motions were counted in the total of ninety-seven
reached here.
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Civ. 4622 (SS), 1996 WL 665610 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1996); Wright v.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, No. 95 CIV 7970 (MGC),
1996 WL 447773 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1996); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears
Realty Co., 932 F. Supp. 392 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Binghamton Masonic
Temple, Inc. v. Bares, 168 F.R.D. 121 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Provident Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Vergara, No. 91 Civ. 5657 KTD, RLE, 1995 WL
746379 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1995); Chi v. Age Group, Ltd., No. 94 CIV 4253
(AGS), 1995 WL 564159 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995); Bowler v. United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 901 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); O'Brien v. Alexander, 898 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (cross
motions); Photocircuits Corp. v. Marathon Agents, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 449
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (cross motions); Gray v. Millea, 892 F. Supp. 432
(N.D.N.Y. 1995); Anyanwu v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 887 F.
Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); D'Orange v. Feely, 877 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
THIRD CIRCUIT (12): Brunner v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 612
(D.N.J. 2001); Clement v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 122 F. Supp.
2d 551 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales
Practices Litigation, 63 F. Supp. 2d 516 (D.N.J. 1999); Cannon v. Cherry
Hill Toyota, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 147 (D.N.J. 1999) (cross motions); Hockley v.
Shan Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 19 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 1998);
Kleinpaste v. United States Internal Revenue Service, No. 970884, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22377 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 1997); Lopez v. Constantine,
Nos. 94 CIV 5981 DAB SEG, 95 CIV 5915 DAB SEG, 1997 WL 793595
(E.D. Pa. June 18, 1997); Lal v. Borough of Kennett Square, 935 F. Supp.
570 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Progress Federal Savings Bank v. Lenders Ass'n, No.
CIV A 94-7425, 1996 WL 57942 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1996); Watson v. City of
Salem, 934 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.J. 1995); Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96
(D.N.J. 1994).
FIFTH CIRCUIT (9): Porter v. Milliken & Michael, Inc., No. 99-0199,
2001 WL 104769 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2001); Seal v. Gateway Cos. of
Delaware, No. 01-1322, 2001 WL 1018362 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2001);
Laughlin v. Falcon Operators, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-1484, 2001 WL 474282
(E.D. La. May 3, 2001); Muhammad v. Louisiana, Nos. CIV A. 99-3742,
CIV A. 99-2694, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18807 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2000); Riley
v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 2 F. Supp. 2d 864 (S.D. Miss. 1997);
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. United States, 966 F. Supp. 1453 (S.D.
Miss. 1997) (cross motions); Tolbert v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No.
20021
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GA3-96-CV-0428-R, 1997 WL 135606 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 1997); Prewitt v.
Alexander, 173 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
SIXTH CIRCUIT (7): Miller v. Credit Collection Services, 200 F.R.D. 379
(S.D. Ohio 2000) (cross motions); Simmons v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp.,
No. 99-CV-76093-DT, 2000 WL 424198 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2000);
Neighbors Concerned About Yacht Club Expansion v. Grosse Pointe
Yacht Club, No. 99-70325, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8646 (E.D. Mich. May 26,
1999); Allied Mechanical Services, Inc. v. Local 337 of the United
Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe
Fitting Industry, No. 4:98-CV-113, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4654 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 30, 1999); Two Men & a Truck/International Inc. v. Two Men
& a Truck/Kalamazoo, Inc., No. 5-94-CV-62, 1996 WL 740540 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 16, 1996); Kratage v. Charter Township of Commerce, 926 F.
Supp. 102 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
SEVENTH CIRCUIT (19): Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Theobold,
No. IPOO-03250C-M/S, 2001 WL 484181 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2001); Bryant v.
Polston, No. IPOO-1064-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1670938 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2000)
(cross motions); Klefstad Companies, Inc. v. New Boston Allison Ltd.
Partnership, No. IP98-0771-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1469701 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29,
2000); Cox v. Preferred Technical Group, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 786 (N.D.
Ind. 2000); Northlake Marketing & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, S.A., 194
F.R.D. 633 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Smith v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,
No. 95 C 5903, 2000 WL 549483 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2000); Dearborn
Financial Services Corp. v. Heath, No. 98CV5222, 1999 WL 1011860 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 30, 1999); Harding University v. Consulting Services Group,
L.P., 48 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. I1.1999); Birch v. Kim, 977 F. Supp. 926
(S.D. Ind. 1997); Cooper v. Chicago Transit Authority, No. 95 C 2616,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5299 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 1997); Vildaver v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Nos. 94 C 3041, 94 C 3143, 1997 WL
7562 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1997); Smith v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Lerch v. Boyer, 929 F. Supp. 319
(N.D. Ind. 1996); Erg v. Stern, No. 94 C 3729, 1996 WL 131743 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 11, 1996); Sethness-Greenleaf, Inc. v. Green River Corp., Nos. 89 C
9203, 91 C 4313, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13796 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1995);
Religious Order of St. Matthew v. Brennan, No. 3:92-CV-793 RM, 1995
WL 555102 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 1995); Gazouski v. Belvidere, No. 93 C
20157, 1995 WL 149438 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1995); Israel Travel Advisory
Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., No. 92 C 2379, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 751 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 26,1994).
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NINTH CIRCUIT (8): Truesdell v. Southern California Permanente
Medical Group, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Kibbee v. City of
Portland, No. CV-98-615-ST, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17205 (D. Or. Oct. 12,
2000); McMahon v. Best, No. C-00-00616 CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10872 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2000); Ex rel Eitel v. Reagan, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1151
(D. Ariz. 1998); Fat T, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Associates Piers 7, 8, 9, 172
F.R.D. 411 (D. Haw. 1996); Curl v. Wilson, No. C9302376 FMS, 1994 WL
323998 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 1994); Religious Technology Center v.
Gerbode, No. 93-2226 AWT, 1994 WL 228607 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 1994);
Dunn v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 850 F. Supp. 853 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
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APPENDIX 4: REDUCTION IN RULE 11 ACTIVITY-DISTRICT COURT CASES
A total of four searches were conducted, one for the Central District
of California and one for the Northern District of California, for each of
the five-year time periods. The following natural language searches in
the California Federal District Courts database on LEXIS were used:
"Rule 11" "Fed. R. Civ. P. 11" "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11"; a
field restriction for the northern district or the central district was
selected for each search. All of the cites were then reviewed by my
research assistant, Kristin M. Schuh, to make sure that the cases cited
below did in fact deal with the applicable version of Rule 11. Subsequent
history was not checked for any of the cases cited because the purpose of
collecting this data was simply to test a hypothesis-has Rule 11 use
declined in these two federal district courts since the 1993 amendments
to the Rule? In short, I was merely interested in raw numbers. Whether
any of the cases cited were ultimately modified or even reversed on
appeal, therefore, had no bearing on the hypothesis being tested.
1983 Version: January 1, 1986-December 31, 1991
CENTRAL DISTRICT (23): Zogbi v. Federated Department Store, 767 F.
Supp. 1037 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 137 F.R.D.
310 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Refac International, Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 141 F.R.D.
281 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, No. CV 83-5846 (CBM)(Bx), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19578 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 26, 1991); In re All Terrain Vehicle Litigation, 771 F. Supp. 1057
(C.D. Cal. 1991); Sayatovic v. United States, No. SA CV 90-641 AHS, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15576 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1990); Grantham v. United
States, No. SA CV89-755 AHS, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11568 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 20, 1990); Bloom v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1553
(C.D. Cal. 1990); Dentsply Research & Development Corp. v. Cadco
Dental Products, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1039 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Griffith v.
Martech International, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1989); DNIC
Brokerage Co. v. Morrison & Dempsey Communications, Inc., 14
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Lentz v. Woolley, No. 89-0805 JGD,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12651 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 1989); Pasillas v.
McDonald's Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1880 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Altmanshofer v.
TRW, Inc., 95 B.R. 729 (C.D. Cal. 1988); National Yellow Pages Services
Ass'n v. O'Connor Agency, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1516 (C.D. Cal. 1988);
Greene v. Meeder, No. CV87-2621 CBM (Kx), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14958
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1987); Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., No.
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CV85-4225-PAR, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14132 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1987);
Mercury Service, Inc. v. Allied Bank of Texas, 117 F.R.D. 147 (C.D. Cal.
1987); Clayton v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group, No. CV85-5957-WMB, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13497 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1987); Misa Manufacturing, Inc.
v. Pacific Egg & Poultry Association, No. CV 86-1495 AHS, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14471 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1987); S.O.S. Inc, v. Payday, Inc., 1
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1573 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Group
Systems International Far East, Ltd., 109 F.R.D. 594 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
NORTHERN DISTRICT (52): Anderson v. California Republican Party,
No. C-91-2091 MHP, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18246 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26,
1991); Premier Commercial Corp., Ltd. v. FMC Corp., 139 F.R.D. 670
(N.D. Cal. 1991); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. C-91-
1420-DLJ, 1991 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 20180 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1991); Integral
Systems, Inc. v. Peoplesoft, Inc., No. C-90-2598-DLJ, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20878 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1991); Blood v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., Nos. C 89-1442 RFP, C 89-02906 RFP, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9905 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 1991); In re Hayes Mircrocomputer Products, Inc.
Patent Litigation, 766 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Wolfe v. Langford,
No. C-90-3500-DLJ, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5581 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 1991);
Taylor v. Logic Devices, Inc., No. 89-20781, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2574
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 1991); Louisville v. Armored Transportation of
California, No. C-90-0266 RFP, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2523 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
26, 1991); Basel v. Allstate Insurance Co., 757 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Cal. 1991);
Stuckey v. Bar Ass'n, Nos. C-90-2409 FMS, C-90-2486 FMS, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1004 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1991); Luxor California Exports Corp.
v. RTM Navigation, Inc., No. C-88-2796 JPV (FJW), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13676 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1990); United States v. City and County of San
Francisco, 132 F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Carter v. United States, 66
A.F.T.R. 2d 5597 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediaamerica,
Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1769 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Geurin v. Department of the
Army, No. C-89-3980 MHP, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7748 (N.D. Cal. May
16, 1990); Marine Terminals Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co., No. C 89-4557 MHP, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7856 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1990); Heinz v. Operating Engineers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, No.
C-88-2472-DLJ, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7779 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1990); In re
Orosco v. Orosco, No. C-89-2875 MHP, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19288 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 20, 1990); Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp.
1542 (N.D. Cal. 1990); American States Insurance Co. v. Pinto, No. C
892469 SC, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7778 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1990); Cenlin
Taiwan Ltd. v. Centon Ltd., No. C884947 DLJ, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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4558 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 1990); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Burke, 741 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Technical Equities
Federal Securities Litigation, Civil No. C-86-20157(A)-WAI, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18405 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1989); In re Centennial Savings &
Loan Ass'n Litigation, No. 87-1197 RHS, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10675
(N.D. Cal. July 31, 1989); Coman v. International Playtex, Inc., 713 F.
Supp. 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1989); National Computer, Ltd. v. Tower
Industries, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 281 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Kirkbride v.
Continental Casualty Co., 707 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Gonick v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 711 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Cal. 1988); STX,
Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Saratoga Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Tate, No. C-87-20603 WAI, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16573
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1988); Royal Service, Inc. v. Goody Products, Inc, No.
C88-2758 TEH, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15540 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 1988);
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc.,
121 F.R.D. 402 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Roberts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); The Movie 1 & 2 v. United Artists Communications, Inc., No.
C 86-20390 RPA, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11396 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1988);
Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 677 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1988);
Modine Manufacturing Co. v. The Allen Group, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1922
(N.D. Cal. 1987); Spectravest, Inc. v. Mervyn's, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1486
(N.D. Cal. 1987); Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal.
1987); Elxsi v. Kukje America Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
Roberts v. Heim, No. C 84-8069, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15868 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 5, 1987); Roberts v. Heim, No. C 84-8069 TEH, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15869 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 1987); Garcia v. Hudson Lumber Co., 679 F.
Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal. 1987); National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v.
Turange, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Dutt v. United Airlines, Inc.,
No. C-86-3229 MHP, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14908 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20,
1987); Worrell v. Uniforms to You & Co., 673 F. Supp. 1461 (N.D. Cal.
1987); Blankenberg v. Commerical Insurance Co., 655 F. Supp. 223 (N.D.
Cal. 1987); American Metal Products, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers
International Ass'n Local Union No. 104, 124 L.R.R.M. 2950 (N.D. Cal.
1986); Van Cleve v. United States, No. C 85-7053, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30957 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1986); Northern California Food Employers &
Retail Clerks Unions Benefit Fund v. Dianda's Italian-American Patry
Co., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Cal. 1986); In re Diasonics Securities
Litigation, No. C-83-4584 RFP, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22750 (N.D. Cal.
July 15, 1986); Johnson v. Smith, 630 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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1993 Version: January 1, 1996-December 31, 2001
CENTRAL DISTRICT (17): Hart v. Baca, 204 F.R.D. 456 (C.D. Cal. 2001);
Truesdell v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 151 F.
Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Ulead System, Inc. v. Lex Computer &
Management Corp., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2001); McAnally
Enterprises v. McAnally, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (C.D. Cal. 2000);
Bermudez v. United States Department of Housing & Urban
Development, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Davis v. Prentiss
Properties Ltd., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Velez v. Mohiuddin,
84 A.F.T.R. 2d 99-6162, (C.D. Cal. 1999); Digital Communications
Network, Inc. v. AB Cellular Holding LLC, No. 99-5418 CM (AJWx), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15107 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1999); Toxic Injuries Corp. v.
Safety-Kleen Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 947 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Continental
Airlines, Inc. v. Weiner, No. CV 98-10334 DT(ex), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16377 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 1999); Fields v. Gates, 184 F.R.D. 342 (C.D. Cal.
1999); Gealer v. United States, 82 A.F.T.R. 2d 98-5669 (C.D. Cal. 1998);
Robinson v. City of San Bernardino Police Department, 992 F. Supp. 1198
(C.D. Cal. 1998); Cable & Computer Technology v. Lockheed Saunders,
Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646 (C.D. Cal. 1997); ADO Finance, AG, v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 938 F. Supp. 590 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Remington
Investments, Inc. v. Kadenacy, 930 F. Supp. 446 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Stussy
v. United States, No. CV 95-7882-WMB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6664 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 16, 1996).
NORTHERN DISTRICT (37): Emma C. v. Eastin, No. C-96-4179 TEH,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2001); Rooz Abras
Eftekhari v. Peregrine Financials & Securities, No. C 00-3594 JL, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16087 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2001); Terflinger v. Winslow, No. C
00-1631 CRB (PR), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15442 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2001);
Hill Physicians Medical Group, Inc. v. PacifiCare of California, No. C 01-
0318 SI, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6051 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2001); Burgess v.
City and County of San Francisco, No. C 00-4198 CRB, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3184 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2001); Uriarte v. R & J Machinery, No. C
00-03196 WHA, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18084 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2000);
Quigley v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Administration,
No. C 00-1661 CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11957 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14,
2000); Bader v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 195 F.R.D. 659 (N.D. Cal.
2000); McMahon v. Best, No. C-00-00616, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10872
(N.D. Cal. July 28, 2000); Braun v. California Bureau of State Audits, No.
C 994841 VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10072 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2000);
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Kotakis v. Gruntal & Co., No. C97-0202 CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10094
(N.D. Cal. July 11, 2000); Woodward v. Goodwin, No. C 99-1103 MJJ,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7642 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000); Travelers Indemnity
Co. v. Navigators Insurance Co., No. C 99-4509 CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6702 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2000); Abito v. United Airline, No. C99-
0085 SC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5912 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2000); Salazar v.
Golden State Warriors, No. C-99-4825 CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2366
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000); Royce International Broadcasting Corp. v. Field,
No. C99-4169 SI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2369 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2000);
Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., Nos. C-99-1047 MHP, C-99-1048 MHP, C-99-
1049 MHP, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22305 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 1999);
Gemisys Corp. v. Phoenix Americans, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 551 (N.D. Cal.
1999); Paciulan v. George, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Taylor v.
Central Contra Costa Transit Authority, No. C 98-4030 CRB, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1205 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 1999); Copperstone v. TCSI Corp.,
No. C 97-3495 SBA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1999);
Vigil v. Walt Disney Co., No. C-97-4147 MHP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22853 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1998); County of Sonoma v. Bisso, No. C-98-3225
SI, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17861 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1998); Hancock v. Hitt,
No. C-98-960 MMC, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10058 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
1998); Ghorbani v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., No. C97-2730 FMS, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7789 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 1998); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, No. C98-0365 CAL, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6215 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
29, 1998); McCormick v. Travelers Insurance Co., No. C98-0641 TEH,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6054 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1998); Herships v. Maher,
No. C-97-3114 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2880 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1998);
VSL Corp. v. General Technologies, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1356 (N.D. Cal. 1998);
On Command Video Corp. v. Lodgenet Entertainment Corp., 976 F.
Supp. 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Giovanni v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., No. C-95-
4259 MMC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14004 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1997); Grecco
v. Sanofi Winthrop Pharmaceuticals, No. C-96-3876 FMS, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23391 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1997); Minden v. City of Monte Sereno,
Civil No. 96-20362 SW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25,
1996); Salvioli v. Continental Insurance Co., No. C 96-0630 FMS, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13094 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1996); Cariveau v. Farmers
New World Life Insurance Co., No. C-95-1583 MHP, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12360 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1996); Sonsten v. Moreno, No. C-95-1941
MHP, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12030 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 1996); Cinquini v.
Donohoe, No. C 95-4168 FMS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2131 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
7, 1996).
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Total Cases
Plaintiff/attorney t
Plaintiff sanctions i
Plaintiff sanctions
Defendant/attome
Defendant sanctior
Defendant sanctior
Rule II
APPENDIX 5: SUMMARY OF CASES BY CATEGORY
DISTRICT COURTS
Type of Case*
Contract Other Civil Rights Person
Commercial Injur
14 24 37 14
arget 9 16 30 12
moosed 3 2 19 2
10
2
lenied
y target
is imposed
ns denied
Total Cases
Plaintiff/attorney target
Plaintiff sanctions imposed
Plaintiff affirmed
Plaintiff reversed
Defendant/attorney target
Defendant sanctions imposed
Defendant affirmed
Defendant reversed
APPELLATE COURTS
Type of Case*
Contract Other Civil Rights
Commercial
9 12 16
5 10 15
3 10 13
1 5 6
2 8 8
3 2
159
Total
89
al
Total
40
Personal
Injury
3
3
2
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DISTRICT & APPELLATE COURT TOTALS
Type of Case*
Contract Other Civil Rights
Commercial
Total Cases
Plaintiff/attorney target
Plaintiff sanctions imposed
Defendant/ attorney target
Defendant sanctions imposed
Plaintiff/ attorney target
Plaintiff sanctions imposed
Defendant attorney target
Defendant sanctions imposed
23 36 53 17 129**
14 26 45 15 99
6 12 32
9 10
3 3
61% 72%
43% 46%
39% 28%
4 53
2 30
0 8
88% 77%
27% 54%
12% 23%
0% 27%
* The categories used here reflect the ones used in the AJS study. See
generally Marshall, supra note 10, at 965. Of the four categories, only
"other commercial" was specifically defined as combining commercial
litigation, antitrust, corporation law, banking law, insurance coverage,
lender liability, securities, dealership and franchise, copyright, patents,
and other intellectual property, and trademarks. Id.
** One hundred and thirty-five cases were collected for this Article. In
several instances, however, it was not possible to tell what the type of
case was from the opinion. Hence, the total reflected in Appendix 4 is
one hundred and twenty-nine.
Personal
Injury
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